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Directly or indirectly, poetry produced in the postmodern era is implicated in the 
politics of the time. Postmodern American poetry, then, is not reducible to a single poetic 
mode or to a specific set of stylistic features. In other words, a more comprehensive 
understanding of postmodern American poetry can be made by employing a flexible 
version of Raymond Williams’ notion of uneven development, a theory that insists on the 
synchronic existence of dominant, residual, and emergent cultural elements. As the 
stylistically and politically diverse work of the six poets—Susan Howe, Robert Grenier, 
Gary Snyder, A.R. Ammons, Sherman Alexie, and Kenneth Goldsmith—examined in 
this dissertation illustrates, postmodernism is a period in which multiple modes or 







Postmodern poetry, to appropriate a phrase from Linda Hutcheon, “cannot but be 
political” (The Politics of Postmodernism 3). Perhaps a poem flows with postmodernism, 
perhaps it fights against it, perhaps it attempts to ignore it, or maybe it evidences a 
combination or even a potentially contradictory mixture of these positions. Regardless, 
poetry produced in the postmodern era is implicated, directly or indirectly, in the politics 
of the time. In this sense, postmodern American poetry is not reducible to a single poetic 
mode or to a specific set of stylistically experimental features, as many critics have 
claimed. Instead, as the diverse work of the six poets examined in this dissertation 
illustrates, postmodernism is a period in which multiple modes or versions of postmodern 
poetry exist and flourish within a culturally dominated system. In other words, I argue 
that a more comprehensive understanding of much postmodern poetry can be made by 
utilizing a flexible version of Raymond Williams’ notion of uneven development, a 
theory that insists on the synchronic existence of dominant, residual, and emergent 
cultural elements.  
As I argue in the first chapter, postmodernism is not dead. In fact, it is a distinct and 
ongoing historical period, increasing and intensifying like a wave moving toward a shore. 
A kind of energy, a process, it changes, crashes, and reforms. Recognition of its 
continued existence generates the ability to understand its influence, including its 
influence on poetry and the critical view of that poetry. As Douglas Kellner notes in 
“Reappraising the Postmodern: Novelties, Mapping, and Historical Narratives,” 
postmodernism engenders a “critical theory of the contemporary moment” that is 
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“transdisciplinary and multiperspectivist” (123). Historically, however, poetic scholarship 
has been resistant to this concept, a fact reflected in traditional forms of literary criticism, 
literary histories, and, less directly, in poetry anthologies. This resistance is also 
historically tied to a conception of poetry as a politically inert art and to a construction of 
literary merit that values aesthetics over politics. This complex but nonetheless definable 
history, which I discuss at length in the first chapter, helps to explain numerous 
constructions of postmodern American poetry in purely aesthetic terms, most often as an 
experimental style. Altering this view, I argue for a broader and more flexible 
understanding of postmodern poetry, one that construes it as part of an historical period. 
Such an understanding not only accounts for the proliferation of diverse styles during the 
postmodern era but also creates space for a closer examination of poetry’s relationship to 
the dominant culture.  
In short, the first and remaining chapters constitute a kind of guide to walking the 
uneven and politically enmeshed landscape of postmodern American poetry, a term itself 
that is filled with numerous contradictions. Its various chapters represent examinations of 
some of the directions of postmodern American poetry over the past 70 or so years, along 
with their attendant politics. There is also a kind of periodizing in the author selections, 
beginning with Language Writing and the poetry of Robert Grenier and Susan Howe, 
whose work, along with the movement as a whole, significantly challenged the collusive 
efforts of publishers, universities, critics, and other institutions in their manufacturing and 
maintenance of a dominant aesthetic. In addition, Language Poetry also offered a 
symptomatic expression of a need to challenge the commodification and ownership of 
language by the dominant culture, particularly by corporations, media, and the purveyors 
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of history. Despite its current and inevitable incorporation and dilution, its varied poetries, 
historically speaking, still represent a largely oppositional and therefore emergent 
postmodern poetic practice.  
Considering that discussions of postmodern poetry are often limited to an 
examination of literary style, the third chapter is devoted to the work of Gary Snyder and 
A.R. Ammons, poets who are only selectively labeled as postmodern as a consequence of 
their association with the institutionally dominant aesthetic mode. However, careful 
consideration of the politics of their work reveals that both poets simultaneously engage 
with residual elements of the culture as well as various emergent postmodern social 
movements, especially those with origins in the anti-authoritarian politics of the 1960s, 
particularly deep ecology. In other words, despite writing in an aesthetic mode that is not 
typically considered postmodern and engaging in a complex politics that stands in direct 
opposition to the values of the larger culture, the transdisciplinary and heteroglossic work 
of these poets is undoubtedly postmodern.    
The final chapter, which takes up the work of Sherman Alexie and Kenneth 
Goldsmith, is representative of yet another direction in the history of postmodern 
American poetry and poetics. Both poets engage with culturally dominant forms, 
although in radically different fashions, and both challenge the institutionally dominant 
aesthetic mode. Alexie, for example, through the postmodern practice of parody and 
politicized pastiche, engages and challenges multiple poetic modes as well as the 
inherited values of domination and colonization. Goldsmith’s work, on the other hand, is 
intimately tied to an emergent technoculture and the reality of inundation and excess. 
Adopting a primarily conceptual practice, his aesthetics and politics are framed as a 
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response to this postmodern condition. Finally, both Alexie and Goldsmith inspire 
reflection on the history of cultural and institutional privilege and exclusion, although 
Goldsmith, unlike Alexie, does so unwittingly.  
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CHAPTER 1. TOWARD A THEORY OF POSTMODERNITY IN AMERICAN 
POETRY 
 
It is not possible to write the history of contemporary 
American poetry, though it is, of course, worthwhile to 
attempt to historicize the present. 
               --Hank Lazer, Opposing Poetries  
 
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in postmodernism, 
challenging numerous reports of its death. As the entry on postmodernism in The 
Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics reads, “The definition and history of 
postmodernism have both been highly contested; postmodernism was declared dead 
shortly after it came into being, yet it appears to be still with us” (Hutcheon et al. 1095). 
In Literary Criticism in the 21st Century (2014), Vincent Leitch notes, “I’ve been 
surprised to see a spate of books and articles on postmodernism published in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century” (121). He goes on to say, “Following its highpoint in 
the 1990s, marked by the publication of Fredric Jameson’s landmark book, 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), interest in this topic 
has gradually waned only to come back now. It’s a question of survivance” (121). 
Following the return, Leitch provides an account and critique of several recent texts on 
the concept, while also offering a brief history of its use, arguing that “we still reside in 
the postmodern era with no end in sight” (121), although he insists that clearer definitions 
and descriptions of the “distinct phases” (122) of the period are needed. To that end, he 
charts four turning points, beginning with 1973 and the “establishment of a new global 
monetary regime of floating currencies marking a shift away from Keynesian Welfare 
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State economics” (122). In addition, he isolates the “dissolution of the USSR” in 1989, 
the “onset of Empire’s endless global war on terror” in 2001, and a fourth phase, 
beginning in 2011, “characterized by growing demands for political freedom, social 
justice, and economic fairness” (122). As for the latest phase, Leitch draws attention to its 
numerous Occupy movements, and although not specifically noted, Black Lives Matter, 
WikiLeaks, and Anonymous serve as important examples as well, despite that the latter 
two movements were founded in earlier moments. In addition, Leitch characterizes 
arguments about the end of postmodernism as an “unconvincing countercurrent troubled 
by the absence of anything to take its place” (124), and he contends that without 
postmodernism as a periodizing concept, “contemporary history appears haphazard, 
chaotic, and atomized” (122). He recognizes and acknowledges, of course, that the “term 
‘postmodern’ has long been employed in three different yet overlapping ways—as a style, 
a philosophy or movement, and a period” (121). Nonetheless, the “period concept has 
long encompassed postmodern style and postmodern philosophy following Jameson’s 
widely accepted broad usage” (122). In other terms, as Jameson argues in Postmodernism, 
“If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a 
view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host 
of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable” (6). Distinct from other eras, the 
driving force of this “cultural dominant” is far from singular, though its reference point is 
decidedly economic. 
 In Post-Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism, 
Jeffrey Nealon extends Jameson’s argument while adopting his methods of inquiry and 
analysis. Echoing the language of Jameson’s famous text, he argues that “post-
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postmodernism marks an intensification and mutation within postmodernism” (ix), since 
“capitalism itself is the thing that’s intensified most radically since Jameson began doing 
his work on postmodernism in the 1970s and ’80s” (x). Nealon’s nomenclature is 
questionable; an F5 tornado on the Fujita scale is still a tornado. His theory of 
intensification, however, is well-founded. Thinking of the economic collapse of 2008 and 
the slew of government bailouts that followed, Nealon writes, “Ultimately, these bailouts 
were not the abandonment of free-market ideology, but simply the other face of the 
privatized, free-market coin we’ve become so familiar with since the 1980s” (2). In 
particular, Nealon is thinking of the “now-ubiquitous ‘corporatization’ of large sectors of 
American life: welfare, media, public works, prisons, and education” (3). The transition 
from the economy and market demands of the ’80s is one of intensification rather than 
alteration, at least in a fundamental sense: “In the move from Fordism to post-Fordism 
and beyond, capital has become increasingly deterritorialized, floating flexibly free from 
production processes, and coming to rest more centrally in the orbit of symbolic 
exchange and information technologies” (20). Increases, intensifications, and 
concentrations of postmodern capitalist imperatives are readily apparent and distinctly 
observable in many areas of the culture: dissolving, merging, downsizing, outsourcing, 
corporatizing, privatizing, commodifying, globalizing, speculating, union busting. 
Valuing profit over social welfare, the current system of late capitalism, which might also 
be labeled finance capitalism or casino capitalism, “seeks primarily to saturate and 
deepen—intensify—its hold over existing markets, insofar as global capitalism . . . has 
run out of territories to conquer” (26). The exploitation and domination of markets, 
people, and the environment is now more common than ever, confirming Jameson’s 
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contention in the early 1990s that “this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture 
is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military 
and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, 
the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror” (Postmodernism 5). In this 
obvious way, postmodernism, as Nealon relates, is “not a thing of the past . . . precisely 
because it’s hard to understand today as anything other than an intensified version of 
yesterday” (8). Or, as Jameson notes in his postscript to a recent collection of essays on 
postmodernism, “[W]hatever the changes in nomenclature, we can be sure that the third 
stage of capitalism, as it is expressed in globalization and postmodernity alike, will still 
be with us for a bit longer” (Postmodernism. What Moment? 216). 
The current intensification and expansion of the system of late capitalism is 
symptomatically reflected in many areas and institutions of postmodern American 
culture—a culture characterized by proliferation, inundation, and the dissolution of 
formerly distinct boundaries, both real and artificial. At the university, for example, the 
discrete definitions of academic disciplines no longer hold. Studying literature now 
entails studying history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, religion, linguistics, and 
various kinds of theory and cultural criticism, much of which goes in and out of fashion. 
Information is turned out and over at ever-increasing rates, as the new, in line with the 
logic of planned obsolescence, is increasingly valued. In addition, burdens of all kinds are 
concentrated and extended. Following the structure and imperatives of the larger 
corporate culture, presidents and administrators enjoy top-dollar salaries and generous 
benefit plans, endowments are treated as investment funds, students accrue almost 
unimaginable debt, academic departments undergo downsizing, reorganization, and 
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elimination, tenured faculty endure pay cuts and dwindling pensions, and, as Marc 
Bousquet relates in How the University Works, “undergraduate education is conducted by 
a superexploited corps of disposable workers” who often collect “wages and benefits 
inferior to those of fast-food clerks and bell-hops” (2-3). Despite resistance, these trends 
are increasing. 
 The cultural arts are no exception to the trends and standards of the dominant 
culture. In music, the proliferation of genres, sub-genres, and sub-sub-genres, each 
building up and expanding out into even more forms, and its rapid dissemination by a 
broad range of corporate online services, all of which grossly underpay artists, has 
created a condition of disaggregation and inundation that makes music, or even a single 
genre, simply unknowable. In the face of so much, maps and guides are needed. In 
addition, in this environment, music is experienced as a temporary stream; songs are 
favored over albums. Short-term enjoyment, the thrill and addictive quality of immediate 
consumption, is preferred. Connection is tenuous; obsolescence is both planned and 
inevitable. This, of course, says nothing of the music itself, which, as with many other 
cultural artifacts, pays little attention to history, tradition, labels, or aesthetic categories in 
its presentation of the “new.” Jameson’s insistence that “aesthetic production has become 
integrated into commodity production” and that the “frantic economic urgency of 
producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods . . . assigns an increasingly 
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation” 
(Postmodernism 4-5) now rings particularly true, as the transition from an economy of 
production to consumption appears nearly complete. Bolstered and emboldened by 
various kinds of digital outlets and media platforms, a similar argument could be made 
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about video, gaming, television, and film. Of course, the new is rarely new. Reproduction 
and recycling, forms of assemblage, are emblematic of the era, as the seemingly endless 
stream of film remakes and sequels demonstrates. In the case of much film, in fact, there 
is the real feeling that postmodernism really does have nowhere to turn but to the past.           
Intensification, proliferation, concentration, disaggregation, dissolution, and 
inundation are terms that equally describe postmodern American poetry. In an entry on 
his influential poetry blog, Ron Silliman offers a short history and analysis of American 
poetry anthologies, insisting that Donald Allen’s The New American Poetry, published in 
1960, is “still the most successful volume in the genre.” More importantly, he notes that 
when Allen published his now-classic anthology, he chose from a relatively small pool of 
poets: “It included 44 post-avant poets at a time when no contemporaneous account of the 
total number of publishing U.S. poets estimated more than 100. In hindsight, I think those 
estimates were low and that a more reasonable figure in 1960 would have been 
somewhere between 200 and 500, but certainly not more than that latter tally.” He goes 
on to say, “A half century later, there are well over 10,000 poets publishing in English in 
the U.S., a sum that is at least 20 times—and conceivably 100 times—the number active 
when Allen pulled together his book.” This is a staggering figure that provokes feelings 
of confusion, unease, and, as with other cultural industries, a general sense of the field as 
unknowable. Needless to say, some method of reading, of understanding, and, 
importantly, of contending with the sheer scale, a kind of map, guide, or theory, is needed. 
As Silliman relates, “[T]he field itself has become so large & diverse that new tools, and 
new levels of specificity, are required to make sense of it.” This is unquestionably true. 
At the same time, without a larger guide or map that offers a general sense of the 
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institution of poetry as well as its diverse modes and tendencies, specificity, to 
appropriate Jameson, will undoubtedly engender a view of the current state of 
postmodern American poetry as “sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence 
of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable” (Postmodernism 6).  
In Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Jameson insists that 
the “dominant cultural logic” of postmodernism is also the “force field in which very 
different kinds of cultural impulses—what Raymond Williams has usefully termed 
‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ forms of cultural production—must make their way” (6). 
Development, in other terms, is uneven. As Vincent Leitch relates in Literary Criticism in 
the 21st Century, “[P]ostmodern times describe an eclectic postindustrial era of pluralism 
and disaggregation, of hybrids and fusions, accompanied unsurprisingly by nostalgia, 
currents, and backlashes” (122). Following Williams and Jameson, then, one method of 
charting the history and present condition of postmodern American poetry is through the 
general framework of the dominant, the residual, and the emergent—a postmodern map 
rooted in postmodern methods of analysis and historiography. This is not, of course, to 
suggest a blind devotion to Williams’ model or Jameson’s landmark text, as the following 
pages and chapters will make clear. Nonetheless, the logic of this specific methodology, 
which construes postmodernism as an era, requires both contextualization and 
examination. 
With little question, literary history is a complex and uncertain affair. At the same 
time, there is a historical and cultural imperative to delineate moments of transition and 
to chart the various directions and manifestations such moments originate. This 
imperative is not without its complications, as literary histories are implicated in and 
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directed by a broad range of social, cultural, and academic politics, including theoretical 
affiliation. Literary histories, in this sense, can be defined not only for what they engage 
but also for what they leave out. Histories of American poetry and poetics bear out this 
premise. However, traditionally, these histories, under the pretense of a claim to textual 
immanence and “high” art, have been adept at concealing social, cultural, and academic 
biases. In other words, steeped in the politics of close reading and its naturally 
accompanying concept of literary value, texts such as David Perkins’ A History of 
Modern Poetry or Rosenthal and Gall’s The Modern Poetic Sequence, to use two classic 
examples in the history of American poetry criticism, occlude, subjugate, and marginalize, 
often on the basis of race and gender, in an attempt to establish a normative vision of 
American poetic history. And although operating on slightly different terms, Donald 
Allen’s New American Poetry might be considered here as well. Of the 44 poets included 
in his anthology, only four were women.  
Despite the decline of the New Criticism in the 1970s, more recent literary 
histories of American poetry have similarly avoided addressing and evaluating important 
political and cultural questions, expressing, as Maria Damon frames it, an “anachronistic 
reluctance to speak of poetry in other than formal or thematic terms” (“Postliterary Poetry” 
36). For example, Marjorie Perloff’s Unoriginal Genius, published in 2010, is clearly 
informed by postmodernism as a “cultural dominant,” to use Fredric Jameson’s term, but 
it nonetheless fails to move beyond a largely “artistic” exegesis of postmodern American 
poetry. In fact, much of the work on postmodernism and poetry, postmodern poetry, and 
the postmodern in poetry focuses almost exclusively on the aesthetic similarities and 
differences between modern and postmodern poetry. Needless to say, these similarities 
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and differences are important literary and historical considerations, but, as Carrie Noland 
insists in “Poetry at Stake: Blaise Cendrars, Cultural Studies, and the Future of Poetry in 
the Literature Classroom,” the model itself confirms the tendency of poetic scholarship to 
present poetry as “innately beyond the political, impervious to the pressures of its 
occasion, and thus ontological in the sense that its value is not subject to change” (41). 
Paul Hoover, Jonathan Holden, Jon Erickson, Eliot Weinberger, and Helen Vendler 
might be criticized along similar lines.1 Unfortunately, the depoliticized positions of these 
literary critics and historians do not fairly account for American poetry in the postmodern 
period, an era in which all art, to quote Linda Hutcheon’s well-known claim, “cannot but 
be political” (The Politics of Postmodernism 3).    
Hutcheon suggests that all art in the postmodern era is ideologically situated, that 
aesthetics, artistic content, and cultural politics no longer exist in discrete spaces—a 
suggestion that invariably raises important questions about the political agency of 
postmodern art. However, the undeniably ideological nature of postmodernism—
extensively theorized by such cultural critics and postmodern theorists as Frederic 
Jameson, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, David Harvey, and Linda Hutcheon—
                                                
1 See Paul Hoover, ed., Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology (New York: 
Norton, 1994, 2013); Jonathan Holden, Style and Authenticity in Postmodern Poetry 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1986); Jon Erickson, The Fate of the 
Object:  From Modern Object to Postmodern Sign in Performance, Art, and Poetry (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Eliot Weinberger, ed., American Poetry 
Since 1950: Innovators and Outsiders (New York: Marsilio, 1993); and Helen Vendler, 
The Music of What Happens: Poems, Poets, Critics (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985). 
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demands that both histories and interpretations of postmodern American poetry be 
informed by both aesthetics and politics, both text and context. This is not to say that 
postmodernism does not, in many instances, signify a dramatic alteration in poetic 
practice or poetic substance, as this is certainly the case. It is to say, however, that much 
literary criticism and many literary histories obfuscate the relationship between poetry 
and various kinds of politics, therefore limiting and narrowly defining the concept of 
literary value. Such neglect reflects a systemic and systematic attempt to maintain an idea 
of American poetry as a purely aesthetic practice, and one, therefore, free from political 
implication or political aspiration.    
      Postmodernism, however, is not simply a style or an aesthetic. It is essential, as 
Frederic Jameson insists, “to grasp postmodernism not as a style but as a cultural 
dominant: a conception which allows for the presence and coexistence of a range of very 
different, yet subordinate, features” (Postmodernism 4). This simultaneity of difference 
and subordination—a variation of Williams’ notion of the dominant, the residual, and the 
emergent—no doubt inspires Jameson to claim that not all “cultural production today is 
‘postmodern’ in the broad sense I will be conferring on this term” (6). At the same time, 
Jameson’s conception of postmodernism as a cultural dominant establishes 
postmodernism as a “hegemonic norm” (6). To that end, Jameson implies that all cultural 
production in the postmodern era, beginning, for him, sometime in the middle to late 
1950s, be assessed within “a general modification of culture itself with the social 
restructuring of late capitalism as a system” (62). Postmodern poetic production, then, 
following Jameson, is unavoidably imbued with and implicated in the politics of late-
capitalist culture. Of course, these politics, as Jameson fails to make clear, are often 
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grounded and mediated by the politics of class, race, and gender, which does much to 
explain specific and general resistances to many of the dominant values of postmodern 
culture, most of which are intimately tied to the economic. In the context of postmodern 
American poetry, this raises a number of relevant and important questions and issues. 
      In the first case, this “modification of culture” suggests that poetic production in 
the postmodern era cannot be separated from larger cultural productions, including the 
artifacts of mass media, which results, of course, in the diminishment of poetry’s status as 
a “high” art. Postmodern poetic production is subject to the same laws of late 
capitalism—its wholesale commodification and participation in a new global economy—
along with the rest of postmodern culture. Definitions and boundaries of all kinds fall 
apart. This collision and collapse of formerly opposed cultural spaces, produces, at least 
in the most symptomatic cases, reflective aesthetic practices and poetic content. In light 
of these practices, questions also begin to emerge about the political agency, if not 
exigency, of postmodern poetry, and, to be sure, postmodern art in general. However, 
while critics and theorists from Frederic Jameson to Jean Baudrillard seem to have little 
faith in the possibility of a politically viable and critically aware art, other critics and no 
doubt poets recognize an ideologically positioned attempt to produce a critical art from 
within the culture of late capitalism, from within, in short, the postmodern condition.             
      This brand of postmodern American poetry, perhaps still most adequately 
represented in Language Poetry, or Language Writing, a movement that began in the 
early 1970s and reached its zenith in the late 1980s, and which includes the varied work 
of such poets as Lyn Hejinian, Bob Perelman, Charles Bernstein, Susan Howe, Ron 
Silliman, Bruce Andrews, Carla Harryman, Hannah Weiner, and Robert Grenier, is what 
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I consider as a primarily emergent postmodern mode, a point I will return to later. At the 
same time, this mode is by no means limited to Language Poetry, as it most certainly 
includes the formally experimental and/or politically progressive work of such poets as 
Gary Snyder, A.R. Ammons, Sherman Alexie, John Ashbery, Amiri Baraka, Ted 
Berrigan, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, Wanda Coleman, Clark Coolidge, Jayne Cortez, Ed 
Dorn, Kathleen Fraser, Erica Hunt, June Jordan, Amy King, Tan Lin, Nathaniel Mackey, 
Frank O’Hara, Ron Padgett, Norman Pritchard, and Joan Retallack, to name some. 
Nonetheless, the self-consciously experimental style of Language Poetry—characterized 
by new and often alarming syntagmatic structures, an extreme visibility of artifice, a 
mixing of seemingly distinct discourses, a metrical procedurality based, for example, on 
chance, and an often nonexistent, nondetectable, or fragmented subject matter—attempts 
to legitimize a poetic theory and practice rooted in the lessons of postmodernism. 
Recognizing the inextricability of aesthetics and politics, such writing is also invested in 
a postmodern politics that questions the aesthetic and ideological legacy of modernism 
and its contemporary remnants along with its challenge to the obdurate consumer-based 
values of late capitalism.        
Still, this raises the problem of where to place and how to historicize the poetry 
that doesn’t “look” postmodern. The first and most obvious solution is to deny the 
relevance and effectiveness of the term to deal with the art. Such a solution, however, is 
unacceptable, for at least two reasons. In the first place, denying the relevance of 
postmodernism as a cultural dominant suggests that postmodern poetry lacks essential 
aesthetic, political, cultural, and ideological differences from modernism. Second, what 
remains in this view is simply a celebration of (or lament for) cultural plurality, of 
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heterogeneity and difference, a denial of cultural transition, and, perhaps, a conception of 
poetry as a politically inert art removed from the culture in which it was produced. Again, 
a more plausible explanation can be made by employing Raymond Williams’ notion of 
uneven development, a theory which insists that, at any given historical moment, there 
are dominant, residual, and emergent cultural elements. Postmodern American poetry, in 
this sense, cannot be reduced to a set of stylistic features that might be freely adopted in 
service of creating a “postmodern” poem. Rather, as Williams’ historical and cultural 
model implies, postmodernism is a period in which multiple modes or versions of 
postmodern poetry obtain and flourish. 
Such a conception of the existence of different cultural forms within a culturally 
dominated system no doubt construes postmodernism as an era and not as a style. In 
addition, this conception of postmodern American poetry advances a postmodern 
historiography in favor of traditional literary and historiographic methods based primarily 
in textual and aesthetic models of interpretation. It also challenges the assumption that 
literary history alone is an adequate framework for exploring poetic value. As 
Christopher Beach argues, many literary histories of and works of criticism on 
postmodern American poetry—J.D. McClatchy’s White Paper: On Contemporary 
American Poetry, Jonathan Holden’s The Fate of American Poetry, Dana Gioia’s Can 
Poetry Matter?, or Vernon Shetley’s After the Death of American Poetry: Poet and 
Audience in Contemporary America, for example—operate within a “realm of ‘high’ or 
traditionally literary culture, leaving unexamined and unproblematized the significant 
relationship between poetry and other forms of culture and discourse” (Poetic Culture 15). 
In other words, traditional methods of historicizing poetry—whether explicitly in the 
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form of literary histories and literary criticism or indirectly in the form of poetry 
anthologies—leave out an investigation of political and cultural value. Often directed by 
taste, these normative-building and primarily textual and aesthetic-based historiographic 
models do not fairly account for the diversity or quality of postmodern American poetry. 
These points require elaboration.  
For many decades, histories of postmodern American poetry have sanctioned a 
specific model of literary historiography, one that has functioned to exclude, occlude, 
marginalize, and omit on the basis of literary merit, a value typically presented as 
objective, disinterested, and unmediated by politics of any kind. Generally speaking, this 
model has been situated in an aesthetic-based logic—inherited from the New Critics—
that insists on the supposedly inherent qualities of art. Harold Bloom, for instance, in 
“Criticism, Canon-Formation, and Prophecy: The Sorrows of Facticity,” contends that 
literary critics “can only confirm the self-canonization of the truly strong prophets and 
poets. What we cannot do is invent their canonization for them” (17). Here, Bloom 
presents a familiar line of historiographic logic, namely that poets establish themselves as 
part of the canon by virtue of their self-evident artistic excellence. Great poets and great 
poems, the argument suggests, simply exist, and the process of historicizing (and 
canonizing) is therefore ideologically innocent. Literary historiography, in this sense, is 
an apolitical practice that does little more than describe the aesthetic practices and literary 
products of the “truly strong prophets and poets.” Perhaps needless to say, Bloom 
positions himself outside of the history he is constructing, as a detached and nonpartisan 
observer. This move, a historical, theoretical, and political sleight of hand, is also evident 
in a number of other important critical texts.   
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In The Music of What Happens: Poems, Poets, Critics, Helen Vendler claims that 
poetic canons are created not by “governments, anthologists, publishers, editors, or 
professors, but by writers” (37). For Vendler, like Bloom, the canon is free from the 
literary taste, political will, and the influence of institutions, including literary critics. On 
the contrary, it is “composed of the writers that other writers admire, and have admired 
for generations” (37). In other words, Wallace Stevens’ admiration for John Keats 
explains, according to Vendler, why “those writers turn up in classrooms and anthologies” 
(37). Again, like Bloom, Vendler’s poet-based theory of canon formation is ostensibly 
apolitical but indirectly supports a model of literary historiography in which the critic 
exists outside or beyond the production of art, as a detached and unbiased observer. In the 
end, of course, this model of literary historiography is far from apolitical. As Alan 
Golding argues, such “institutionally well-placed” critics as Vendler employ their 
“canonizing power without acknowledging it” (From Outlaw to Classic 51).    
Employing a model and line of logic similar to both Bloom and Vendler, Dave 
Smith, in Local Assays: On Contemporary American Poetry, contends that poems “exist 
in forms but poetry exists only in form, in the fused moment of language where we seem 
to behold the beauty and curve of life freed from the bondage of time, place, and effort” 
(89). Here, Smith, a passionate advocate for the creative writing workshop, offers a 
defense of poetry that openly dismisses postmodern interrogations of language, proposing, 
instead, an aesthetic model in which language provides direct access to an objective 
reality. In addition, poetry, for Smith, is archetypal, an essential and spiritual aesthetic 
manifestation unconstrained by history, politics, or culture; it is, according to this model, 
relatively static. Like Bloom and Vendler, Smith’s conception of poetry conceals an 
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implied model of literary historiography that essentializes aesthetics and textual 
interpretation in service of a broader and implied politics of literary merit, the formal 
consequences of which are exclusion, occlusion, marginalization, and omission. As Hank 
Lazer relates, “Smith seems to regard his position as an embattled one, threatened on one 
flank by experimental writing and on the other by an overdecorous formalism” (Opposing 
Poetries 10).           
Given the long-standing dominance of this aesthetic-based interpretive model, it 
is also not surprising to see critics, historians, and anthologists openly denigrating forms 
of historiography that operate outside its boundaries, including its traditional conception 
of literary value. Eliot Weinberger, for instance, in the introduction to his anthology 
American Poetry Since 1950: Innovators and Outsiders, complains that those who 
attempt to construct the canon “according to gender and race should first consider how 
many poets genuinely qualify within these chronological limits” (xiii). In emphatic 
fashion, Weinberger insists that such “extra-literary categories” as “ethnic background 
and sexual preference” have taken academic and cultural precedence over “aesthetic 
beliefs and practices” (405). As odd as it might sound, he fashions his predominantly 
white and mostly male anthology as a corrective to what he labels as identity-based forms 
of literary history and literary criticism, a decidedly conservative political position that is 
very obviously invested in maintaining a narrow conception of American poetry and 
poetic practice. 
In addition, this model of literary history, most often based on an academic 
protocol of textual and aesthetic differentiation, attempts to codify postmodernism, if it 
takes up the term at all, as little more than a reactionary period style. For instance, despite 
21 
 
her initial claim in 21st-Century Modernism that discussions of twentieth- and twenty-first 
century poetry and poetics are dominated by “the tired dichotomy” (1) of modernism and 
postmodernism, Marjorie Perloff adopts a similar position in her attempt at tracing the 
“unfulfilled promise of the revolutionary poetic impulse” (5) of early modernism in 
postmodern poetic practice. In short, her historical analysis of the postmodern poetic 
landscape relies almost exclusively on a hermeneutics of reminiscence. For instance, in 
her discussion of Susan Howe’s Thorow, a highly politicized and clearly deconstructive 
rewriting of early American colonization, she locates the aesthetic significance of Howe’s 
use of sound-based meaning in the zaum poetics of Russian Futurist Velemir Khlebnikov: 
“The relation of sound to meaning . . . is thus reminiscent of Khlebnikov’s zaum, where 
the semantically unrelated ‘salt’ and ‘sun’ are linked by poetic fiat” (170). Other 
instances abound. In Charles Bernstein, she finds the unfulfilled promise of Eliot, and in 
Lyn Hejinian, she finds the poetics of Gertrude Stein. In sum, Perloff’s textual and 
aesthetic-based logic of reminiscence insists that any connection—in form, syntax, image, 
or theory—between a modernist poet or poem and a postmodern poet or poem is simply a 
reaction to or an extension of an early modernist impulse. Writers, in this sense, are 
largely unaffected by their social, cultural, or historical circumstance.  
To be certain, this does much to explain Perloff’s overall resistance to and 
ultimate omission of the term “postmodern,” insisting, instead, that the term has “lost its 
momentum” (2) and that the “modern/postmodern divide has emerged as more apparent 
than real” (164). With little question, Perloff’s resistance to postmodernism as a concept 
is rooted in an aesthetic-based model of historical and literary progress as well as the 
notion of a stable lyric subject—a position seriously problematized if not rejected by the 
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very postmodern writers she discusses. What’s more, her exclusion of the concept of 
postmodernism as a cultural dominant and, therefore, as a theory of social, historical, and 
cultural transition—an obvious divergence from such earlier texts as Radical Artifice—
indirectly fashions an apolitical and ahistorical model of literary history that values text 
over context, content over form, and aesthetics over politics. As Frederic Jameson 
implies, historiographic models immersed in the politics of style often fail to take into 
account fundamental transformations in the nature of economic and cultural systems:   
[E]ven if the constitutive features of postmodernism were identical with 
and coterminous to those of an older Modernism . . . the two phenomena 
would still remain utterly distinct in their meaning and social function, 
owing to the very different positioning of postmodernism in the economic 
system of late capital and, beyond that, to the transformation of the very 
sphere of culture in contemporary society. (Postmodernism 5)  
In this sense, Perloff appears more as a guardian of the gate than a champion of the 
forward guard.  
In Differentials, published in 2004, Perloff adopts an even more conservative 
position by advancing the New Critical politics of “close reading” (xiii) in response to 
theoretical and/or ideological evaluations of poetic texts that, for her, place the “literary 
work in a secondary position—a position where the poem tends to be no more than an 
example of X or a cultural symptom of Y” (262). As Christopher Nealon argues in The 
Matter of Capital: Poetry and Crisis in the American Century, Perloff’s work provides “a 
powerfully depoliticizing language for poetry in the 1980s and 1990s” (11). In fact, 
Perloff’s call for “close reading” might be seen as an early example of antitheory, that 
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“odd phalanx,” as Vincent Leitch relates, that has “a dozen or more contemporary . . . 
factions in North America and the United Kingdom” (Literary Criticism in the 21st 
Century 11). In short, her model of literary history is an extension of the style-based 
model employed by Bloom, Vendler, Smith, and Weinberger. Of course, it is by no 
means unique to Perloff. 
In The World’s Hieroglyphic Beauty, Peter Stitt insists that the “minority 
movement known as postmodernism” is a “rather specialized approach to the possibilities 
of literature” where “the spirits of play and parody are preeminent and in which the 
poet’s commitment is to the logic of the poem’s world rather than to the external truth of 
the world that surrounds him” (69). The implication here is obvious. Postmodern poetry 
is not, for example, a response to and engagement with the complex social and cultural 
politics of late capitalism. Instead, for Stitt, postmodern American poetry is simply an 
aesthetic emergence, a “specialized” and “minority movement,” a self-reflexive style in 
which the postmodern poet does little more than engage in an apolitical practice of “play” 
and “parody.” Aside from its valorization of aesthetic-based models of interpretation, 
Stitt’s definition of postmodernism also serves to tacitly establish an opposition between 
“experimental” and “mainstream” modes of poetic production, a commonly adopted 
position. In fact, this position is evident in one of the most frequently referenced texts on 
the topic, Paul Hoover’s Postmodern American Poetry, first published in 1994 and then 
significantly revised in 2013.           
In both editions of Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology, Paul 
Hoover insists that postmodernism is the “historical period following World War II” 
(xxix). In addition, he insists, in the first edition, that “postmodernist poetry is the avant-
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garde poetry of our time” (xxv), a claim that is slightly adjusted for the second edition, 
where he argues that the term postmodern “refers to avant-garde poetry by American 
poets from 1950 to the present” (xxix). Leaving aside the somewhat puzzling conflation 
of postmodernity and postmodernism, it is clear that Hoover is less concerned with 
cultural politics than he is with aesthetics, as his historiographic model isolates aesthetic 
alteration and innovation as the key historical markers of postmodernism. In Hoover’s 
terms, postmodernism, as he argues in both editions, “suggests an experimental approach 
to composition, as well as a worldview that sets itself apart from mainstream culture and 
the narcissism, sentimentality, and self-expressiveness of its life in writing” (xxix). In the 
second edition, he adds that postmodernism is “considered a reigning style, one that 
continues in the twenty-first century” (xxix). However, if postmodernism is synonymous 
with experimentation, then his historical designation—the “period following World War 
II”—is arbitrary and irrelevant. How, for example, does Hoover’s definition of 
postmodernism account for such writers as Sharon Olds, June Jordan, Michael Harper, 
Gary Snyder, A.R. Ammons, Nikki Giovanni, Wendell Berry, Maxine Kumin, Li-Young 
Lee, Anthony Hecht, Adrian Louis, Adrienne Rich, Joy Harjo, Robert Bly, Mark Strand, 
Sherwin Bitsui, Mary Oliver, Jane Kenyon, Jane Hirshfield, Rita Dove, Linda Hogan, 
Chitra Divakaruni, Louise Glück, Mark Doty, Maya Angelou, Mark Turcotte, Dana Gioia, 
or Jorie Graham, for example, poets whose “approach to composition” is often less than 
experimental but whose politics and poetic content are clearly implicated in the 
complexities of the postmodern era? Interestingly, of the poets mentioned here, Gary 
Snyder is, in fact, included in both editions of the anthology, though the selection of 
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poems is wholly at odds with Hoover’s claims about experimentation, highlighting the 
problem with Hoover’s historiographic method.  
Understandably, Hoover’s Postmodern American Poetry, like all anthologies, 
operates by a process of omission and exclusion. However, it does so in service of 
maintaining a narrow understanding of postmodern American poetry. In other words, 
“mainstream” poetry, or, more specifically, poetry invested in the first-person lyric and 
lyric subjectivity, is summarily dismissed on the grounds of its dominance. As Hoover 
notes in the second edition, “These new poetics tend to work in opposition to the motives 
of mid-twentieth century romanticism, which served as the dominant model from 1950 to 
1990” (xxxi). Hoover offers no explanation for his choice of 1990 as the end date for the 
self-expressive lyric. In addition, his notion of ideology, despite its Marxist overtones, 
seems to have little to do with political revolt, resistance, or opposition; nor is it a term 
that deals directly with or refers to questions and issues of race, gender, class, and/or 
cultural politics, as is often the case in both neo-Marxist and postmodern accounts of 
contemporary culture. For Hoover, opposition, as he notes in the second edition, is 
“resistance to dominant and received modes of poetry” (xxxiii). In sum, Hoover, like 
others, constructs postmodernism as a purely aesthetic emergence, a period style at once 
defined and determined by its formal characteristics. In doing so, he represents 
postmodern poetry as an impulse toward the aesthetically innovative, as an “experimental 
practice.” Interestingly, he notes, in both editions, that the anthology “does not view 
postmodernism as a single style with its departure in Pound’s Cantos and its arrival in 
language poetry; it is, rather, an ongoing resistance to and comment upon dominant 
practices” (xxvi). Given his claim that the dominance of the lyric mode ended in 1990, 
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this appears as a contradictory point, and it is repeated in slightly different fashion near 
the end of the second edition: “We should not imagine that a single style rules the period, 
such as language poetry, conceptual poetry, or the postlanguage lyric. It is all of the 
above” (lvi). Here, Hoover’s struggle to historicize and to map is apparent, as confusion 
and contradiction result from the fact that he attempts to have it both ways, conflating 
postmodernism as a style with postmodernism as an era. As with others, Hoover’s focus 
on style, on aesthetics, limits and confines, prohibiting a broader view and understanding 
of the poetry of the era.  
Obviously, Hoover is not alone in his insistence that postmodern American poetry 
is defined and constituted by experimentation. In fact, this aesthetic-based interpretation 
has its own specific history in formulations and overviews of postmodern American 
poetry. In short, this history might be characterized as a reaction by both critics and poets 
to the continued aesthetic dominance of early critiques of New Critical modes of literary 
production in the form of the first-person lyric, an aesthetic that, at the time, attempted to 
remove itself from modernist propositions of artistic autonomy and monumentalism. To 
be sure, Robert Lowell’s Life Studies and W.D. Snodgrass’ Heart’s Needle, both 
published in 1959, became the foundation for a larger and more directed attack on the 
aesthetics of literary modernism. Although later considered part of a mid-century closed-
verse tradition, as critics such as David Antin have claimed2, Lowell and Snodgrass’ 
confessional aesthetics, often based in the personal, intimate, and autobiographical, were 
targeted at disrupting, as David Perkins relates, New Critical values of “impersonality, 
                                                
2 See David Antin, "Modernism and Postmodernism: Approaching the Present in 
American Poetry," boundary 2: a journal of postmodern literature 1.1 (1972): 98-133. 
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formality, intellectuality, and self-conscious control” (A History of Modern Poetry 382). 
In other words, although these assaults on an essentially institutionalized modernism 
were often more formal than the breath-based utterances advocated by Charles Olson or 
the seemingly direct, natural, and spontaneous quality of Beat poetry, for example, their 
expressive, personal, and experiential qualities have nonetheless served as an aesthetic 
standard for much postmodern poetic practice. Rising to a position of dominance, 
inherited and institutionalized, this practice has come under assault on a variety of fronts, 
and the critique of its ostensibly passive mode has remained relatively constant since the 
1980s. 
In 1984, for example, in an essay entitled “The Academy in Peril: William Carlos 
Williams Meets the MLA,” Charles Bernstein insisted that the “officially sanctioned 
verse” of the time was characterized by a “restricted vocabulary, neutral and univocal 
tone in the guise of voice or persona, grammar-book syntax, received conceits, static and 
unitary form” (Content’s Dream 245). This practice, which Bernstein regarded as part of 
an uninspired and uninspiring homogenous and hegemonic “official verse culture,” relied 
on the policies and practices of reviewing and publishing institutions and the influence of 
university-aligned poets and critics to sanction and legitimate its “official” aesthetic: 
Let me be specific as to what I mean by “official verse culture”—I am 
referring to the poetry publishing and reviewing practices of The New 
York Times, The Nation, American Poetry Review, The New York Review 
of Books, The New Yorker, Poetry (Chicago), Antaeus, Parnassus, 
Atheneum Press, all the major trade publishers, the poetry series of almost 
all of the major university presses (the University of California Press 
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being a significant exception at present). Add to this the ideologically 
motivated selection of the vast majority of poets teaching in university 
writing and literature programs and of poets taught in such programs as 
well as the interlocking accreditation of these selections through prizes 
and awards judged by these same individuals. Finally, there are the self-
appointed keepers of the gate who actively put forward biased, narrowly 
focused and frequently shrill accounts of American poetry, while claiming, 
like all disinformation propaganda, to be giving historical or nonpartisan 
views. (247-48)  
Bernstein’s analysis of the poetry industry is now a relatively familiar line of attack in 
institutional-based histories, accounts, and constructions of postmodern American poetry. 
Like Bernstein, these critics and historians consider the role and influence of high-profile 
individuals and institutions—critics, reviewers, universities, writing programs, academic 
and creative associations, trade and academic presses, journals, and newspapers—in the 
manufacturing of an officially sanctioned aesthetic, namely the first-person lyric, 
although different names have been assigned along the way.  
In The American Poetry Wax Museum, for instance, published in 1996, Jed Rasula 
interrogates the “canonizing assumptions” that have “fabricated an image of American 
poetry since World War II,” isolating the “self-expressive subject” (4) as the dominant 
and institutionally validated aesthetic mode. Hyperbolizing the notion of enshrinement, 
Rasula envisions American poetry as a wax museum “operated by the MLA and 
subsidized by the nationwide consortium of Associated Writing Programs” with “special 
galleries” dedicated to such “corporate benefactors” as the “New York Times Book 
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Review, The New Yorker, Poetry and American Poetry Review” (1). According to Rasula, 
these institutions, and no doubt the bulk of poetry anthologies, have “worn a trench 
around the first person singular in [their] ritual peregrinations” (26) as well as 
“surreptitiously turned down the volume on certain voices and simulated a voice-over for 
certain others” (33). For Rasula, there is little doubt about the exclusionary nature of this 
subsidized “voice-over:” “[P]ostmodern heterogeneity, semiotic slippage, decentering 
and reinvention of identity are emphatically not among those features which typify the 
poetry that is critically certified and anthologized today. The anthologies remain 
hierarchically motivated, dedicated to preserving the dream of autonomous agency and 
experiential authenticity” (26). For Rasula, the institutional authorization of a specific 
definition of American poetry is a form of collusion, what he elsewhere calls “Poetry 
Systems Incorporated, a subsidiary to data management systems” (“Literary Effects in the 
Wad” 78). This exclusionary definition, in other words, minimizes the potential influence 
and ultimate validation of aesthetic modes of writing that challenge, for example, 
traditional notions of subjectivity, agency, coherency, authenticity, language, logic, 
experience, order, stability, transparency, meaning, and expression. As such, Rasula, as 
well as a number of other writers and critics, especially those associated with the 
Language School, have been openly hostile to this poetic mode—a mode historically 




those published in the 1980s and 1990s.3 As Marjorie Perloff notes, despite the 
“enormous political, demographic, and cultural changes of the post-World War II era,” 
for the “mainstream poetry press,” the “lyric paradigm has remained remarkably constant” 
(21st-Century Modernism 155). 
In more specific terms, this aesthetic mode is dominated, according to Hank Lazer, 
by a “simple declarative syntax; the illusion of a craftless transparent language; [and] a 
simple speechlike singular voice in the service of a poem that ends with a moment of 
epiphanic wonder and/or closure where all parts of the poem relate to a common theme” 
(Opposing Poetries 131). Marjorie Perloff, as well, insists that the majority of 
contemporary American poetry follows the same set of basic aesthetic assumptions: “A 
generic ‘sensitive’ lyric speaker contemplates a facet of his or her world and makes 
observations about it, compares present to past, divulges some hidden emotion, or comes 
to a new understanding of the situation. The language is usually concrete and colloquial, 
the ironies and metaphors multiple, the syntax straightforward, the rhythms muted and 
                                                
3 Although the list of anthologies that sanction this specific poetic mode is large, the most 
frequently criticized include the following: Paul Lauter, ed., The Heath Anthology of 
American Literature (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1994); J.D. McClatchy, ed., Vintage Book 
of Contemporary American Poetry (New York: Random House: 1990); Dave Smith and 
David Bottoms, eds., The Morrow Anthology of Younger American Poets (New York: 
Quill, 1985); Helen Vendler, ed., The Harvard Book of Contemporary American Poetry 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985); Jack Myers and Robert 
Weingarten, eds., New American Poets of the Eighties (Green Harbor, Mass.: Wampeter 
Press, 1984).    
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low-key” (21st-Century Modernism 161-2). For Perloff, this aesthetics of self-expression, 
predicated on a “topical ‘subjective’ realism” (163), yields an unoriginal poetry that 
approaches “the condition . . . of journalism” (164). And Vincent Leitch, in a chapter 
entitled “Late Contemporary US Poetry,” notes that the “confessional lyric of 20-40 free-
verse lines” has been a “longtime favorite of classroom teachers and magazine editors, 
who particularly appreciate its brevity, approachability, sincerity, and epiphanic wisdom” 
(Living With Theory 103). 
In fact, if there is a defining feature to the history of institutional-based analyses 
of American poetry, it is most certainly an emphasis on the dichotomy between two 
broadly construed aesthetic modes—“mainstream” (the first-person, post-confessional, or 
self-expressive lyric) and “experimental”—engendered by the struggle for academic and 
cultural recognition and priority. Twenty years out, this opposition is perhaps still best 
represented in a section from Hank Lazer’s 1996 text, Opposing Poetries: 
Today’s crisis in American poetry, marked by a broad sense of segregation 
and growing critical discomfort, consists of the collision between two 
incompatible notions of verse practice: one characterized by a plainspoken 
sincerity, a focus on apotheosis, a single organizing self and/or voice, 
lyrical brevity, carefully crafted vowel and consonant music, a kind of 
representational realism, and liberal politics; the other characterized by 
stylistic innovation, increased attention to the operations of language, 
enactment rather than re-presentation or summary, a poetry infused with 
the thinking of modernist and contemporary theory, philosophy, and 
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speculative prose, a more intensely collaborative concept of the reader, 
and neo-Marxist politics. (34)    
Of course, while Lazer’s institutional-based historical analysis of postmodern American 
poetry usefully outlines some of the distinctive features and overall differences between 
two seemingly “incompatible notions of verse practice,” it also fosters, like the critical 
perspectives of Charles Bernstein, Jed Rasula, Christopher Beach, and Marjorie Perloff, a 
binary logic in its categorical opposition between “experimental” and “mainstream” 
modes of poetic writing while surreptitiously positing experimental poetry as 
quintessentially postmodern. This theoretical position is also evident in another important 
conception of postmodern poetry, Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris’ second volume of 
Poems for the Millenium: The University of California Book of Modern and Postmodern 
Poetry.  
Rothenberg and Joris’ anthology, in other words, is a productive but still 
somewhat troubling historical construction of postmodern poetry. In short, Rothenberg 
and Joris are aware of the exclusionary nature of the anthology and the role it often plays 
in the canon-making process and the official sanctioning of specific aesthetic modes. As 
such, they position themselves as “participants, not just observers” (12) and draw 
attention to the fact that their role as chroniclers “colors” (13) not only their historical 
overview but also their inclusion of poets. And although it extends beyond the American 
instance, the descriptive elements of their anthology provide a useful summary of some 
of the aesthetic and political elements evident in a number of strains of postmodern 
American poetry. These elements include “an exploration of new forms of language, 
consciousness, and social/biological relationships,” “poetry-art intersections,” a “return to 
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the concept of poetry as a performance genre,” “language experiments,” a “renewed 
privileging of the demotic language,” “ethnopoetics,” “an ongoing if shifting connection 
to related political and social movements,” a “widely held belief that poetry is part of a 
struggle to save the wild places,” and a “sense of excitement and play” (11-12). Needless 
to say, Rothenberg and Joris’ anthology is much more inclusive, making room for 
poetries that respond to the profound changes in the culture since the 1950s, including 
globalization. At the same time, the large selection of poets in their anthology, from John 
Cage and Ed Sanders to Steve McCaffery and Jackson Mac Low, who operate on the 
basis of an “experimental” aesthetics, serves to implicitly manufacture innovation as the 
distinguishing feature of postmodern poetry. Why, for example, are poets such as A.R. 
Ammons, Wendell Berry, or Simon Ortiz not included, especially given their direct and 
indirect participation in the “struggle to save the wild places”? Their exclusion likely has 
to do with style, with the operational logic of the text that equates postmodernism with 
experimentation. As Christopher Nealon argues in The Matter of Capital: Poetry and 
Crisis in the American Century, “The enduring persistence of problems of historical 
consciousness for literature is not only a question of how literary writing has developed 
understandings of periods and of the meanings of periodization; it has also attached itself 
to questions of literary style” (17). 
Despite these equations of postmodern American poetry with formal 
experimentation, Maria Damon offers an alternative to the construction of postmodern 
American poetry as a purely aesthetic phenomenon. In The Dark End of the Street, she 
argues for a definition of the “avant-garde as writing that pushes at the limits of 
experience as well as at the limits of conventional form” (ix). In a kind of reversal, she 
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insists that vanguard literature is largely the domain of the socially and culturally 
marginalized:   
Their often neglected work becomes canon-fodder in the construction of a 
respectable façade of American letters that would erase the indigence and 
illegitimacy of its vital sources. The avant-garde . . . can include work that 
may or may not be formally experimental but breaks new social taboos 
and formalist rules in its attempt to create a new consciousness borne of 
heretofore inexpressible experience. (xi)   
Here, Damon rewrites traditional definitions of the poetic avant-garde and offers a more 
flexible conception of literary value. In short, her idea of literary value, as well as its 
implied historiographic stance, equally weighs the importance of social and cultural 
politics along with textual and aesthetic evaluation. Damon’s definition of 
postmodernism reflects this idea, evident in her discussion of a group of young and 
untrained poets from South Boston: 
For instance, the South Boston poems, though they conform to very clear, 
arguably outdated, precepts of what poetry is, are avant-garde, marginal, 
experimental, both in their challenge of middle-class readers’ assumptions 
about who gets to write what about whom, and in their deconstruction and 
reassemblage of other dominant discourses, a practice currently labeled 
“postmodern” but observable in any culture that has relations with other 
cultures. All writing is experimental, especially for people whose status as 
writers has traditionally been challenged: women, children, people of 
color, and members of the working classes. (xv) 
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Here, Damon questions the assumption that postmodern American poetry can be 
adequately analyzed through the application of a specific set of established formal 
standards. For Damon, postmodern poetic forms of experimentation are less the products 
of innovative aesthetics than of the social, political, and cultural expressions of 
marginalization, subjugation, and oppression. Relying on the notion that “difference” 
(alterity, marginality, sub, other) is one of the constitutive features of postmodern culture, 
Damon fashions poetic production in the postmodern era as not only a differential 
response to prevailing aesthetic standards but as social, political, and cultural engagement 
with the dominant late-capitalist culture. In other terms, Damon’s implied contention is 
that the standards by which literary critics and literary historians evaluate poetic texts too 
often precludes investigation of social, political, and cultural value. In short, her critical 
model provides a starting point for the articulation of an alternative to the understanding 
of postmodern American poetry as a purely aesthetic practice. It is imperative, she 
implies, to defeat the notion that postmodern American poetry is, in exclusive terms, a 
highly specialized and a highly experimental work intended to foreground, among a host 
of other things, the decentered subject, the unstable and inescapable function of language, 
or the dubious nature of reality. This is true in many instances, of course, but the 
definition denies a multitude of other equally postmodern poetic modes, all of which exist 
in a culturally dominated system.  
According to Fredric Jameson, the current global and consumer-based capitalism 
of postmodern culture, a transition from the modern system of monopoly capitalism, 
represents, as Vincent Leitch relates, a “new and distinct historical stage in the 
development of Western culture” (Postmodernism 117). Generally speaking, this “new 
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and distinct historical stage,” characterized, as Jameson suggests, by a “prodigious 
expansion of culture throughout the social realm” to the extent that “everything in our 
social life—from economic value to state practices and to the very sphere of the psyche 
itself—can be said to have become ‘cultural’” (Postmodernism 48), signifies not only a 
dramatic break with modernist notions of social and cultural autonomy but a dizzying and 
explosive acculturation of reality itself—an acculturation that no doubt serves such 
capitalist values as profit, consumption, and exchange. To be certain, this proliferation of 
capital into all aspects of experience is the dominant and inescapable “cultural logic of 
late capitalism,” and it explains why Jameson claims that “every position on 
postmodernism in culture—whether apologia or stigmatization—is also at one and the 
same time, and necessarily, an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of 
multinational capitalism today” (3). Again, it should come as no surprise that a mutation 
in the nature of capitalism itself should symptomatically produce an array of social and 
cultural modifications with concomitant social and cultural consequences. 
Consistent with such theorists as Guy DeBord and Jean Baudrillard, Jameson 
suggests that cultural production in the postmodern era is not “a matter of content any 
longer but of some fundamental mutation both in the object world itself—now become a 
set of texts or simulacra—and in the disposition of the subject” (9). Modernist attacks on 
realistic representation and mimesis give way to a postmodern era of simulacra, an 
endless dissemination and recirculation of texts, a system of floating signifiers without 
stable signifieds, a “transformation,” as Jameson argues, of “older realities into television 
images” which “does more than merely replicate the logic of late capitalism; it reinforces 
and intensifies it” (46). The consequence, of course, and in contradistinction to such 
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modernist values as originality, authenticity, depth, and quality, is that postmodern 
cultural production, as Jameson notes, is rooted in a new kind of “flatness or 
depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense” (9). The flat and 
depthless nature of postmodern art is also a hallmark demonstration of a culturally 
widespread “waning of affect” (10) and a “society bereft of all historicity” whose 
“putative past is little more than a set of dusty spectacles” (18). Modernist expressions of 
“alienation, anomie, solitude, social fragmentation, and isolation” (11) are “no longer 
appropriate in the world of the postmodern” (14) since postmodernism signals the “end of 
the bourgeois ego, or monad” and “with it the end of the psychopathologies of that ego” 
(15). Of course, the end of the “bourgeois ego” represents “the end of much more—the 
end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal, the end of the 
distinctive individual brush stroke” (15). Surface replaces depth, greatness and 
complexity give way to pop, kitsch, and camp, and high and low culture collude and 
collide in an intermixing of formerly distinct aesthetic categories, all of which originate 
the “well-nigh universal practice today of what may be called pastiche” (16), an 
“imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the 
imaginary museum of a now global culture” (18).   
Clearly, Jameson formulates the cultural productions of the postmodern era in 
specific fashion, isolating and concatenating aesthetic tendencies in light of larger 
cultural modifications. Here, the theoretical temptation is to equate these tendencies with 
the concept of postmodernism as an era. It is important, in other words, to remember that 
Jameson’s conception of such cultural elements as the acculturation of reality, simulacra, 
pastiche, depthlessness, and the waning of affect reflect an attempt to achieve “some 
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conception of a dominant cultural logic” (6). These tendencies, in other terms, do not 
exclude the synchronic existence of other distinct cultural elements, many of which 
operate outside of or in opposition to both the dominant culture and dominant aesthetic 
tendencies. To frame this in a slightly different fashion, and to repeat an earlier point, 
postmodernism is not simply a style or an aesthetic. Instead, postmodernism is an 
historical formation, an era, a mutation in the nature of capitalism itself replete with 
dominant, residual, and emergent cultural elements. In terms of understanding the variety 
and complexity of postmodern American poetry, this conception of postmodernism has 
important implications. 
As an alternative to an exclusively aesthetic-based conception of postmodern 
American poetry, the idea of postmodernism as an era and not simply as a style 
engenders a critical and historical perspective that engages cultural and social politics and 
aesthetics in its attempt to account for the broad range of postmodern American poetry. 
As Jameson notes, there is a “radical distinction between a view for which the 
postmodern is one (optional) style among many others available and one which seeks to 
grasp it as the dominant logic of late capitalism,” as the “two approaches” engender 
“different ways of conceptualizing the phenomenon as a whole: one the one hand, moral 
judgments . . . and, on the other, a genuinely dialectical attempt to think our present of 
time in History” (Postmodernism 45-46). As such, and as noted earlier, this conception of 
literary history advances a postmodern historiography in favor of traditional 
historiographic models based exclusively in textual and formal methods of analysis. 
Suspicious of the putatively objective “view from nowhere” offered in many 
constructions of American literary history, the American poetic canon, and, in particular, 
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postmodern American poetry, postmodern historiography provides a negotiable and 
flexible model of literary history, one rooted in the lessons of the postmodern era. As 
such, it employs a mix of theory, cultural criticism, history writing, and traditional 
literary analysis. In addition, this model of historiography offers a view of history and 
literature that is open to multiple perspectives, challenges its own historiographic 
methods, and, finally, offers a more open and flexible conception of literary value 
through its consideration of various kinds of politics along with aesthetics. Raymond 
Williams’ notion of cultural structure and process—the dominant, the residual, and the 
emergent—provides a framework by which to engage in this discourse. 
In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams insists that the “complexity of a 
culture is to be found not only in its variable processes and their social definitions—
traditions, institutions, and formations—but also in the dynamic interrelations, at every 
point in the process, of historically varied and variable elements” (121). Therefore, an 
“authentic” historical analysis must recognize “the complex interrelations between 
movements and tendencies both within and beyond a specific and effective dominance” 
(121). In other words, any examination of an effectively dominant or hegemonic 
system—cultural, historical, or institutional—must also account for both “residual” and 
“emergent” cultural elements as “significant both in themselves and in what they reveal 
of the characteristics of the dominant” (122). This, of course, is another way of 
suggesting that the dominant is “never either total or exclusive. At any time, forms of 
alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in the 
society” (113). What’s more, these forms have “significant effect on the hegemonic 
process itself” since the “hegemonic function is to control or transform or even 
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incorporate them” (113). Dominance, in this sense, requires opposition, although it must 
be “especially alert and responsive to the alternatives and opposition which question or 
threaten its dominance” (113). Hegemony is therefore an “active process” in its constant 
negotiation and maintenance of various cultural elements, as opposed to its more 
common definition as “a complex of dominant features and elements” (115). This does 
not, of course, negate the necessity of recognizing and describing dominant features, 
which Jameson makes clear in his benchmark text.  
Williams defines the “residual” as that which “has been effectively formed in the 
past, but it is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element 
of the past, but as an effective element of the present” (122). Distinguishable from the 
archaic, which exists in the observable past, the residual is both present and active, 
functioning, often, outside of or as an alternative to the dominant: “Thus certain 
experiences, meanings, and values which cannot be expressed or substantially verified in 
terms of the dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of the 
residue—cultural as well as social—of some previous social and cultural institution or 
formation” (122). These elements of the cultural process are often recognized and 
acknowledged for their alternative function because they were “created in actual societies 
and actual situations in the past” and “because they represent areas of human experience, 
aspiration, and achievement which the dominant culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, 
represses, or even cannot recognize” (123-124). At the same time, despite being “at some 
distance from the effective dominant culture,” a residual cultural element, or at least 
“some part of it,” will “in most cases have had to be incorporated if the effective 
dominant culture is to make sense in these areas” (123). Again, incorporation, a form of 
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regulation, restriction, and limitation, is one of the main strategies of the hegemonic 
process. 
Williams’ definition of “emergent” draws attention to the fact “that new meanings 
and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationships are continually 
being created” (123). Of course, he insists, it is “exceptionally difficult to distinguish 
between those which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture . . . 
and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict 
sense, rather than merely novel” (123). Nonetheless, the emergent, effectively speaking, 
is “radically different” (124) from the residual, as emergent cultural elements often exist 
in strict opposition to the dominant culture and therefore require attentive supervision and 
management: “For new practice is not, of course, an isolated process. To the degree that 
it emerges, and especially to the degree that it is oppositional rather than alternative, the 
process of attempted incorporation significantly begins” (124). Or, as Williams notes in 
“Base and Superstructure,” “In capitalist practice, if the thing is not making a profit, or if 
it is not being widely circulated, then it can for some time be overlooked, at least while it 
remains alternative. When it becomes oppositional in an explicit way, it does, of course, 
get approached or attacked” (173). Practically speaking, then, emergent cultural elements 
are in constant battle against incorporation, which, insidiously, often “looks like 
recognition, acknowledgement, and thus a form of acceptance” (Marxism and Literature 
125). Nonetheless, in their opposition to the dominant, emergent elements of the culture 
rely “crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of form” (126).  
Williams’ theory of cultural structure and process is applicable not only to the 
larger postmodern culture but to the symptomatic function of its institutions. In other 
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words, at any moment in any culture or institution, there is always something dominant or 
hegemonic, something that looks to the past as an alternative to that dominance, and, 
finally, something that directly opposes the seemingly exclusive and limiting nature of 
that dominance. However, in standard postmodern fashion, this is not a singular or 
consistently discrete process. These elements and the categories in which they function—
the dominant, the residual, and the emergent—are not mutually exclusive, as both 
dissolution and disaggregation are typical of the era. As Vincent Leitch relates in Literary 
Criticism in the 21st Century, “What characterizes postmodernism yesterday and today is 
a persistent disorganization of culture into separate spheres and the ubiquitous interaction, 
sometimes convergence, of the fields” (129). Singularities and multiplicities of all kinds 
exist side by side; contradiction is common and acceptable. As Leitch notes, “On the one 
hand, we experience the mishmash of world music and cuisines and, on the other, 
uniformities of globalization and Empire popping up everywhere like Coca-Cola and 
reality TV subgenres” (129). Or, to appropriate a claim by Linda Hutcheon in a recent 
essay on postmodernism, “‘both/and’ is more appropriate than ‘either/or’ in addressing 
the issue” (17). In terms of understanding postmodern American poetry, a flexible 
both/and version of Williams’ model allows for mapping and historicizing—one way of 
thinking about the current proliferation of diverse styles and tendencies, politics, 
institutions, and poetry’s relationship to the larger dominant culture. 
Again, intensification, proliferation, concentration, disaggregation, dissolution, 
and inundation are terms that not only describe the larger culture but also the current field 
of postmodern American poetry. Within the span of approximately 70 years, the number 
of actively publishing poets in the United States has gone from reasonably small, 100 to 
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500, to unquestionably large, greater than 10,000, a number no doubt fueled by the rise 
and popularity of creative writing programs beginning in the 1970s and the ubiquitous 
use of various forms of technology at the start of the new century. As Ron Silliman notes 
on his blog, “It is all but impossible to even characterize the map of poetry today. If this 
were the 1950s, a quarter of America’s poets would be producing flarf, another quarter 
conceptual poetry. What we have is a much bigger pie, and one sliced into many more 
fairly narrow slices. And it’s up for grabs as to the order in which they fit.” Similarly, in 
Living With Theory, Vincent Leitch relates that the current field of postmodern American 
poetry “strikes many critics as increasingly carnivalesque and chaotic” (103). For 
example, Dana Gioia and others, the editors of a 2004 anthology entitled Twentieth-
Century American Poetry, insist that the current state of poetry is “highly factionalized 
and combative,” that “numerous aesthetic, ideological, professional, and regional camps 
busily make a case for their own creative enterprise,” and, in a more basic sense, that 
“American poetry is so vast and diverse as to be virtually unknowable” (664). In Lyric 
Postmodernisms: An Anthology of Contemporary Innovative Poetries, published in 2008, 
editor Reginald Shepherd notes, “Ours is a decentered contemporary American literary 
and artistic world in which there is no agreement even on what practitioners of ostensibly 
the same art form are doing or trying to do, let alone on those efforts’ means or aims or 
how they could be evaluated” (xiii). And Cole Swenson, in the introduction to American 
Hybrid: A Norton Anthology of New Poetry, published in 2009, argues, in a slight turn, 
that “while extremes remain, and everywhere we find complex aesthetic and ideological 
differences, the contemporary moment is dominated by rich writing that cannot be 
categorized and that hybridize core attitudes of previous ‘camps’ in diverse and 
44 
 
unprecedented ways” (xvii). Further, she insists, “The product of contradictory traditions, 
today’s writers often take aspects from two or more to create poetry that is truly 
postmodern in that it’s an unpredictable and unprecedented mix” (xxi). Swenson 
proposes, in fact, that the current state of poetry is “rhizomatic,” as binaries and 
hierarchies give way to “a more laterally ordered network composed of nodes that branch 
outward toward smaller nodes, which themselves branch outward in an intricate and ever-
changing structure of exchange and influence” (xxv). Inundation abounds. Assemblage is 
routine. Heterogeneity, a situation of apparent chaos, rules the era. Clearly, as with other 
cultural productions, maps are needed. 
Since the 1950s, the proliferation of diverse styles and movements typical of the 
field is one of relationship with the dominant culture, symptomatically modeling itself on 
larger cultural processes, including changes and intensifications in the capitalist system. 
Struggling for dominance, creating opposition, or resisting incorporation, many of the 
large-scale movements in the history of American poetry—Objectivism, Beat, 
Confessionalism, San Francisco Renaissance, The Black Arts, The New York School, 
Language Poetry, Dark Room Collective, Concrete Poetry, Slam, New Formalism, 
Cowboy Poetry, Slow Poetry, Cyberpoetry, Newlipo, Flarf, and Conceptual Poetry—can 
be understood in terms of both institutional and cultural function. Relationship requires 
interaction with both the past and the present. As for the current moment, Vincent Leitch 
offers the following sketch: “The situation of poetry today has a great deal to say about 
the status of literature in early twenty-first century US society, concerning not only its 
vitality and abundance, but also its disarray and confusion as well as ongoing 
transformation into entertainment and marketable product” (Living With Theory 104). 
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However, despite the chaotic, disorganized, and currently shifting nature of the field, 
including the collapse and combination of formerly distinct styles, a form of dominance, 
a “center or axis,” as Leitch calls it, might still fairly be located in the “University of 
Iowa Writers’ Workshop poem” (103), although its hold is in the process of loosening. In 
the past few years, for example, as former members of the avant-garde have become elite 
members of the academy and as formerly emergent and oppositional aesthetics continue 
to be incorporated through the hegemonic process, an increasing amount of attention has 
been paid to the exclusivity and potentially anti-progressive claims of the American 
avant-garde tradition. In “There's a New Movement in American Poetry and It's Not 
Kenneth Goldsmith,” Cathy Park Hong notes, “Poets are challenging the structural 
inequities within literature.” Sounding a similar note, Amy King, in “Beauty and the 
Beastly Po-Biz, Part 1,” remarks, “I didn’t understand how intentional groups premised 
on exploring poetics intent on engaging politically as the ‘avant-garde,’ presumably to 
destabilize power, might also be complicit in reifying the overall capitalist structure in the 
process of their empire building, er, institutionalization.” Further, she notes, “For all of 
the claims to avant-garde gestures, including ‘institutional critique from within the 
institution,’ these institutions are the opposite of threatened, proceeding with business-as-
usual and rewarding Conceptual group members in the process.” Tan Lin, Ken Chin, 
Jenny Zhang, and Dorothy J. Wang are important voices on this front as well. For the 
moment, however, the lyric, in large part, remains a kind of axis, as the list of poets 
awarded the Pulitzer over the past 20 years indicates. With two signal exceptions, Kay 
Ryan and Rae Armantrout, and some slight alterations and disruptions to the form, C.K. 
Williams, Natasha Trethewey, and Peter Balakian, the list reveals that the lyric and its 
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attendant self-expressive voice is a mainstay, providing, as Leitch relates, “a sense of 
coherence to the otherwise disorganized field of late contemporary US poetry” (Living 
With Theory 103). 
As noted earlier, this currently dominant and institutionally validated aesthetic 
grew out of mid-century rejections of modernist assumptions, including its claims to 
impersonality, formality, and individual genius. By the 1980s, however, these once-
emergent and oppositional aesthetics were significantly incorporated into an 
institutionally dominant poetic mode. In 1984, for example, in an essay entitled “Poetry 
and Ambition,” Donald Hall ridiculed the commercialization, commodification, and 
assembly-line production and reproduction of the self-expressive lyric: “We write and 
publish the McPoem—ten billion served—which becomes our contribution to the history 
of literature. . . . Pull in any time day or night, park by the busload, and the McPoem 
waits on the steam shelf for us, wrapped and protected, indistinguishable, undistinguished, 
and reliable” (235). What’s more, Hall insisted, “To produce the McPoem, institutions 
must enforce patterns, institutions within institutions, all subject to the same glorious 
dominance of unconscious economic determinism, template and formula of consumerism” 
(235). Presumably, Hall was thinking, for example, of such poets as Donald Justice, Mark 
Strand, or Charles Wright. Donald Justice, for example, in a thirteen-line poem entitled 
“Absences,” writes the following: 
And I, who have listened for a step 
All afternoon, hear it now, but already falling away, 
Already in memory. And the terrible scales descending 
On the silent piano; the snow; and the absent flowers abounding. (115) 
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Here, the “I” is the controlling figure of the poem, a stable subject who offers readers a 
path to the reality of an experience. The experience itself is grounded in a private emotion 
and expressed through direct, concise, and accessible language. Predictably, the poem 
ends with a moment of keen insight, of emotional awareness. In presentation, the stable, 
sincere, expressive, and solitary speaker of the poem allows nothing, including the 
language itself, to get in the way. In fact, according to the dominant logic of the poem, 
language directly corresponds to reality, and the poem, in this sense, offers an 
unequivocal expression of authentic experience. Maybe needless to say, this notion of 
subjectivity or self, symptomatic of postmodern culture, is, as Vincent Leitch relates, 
perfectly “fit for the possessive individualism of contemporary consumer society, often 
narcissistic, emotive, sentimental, privatized in the extreme” (Living With Theory 120). 
Here, in other terms, is an aesthetic neatly tied to the values of the dominant culture, 
especially the consumer-based imperatives of accessibility and passive consumption.  
The work of other poets could be examined here as well, including Sharon Olds, 
Billy Collins, Louise Glück, Jorie Graham, Mark Strand, Carolyn Kizer, Philip Levine, 
Dave Etter, or Ted Kooser, to highlight a few examples. Like items at a grocery store, 
these are numerous brands of more or less the same product, which are placed at eye 
level and in plain sight. Not surprisingly, some taste very good. Still, alternatives, other 
options, are placed on the lower shelves outside of immediate view. And, of course, many 
alternatives never make it to the shelves at all. The dominant mode, in other words, 
excludes other forms of literary production. This strategy of maintenance and control, a 
clear function of the hegemonic process, as outlined by Williams and others, helps to 
explain the continued popularity and dominance of this specific aesthetic mode.  
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Perhaps needless to say, critics of the first-person, self-expressive, post-
confessional lyric frame a vast amount of postmodern poetry as little more than a 
collection of aesthetically outmoded and largely trite poetic observations legitimated by 
anthologies, reviews, universities, and other institutional forces. However, while there is 
clearly an insistence on the self-expressive lyric in much of the poetry that is officially 
and institutionally sanctioned, this does little to explain the potential cultural, political, 
and historical necessity of this poetic mode, especially as it articulates a viable notion of 
subjectivity in light of the apparent collapse and seeming absence of fixed notions of both 
language and identity. In other words, there needs to be a clear distinction between poets 
who rest on the laurels of an institutionally mandated aesthetic and poets who use or 
adopt elements of a dominant aesthetic to larger ends, perhaps in an effort to challenge 
the erasure, excision, occlusion, and territorialization of their histories and identities by 
the forces of postmodern culture. The personal, in this sense, is political. To be certain, 
many poets are deemed guilty by association and therefore summarily dismissed. The 
reality is that the work of many lyric poets is challenging and worthy of serious 
consideration, a fact that becomes even more apparent in the absence of the poetry wars 
of the 1980s and 1990s and through a turn away from an exclusive focus on the politics 
of style. In Cole Swenson’s American Hybrid, for example, she includes such poets as 
Etel Adnan, Joshua Beckman, Fanny Howe, Molly Bendall, Mei-Mei Berssenbrugge, 
Katheleen Fraser, Myung Mi Kim, Harryette Mullen, and John Yau. And although not 
included, Sherman Alexie, one of the “dominant” poets whose work is examined here, 
might also be considered in relation to the “unprecedented mix” of styles, tendencies, and 
politics found in Swenson’s collection. In short, these are poets whose work both utilize 
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and challenge the institutionally dominant aesthetic. As Cathy Park Hong notes, there is a 
“new movement in American poetry, a movement galvanized by the activism of Black 
Lives Matter, spearheaded by writers of color who are at home in social media activism 
and print magazines; some poets are redefining the avant-garde while others are fueling a 
raw politics into the personal lyric.”  
Of course, the notion of dominance is not confined to its function within specific 
institutions, as Jameson’s elaboration of a postmodern cultural dominant makes clear. In 
this sense, other postmodern poetic modes might be considered part of the dominant, 
including Conceptual Poetry, Flarf, and, more generally, Cyberpoetry, especially in their 
simulation and reproduction of systematic cultural norms tied to the consumer-based 
values and politics of late capitalism. In the case of Cyberpoetry, for example, the 
operative aesthetic strategy, as Paul Hoover relates, is the “cutting and pasting of texts 
and/or images located on the Web onto a page where you have determined to construct a 
poem. Sampling begins with the use of an online search engine” (Postmodern American 
Poetry li). A section from Brian Kim Stefans’ “Bishop Bedlam’s Entreaties” is telling: 
Please reject me after plagiarizing this. 
 Please turn me over if you think you can. 
 Please rewrite me if you know a bad joke. 
 Please seduce me if you want to touch me. (819) 
Absent of a unique style, devoid of individual subjectivity, flattened of affect, these 
repetitions appear empty and random, free-floating, almost purely cybernetic, the product 
of a web-based cannibalism plugged in to the present moment. The style, in fact, adds 
new although perhaps inexplicable meaning to the notion of collage, intertextuality, 
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pastiche, assemblage, a style Jameson characterizes as “speech in a dead language” (17), 
though, here, his description might be slightly reformulated as “speech in an android 
language.” Such recycling and repetition mirrors the process of reproduction in consumer 
culture, mimetically turning its aesthetics and implied politics into a form of literary 
spectacle. This act, of course, is not bereft of opposition, though it does seem to choose 
play over resistance. As Paul Hoover argues in his author note on Stefans, “Cyberpoetry 
should seek noise rather than silence, interference and discontinuity rather than a smooth, 
unimpeded progress” (815). Method may, in fact, yield, disruption, as a section from 
Stefans’ poem “Searchbot” reveals: 
I have eaten the dumdums 
   that were in the coalition, 
forbid me, 
   they were free, and old, sold 
to me. 
Sort of resemble me. (818) 
This less-than-subtle allusion to the tradition of modernism calls forth the history of 
poetic writing and its contemporary iterations, simultaneously framing voice and 
subjectivity as dominant markers of a restrictive aesthetic tradition and drawing attention 
to the commodification and fetishization of individual identity in consumer culture, 
despite its own complicity. Such, of course, is the nature of postmodernism. As Linda 
Hutcheon argues, “Complicity always attends its critique” (The Politics of 
Postmodernism 99). Rather than strictly dominant, then, Stefans’ poetry exists as a kind 
of hybrid of dominant and emergent postmodern poetic modes. A similar argument could 
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be made about the work of Tan Lin, Flarf poet K. Silem Mohammad, and, in some 
instances, the work of Conceptual poet Kenneth Goldsmith, the subject, in part, of the last 
chapter.  
Careful consideration of both aesthetics and politics indicates that poets rarely fall 
squarely into one category, with some notable exceptions. Dana Gioia, for instance, a 
staunch advocate of New Formalism, engages, along with poets like Timothy Steele and 
Marilyn Hacker, in a decidedly and openly residual practice, one formulated in 
opposition to the self-expressive lyric and its entrenchment in various institutions, 
including the academy. A former businessman, Gioia, oddly, fashions himself as a kind 
of bohemian, a rebel poet writing poems that adhere to the restrictions of form and meter. 
In a poem called “Insomnia,” for example, he writes, “Pipes clanking, water running in 
the dark / the mortgaged walls shifting in discomfort / and voices mounting in an endless 
drone . . .” (4). Interestingly, Gioia’s criticism, especially Can Poetry Matter? Essays on 
Poetry and American Culture and Disappearing Ink: Poetry at the End of Print Culture, 
has garnered more attention than his verse, confirming, in one sense, Williams’ 
contention that residual elements are easy to ignore when their alternative function is not 
a threat to the dominant system. And, of course, other postmodern residual elements exist, 
such as the Cowboy poetry of Larry McWhorter, Chris Isaacs, or Tim Jobe.  
At the same time, this kind of strict classification is rare. John Ashbery’s “Self-
Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” for example, is undeniably less experimental than his 
earlier work, and it signals his movement toward the “mainstream,” but its ekphrastic 
interrogation of subjectivity is clearly at odds with the unquestioned assumptions of 
authenticity, originality, and poetic voice evident in much lyric poetry. Ashbery’s work, 
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in other words, does not neatly or tightly fit into a single definition of postmodernism, 
such as the stylistic claim that it is synonymous with experimentation. The same holds 
true for much Language Poetry, including the work of Susan Howe and Robert Grenier, 
the subject of the second chapter, which is emergent in its aesthetic and political 
opposition but also symptomatic of the dominant in its expressions of fragmentation and 
the collapse of stable subjectivity. Other flexible categorizations of postmodern poetic 
practice are needed, such as with the work of Gary Snyder, A.R. Ammons, Sherman 
Alexie, and Kenneth Goldsmith, the subjects of the last two chapters, as the work of these 
poets exists in the connective spaces of dominant, residual, and emergent postmodern 
poetic modes.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE POLITICS OF PLAY IN THE POETRY OF ROBERT 
GRENIER AND SUSAN HOWE 
 
Language Poetry, according to Michael Greer, “encourages us to reconsider the 
institutional and historical determinations of our notions of poetry, and to recognize our 
own implication in the ideological struggles to define ‘poetry’ and ‘the poetic’" (335). As 
a literary movement and a poetic mode, in other words, Language Poetry, or Language 
Writing, might be seen as a symptomatic representation of a large-scale cultural battle for 
academic and institutional legitimation. Relegated, for much of its history, to small 
presses, magazines, readings, and other group-based writing networks, Language Poetry 
existed at the margins, functioning outside of or exterior to an official network of 
academic and mainstream publications. This is not, of course, inexplicable. Opposition 
requires dominance, and, according to a number of critics, literary historians, and 
proponents of Language Poetry, early critiques of New Critical modes of literary 
production in the form of the first-person lyric—an aesthetic that, at the time, attempted 
to remove itself from modernist propositions of artistic autonomy and monumentalism—
continue to dominate postmodern poetic production. As Hank Lazer relates, Language 
Poetry is an “oppositional literary practice” that “questions the tendencies of mainstream 
poetry, including its evasion of modernism’s formal challenges, its resultant devotion to 
the plainspoken lyric, and its correlative hostility to philosophy and critical theory” (37). 
Lazer is not alone in his assessment. In The American Poetry Wax Museum, Jed Rasula 
characterizes the bulk of contemporary poetry as a museum “operated by the MLA and 
subsidized by the nationwide consortium of Associated Writing Programs” (1). Taking 
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issue with the institutional framework in which poetry is produced, Rasula further insists 
that the majority of poetry anthologies “remain hierarchically motivated, dedicated to 
preserving the dream of autonomous agency and experiential authenticity” (26). Similarly, 
Marjorie Perloff, in 21st-Century Modernism, argues that, in much mainstream poetry, a 
“topical ‘subjective’ realism always reasserts itself as the path of the least resistance” 
(163)—a poetry, for her, that approaches “the condition, not of music, as Walter Pater 
famously held, but of journalism—a form of writing as harmless as it is ephemeral” (164). 
And, finally, Vincent Leitch insists that while contemporary poetry is a highly chaotic 
and disorganized field of competing modes and tendencies, if “there is a center or axis, it 
is probably represented by the University of Iowa Writer’s Workshop poem. This is the 
self-consciously prosaic confessional lyric of 20-40 free-verse lines, a longtime favorite 
of classroom teachers and magazine editors, who appreciate its brevity, approachability, 
sincerity, and epiphanic wisdom” (Living with Theory 103). For many, then, the first-
person lyric is indicative of an “official verse culture,” to use Charles Bernstein’s popular 
term, an institutionally and aesthetically dominant mode against which much of what is 
designated as Language Poetry implicitly or explicitly operates. 
At the same time, Language Poetry, as Romana Huk relates, is an “amorphous 
field of writing for which the term is now internationally if loosely used to join together 
poets working in interaction with postmodern or poststructuralist theories of language” 
(1). Language Poetry, in other terms, is more of a loose constellation than an organized 
grouping. Important differences among individual poets, then, are significant; nonetheless, 
similarities emerge. Douglas Messerli, for example, in the introduction to his anthology 
of Language poets, notes that “language itself” is a common and arguably unifying factor:   
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For these poets, language is not something that explains or translates 
experience, but is the source of that experience. Language is perception, 
thought itself; and in that context the poems of these writers do not 
function as ‘frames’ of experience or brief narrative summaries of ideas 
and emotions as they do for many current poets. (“Language” Poetries 2)   
Operating within, as Huk indicates and Messerli implies, poststructuralist and 
postmodern conceptions of language, Language Poetry, generally speaking, tends to 
emphasize both the materiality and the production of language. Along the way, order, 
coherence, stability, meaning, and truth tend to give way to chaos, disorder, instability, 
play, system, and function. Reality is text; text is reality. Consequently, passive 
consumption, one of the ways in which mainstream poetry participates in the logic of late 
capitalism, is rarely, if ever, an option. As Hank Lazer notes, Language Writing “resists 
habitual reading and in that resistance invites the reader to become a producer of the text 
rather than remain its consumer” (40). Similarly, Jeff Derksen argues that Language 
Poetry does not “aim exclusively at academic reception and canon revision, but rather at 
the transformation of a social subject through language and through a model of 
productive consumption for reading” (43). Boundaries collapse; writer and reader are of a 
piece. These similarities, as well as others, will become apparent throughout the course of 
this chapter.  
To be sure, then, Robert Grenier and Susan Howe are important representations of 
these general tendencies. At the same time, to say that the poetry of Grenier and Howe is 
emblematic of all Language Poetry would, of course, be a mistake. In addition, Grenier 
and Howe are inescapably different poets. Howe’s poetry is frequently complex and 
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elusively palimpsestic, and her work has generated a wealth of critical scholarship. 
Grenier’s poetry, on the other hand, is often deceptively simple and decidedly 
minimalistic, and his work has garnered virtually no critical attention. Nonetheless, their 
shared concerns, as indicated in the first chapter, are indicative of a primarily emergent 
mode in postmodern American poetry. 
 
Language Writing and the Poetry of Robert Grenier 
To eject, that is, the idea that there is something 
containable to say: completed saying. 
       --Charles Bernstein, A Poetics 
I’ll stir. 
        --Robert Grenier, Sentences 
Origins, especially literary origins, are often ideological shelters. Nonetheless, the 
1971 publication of Robert Grenier and Barret Watten’s This magazine is often isolated 
as a fountainhead for the widely variegated movement known as Language Writing or 
Language Poetry.4 Notably, the inaugural issue of the magazine contained Grenier’s now-
famous pronouncement: “I HATE SPEECH.” More than a decade later, Ron Silliman, in 
“Language, Poetry, Realism,” the introduction to his anthology of Language Writing 
entitled In the American Tree, insisted that Grenier’s denouncement of speech-based 
poetics “announced a breach--and a new moment in American writing” (xvii). One way 
of charting that “breach” and the subsequent development of a “new” American writing, 
                                                
4 See, for example, Bob Perelman, The Marginalization of Poetry (Princeton:  Princeton 
UP, 1996) 38. 
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Language Poetry, is to trace and chart the development of individual writers. It is, in 
other words, a method of identifying individual production and development as an 
aesthetic and ideological representation of a larger, often group-based, critique of 
postmodern American poetry and poetics. To be certain, Robert Grenier is an emblematic 
case. This choice, of course, requires explanation.       
 That Grenier’s utterance provided a basis on which a new and decidedly radical 
movement in American poetry would form seems appropriate. Over the course of his 
career, Grenier’s poetry has undergone, in often self-conscious fashion, what I would 
characterize as cataclysmic changes. However, the changes are not entirely, if at all, 
idiosyncratic. In many ways, in fact, Grenier’s poetry is symptomatic and representative 
of larger cultural, philosophical, ideological, institutional, and aesthetic changes and 
challenges in both American culture and American poetic history. In short, and on this 
last front, Grenier’s poetry has moved from a Modernist aesthetics in line with William 
Carlos Williams to a decidedly more “open form” and speech-based poetics along the 
lines of Charles Olson or Robert Creeley, and, finally, to a radical and arguably emergent 
postmodern mode, generally classified as Language Poetry. To the extent that these 
changes exemplify larger movements within American culture, poetry, and poetic history, 
the advent and existence of Language Poetry can be seen as both inevitable and necessary. 
 Grenier’s first book of poems, Dusk Road Games, published in 1967, is written in 
the tradition of the earlier poetics of William Carlos Williams. In fact, the first poem of 
the book, “Slum Spring,” immediately recalls Williams’ “Spring and All.” The language 
is terse, simple, and unsophisticated, a “common” speech. The form, like its content, is 
suggestive but nonetheless gracefully unadorned. And, like “Spring and All,” Grenier’s 
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“Slum Spring” chronicles a transformation in seasons, the emergence of spring, in an 
environment where poverty and suffering is despairingly recognizable. In Williams, it is 
near “a road to the contagious hospital” (1); in Grenier, it is, simply, a “slum.” In this 
particular slum, the neighbor’s dog is a mutt, a “cur,” and the tenement women shop 
laboriously “in the slush” (11). Yet, as in Williams’ poem, spring offers the possibility of 
(re)birth, renewal, and rejuvenation. “Slum Spring” ends with this recognition:   
  Their shopping bags in their pull carts--  
  coming home in their greatcoats-- 
  pull perceptibly lighter 
As in “Spring and All,” however, the recognition of birth and renewal must also be 
weighed against the overwhelming sense of uncertainty and despair. In other terms, even 
though the carts “pull perceptibly lighter,” it is unclear whether the slush is absent, the 
shopping bags are less in number, or the adopted strategy of transportation has been 
altered, from push to pull. Regardless, the act or action is less arduous; at the same time, 
the sense of social despair persists. Thematic congruities among the poems of Williams 
and Grenier surface time and again throughout Dusk Road Games.5 In fact, this kind of 
mirroring effect, the repetition of Williams-based insights, approaches the level of 
diminution.6 
                                                
5 See, for instance, “Song,” a contemporary version of “Danne Russe,” or “Leaf,” a 
thematic play on “The Young Housewife.”   
6 The epiphany of the title poem of the collection, “Dusk Road Game,” is “a thing is a 
pure wonder” (28). The epistemological stance of this poem, and this statement, is in no 
small part a reformulation of Williams’ “No ideas but in things.”   
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 Thematic affinities are not, of course, the only way in which Grenier’s early 
poetry participates in the aesthetics of modernism. Among the many tenets of Modernist 
aesthetics, the poetry of Dusk Road Games most clearly demonstrates an adherence to 
F.S Flint and Ezra Pound’s insistence on “direct treatment of the thing” (142). With little 
question, the poems of Dusk Road Games use no “superfluous word, no adjective, which 
does not reveal something” (143), they refuse to treat images “as ornaments” (149), and 
they are composed “in sequence of the musical phrase, not in the sequence of the 
metronome” (142). In “Slum Spring,” to reiterate, the images are clear and concise; the 
language is straightforward and exact. At the same time, as “Slum Spring” also 
demonstrates, Grenier’s poetry is more closely aligned with Williams in its treatment of 
“local conditions” (The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams 146). The poetry of 
Dusk Road Games is not, in other terms, the poetry of an expatriate. It is, rather, an 
American poetry decidedly situated in a specific social, cultural, and historical context.        
The Modernist aesthetics of objectivity and impersonality, a kind of view from 
nowhere, are also apparent in Grenier’s early poetry. A poem like “Slum Spring” is 
telling in this respect as well. The poem is predicated on the notion of the poet, the “I,” 
who stands at the center of the experience, perception, and poem. In turn, the poem is 
dependent upon the poet’s ability to organize both poetic reality and the reality to which 
the poem refers. This principle of the unique self, the autonomous and monumental “I” of 
poetic modernism who organizes reality, transforms and transmits tradition, and offers an 
often final truth, however tenuously suggested, runs throughout all of the poems of Dusk 
Road Games. Of course, Williams, late into his career, insisted that the poet thinks with 
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the poem, but the early Williams undoubtedly insists on the central position of the poetic 
“I.” 7 Grenier, no doubt, inherited this earlier aesthetic.  
 Grenier’s next collection of poems, Series, published in 1978, illustrates a radical 
shift in poetic style. While it is certain that the importance of a “common speech” 
stressed by Williams has not been totally abandoned, only modified, the poems of Series 
suggest a degree of formal and linguistic complexity more along the lines of a Charles 
Olson or Robert Creeley. In fact, Olson and Creeley seem to be primary influences on the 
poetry of Series. Robert Creeley’s Pieces, for example, published in 1968, is constructed 
so that a dot, or period, half-separates a “piece” or poem, and three dots are used to 
designate the end of a piece. However, as Bob Perelman notes, in The Marginalization of 
Poetry, “The three-dot ‘endings’ are often only slightly stronger versions of the single dot 
‘connections’” (44). The three dots, in other terms, often function as ellipses; in the end, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine where one poem ends and the next begins. 
Grenier, in Series, more or less adopts this method. At the same time, Grenier’s dots are 
occasionally placed in seemingly random spots on the page, and approximately halfway 
through the text they disappear completely. Here, an element of Language Poetry is 
beginning to come to the surface: the materiality of grammatical markers can no longer 
be taken at face value. More to the point, however, the use of space in these poems 
demonstrates an opening of the field and a break, as Charles Olson puts it, in his 
manifesto “Projective Verse,” with the “inherited line, stanza, over-all form, what is the 
‘old’ base of the non-projective” (614).   
                                                




 Olson’s comments on “breath” in “Projective Verse” are also relevant to the 
poems of Series. For Olson, “Verse now, 1950, if it is to go ahead, if it is to be of 
essential use, must, I take it, catch up and put into itself certain laws and possibilities of 
the breath, of the breathing of the man who writes as well as of his listenings” (613). The 
specific way in which this enters the poetic line is defined shortly after: 
  the HEAD, by way of the EAR, to the SYLLABLE 
  the HEART, by way of the BREATH, to the LINE  (616) 
Olson’s manifesto is intended, in one sense, to mark a break with the Modernist 
insistence on “common speech,” the “American” idioms of Williams Carlos Williams or 
Robert Frost. At the same time, speech is not left behind, but its normative function is, 
often at least, transformed into deeply personal utterance and open-form textual 
performance. Needless to say, this transformation in speech also signifies and entails a 
transformation in subject matter. The poem, in other terms, is no longer simply a space 
for commonly designated poetic utterance; on the contrary, openness reigns. All 
experience, no matter how trivial, personal, or even misunderstood, is relevant.     
 The combination of Olson and Creeley in Grenier’s Series manifests in the 
following manner: 
  no time 
  like the present 
 
  there’s the road 
  curving away 
 




  I’m suffering   
  from the  
humidity   (21) 
The poem, or piece, in this instance, is indefinitely open--“no time,” slight pause, “like 
the present.” Temporality is experienced both on the page and in the mind; space and 
composition open. Moreover, the sense of the “present” drives the logic of individual 
breath and utterance.  The result is the possibility of a line like “I’m suffering.” The line 
as breath unit allows, in other terms, the short line. In fact, in a poem such as this, the line 
as breath is absolutely necessary.  The position of the suffering subject can now be 
emphasized and undercut. This is not the Modern or existential subject who suffers from 
an abundance of freedom or an anxiety about being-towards-death. Rather, suffering 
results “from the humidity.” Subject matter now incorporates the banal. Cliché, “no time / 
like the present,” is fair game. Personal observation and subjective emotion, as in another 
early poem from this collection, replaces impersonality and objectivity: “farmers / fishing” 
(38).     
 Leaving behind Creeley’s dots and Olson’s breath, the latter poems of Series 
seem to represent another distinct alteration in poetic style, almost as if, for Grenier, 
“Projective Verse” goes out as quickly as it comes in. The “style” of these later poems, 
however, ultimately remains more fixed. For the next fifteen years or so, the poetic line 
for Grenier remains fairly constant. In other words, the majority of the latter poems of 
Series are often short one-to-ten word poems. Just as likely, two poems normally appear 
per page, placed fairly consistently with one at the top and one at the bottom, and a large 
white space separates the ostensibly discrete texts. In addition, the latter poems of Series 
represent a profound turn toward textuality, toward the materiality of the word itself. In 
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fact, these poems evidence the kind of skepticism toward the word, or the word’s ability 
to represent things, that characterize much Language Poetry. One of the last poems of 
Series reads: 
no signs 
  of things (128) 
This poem, in short, seems to signal the death of the referent or, in the least, expresses an 
inherent uncertainty about the ability of language to adequately represent reality. The 
proposition nomina sunt numina seems stripped of all reasonable plausibility. Moreover, 
the poem is framed in specifically linguistic terms, and the insight is in some senses 
comparable to the critique of language in poststructuralist and postmodern theory: 
everything and every thing tends increasingly toward the sign. At the same time, while 
the context in which this poem takes place is at once philosophical, a point I will return to, 
it is also and at the same time literary. 
 For Grenier, this poem seems to mark an end to assumptions about the adequacy 
of language to represent reality and experience, assumptions undoubtedly informing 
American poetry and poetics. Even as late as 1965, for example, Denise Levertov is 
calling for an organic poetry—a poetry that recognizes “a form beyond forms, in which 
forms partake” (629). Levertov’s assumption is not, of course, without precedent. The 
adequacy of language is one of the essential presuppositions of both Modernist and 
Projectivist verse, a presupposition, for Grenier, in the early 1970s, which had run its 
course. As George Hartley relates, “Language poetry continues that opening of the 
possibilities of verse at a point when Projectivist assumptions themselves in turn appear 
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to have reached a dead end” (21). Indeed, this sense of a poetic cul-de-sac led Grenier to 
claim, in a 1971 manifesto entitled “On Speech” in This magazine, “I HATE SPEECH.” 
 To be sure, Grenier’s proclamation calls for an end to the Olsonian conception of 
the poetic line as a unit of breath. What’s more, it directly attacks the various poetic 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s—Confessionalism, the San Francisco Renaissance, 
Organic Poetry—for an aesthetics rooted in direct and personal utterance, the obvious 
progression from Olson. Grenier writes that it “isn’t the spoken any more than the written, 
now, that’s the progression from Williams” (496). Something of Williams’ avant-garde 
tendencies persists, for, a few lines later, he proclaims: 
Why imitate ‘speech’? Various vehicle that American speech is in the 
different mouths of any of us, possessed of particular powers of colloquial 
usage, rhythmic pressure, etc., it is only such. To me, all speeches say the 
same thing, or:  why not exaggerate, as Williams did, for our time 
proclaim an abhorrence of ‘speech’ designed as was his castigation of ‘the 
sonnet’ to rid us, as creators of the world, from reiteration of the past 
dragged on in formal habit. I HATE SPEECH.  (496) 
Grenier’s position is immediately literary and historical. His proclamation calls into 
question the repetition, seemingly any repetition, of the poetic line since Williams. 
Moreover, Grenier’s own poetry surrounding this comment allows it to be read as a call 
to textuality and a turning away from the self-expressive poetic “I.” This, to be sure, is 
the light Silliman would later read it in:  
[N]either speech nor reference were ever, in any real sense, the ‘enemy.’ 
But, because the ‘naturalness’ of each, the simple, seemingly obvious 
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concept that words should derive from speech and refer to things, was 
inscribed within all of the assumptions behind normative writing, the 
challenge posed by This was to open a broad territory of possibility where 
very different kinds of poets might explore and execute a wide range of 
projects. (xviii)   
Despite Silliman’s slightly apologetic tone, and his apparent refusal to acknowledge the 
full implications of Grenier’s statement, the critique of speech-based poetics in Grenier’s 
“On Speech” is rooted in a poststructuralist critique of language and presence along the 
lines of Derrida. As Derrida notes in Writing and Difference, “It could be shown that all 
the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always been 
designated an invariable presence—eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and 
so forth” (279-80). And, of course, Derrida’s critique of presence in the logocentric 
tradition often rests on his reversal of speech over writing, a reversal which, in many 
ways, gave rise to numerous postmodern theories of language which insist, in one form or 
another, that the text is reality, an assumption that in large part drives the production of 
Language Poetry. In short, then, Grenier’s announcement and denouncement, however 
exaggerated, set the tone for the promulgation of a whole poetic movement. Of course, 
the concerns of Language Poetry are diverse and complex. In many ways, in fact, 
Language Poetry is an individual movement.8 In other ways, it is a collective movement 
                                                
8 See Lee Bartlett, “What is ‘Language Poetry’?,” Critical Inquiry 12 (1984):  741-752. 
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and struggle with literary, historical, and theoretical precedence.9 In either case, the 
designation is not gratuitous:  there are a mass of common assumptions and oppositions 
that warrant the name.  
To begin, Language Poetry posits skepticism about the “I” as the organizing 
principle of the poem. The reasons for this are manifold. In one way, the critique of the “I” 
is a critique of the workshop aesthetic as it evolved out of the subjective or expressive 
poetics of the 1950s, Confessionalism, et cetera, and is now at or near the center of the 
poetry produced by writers in creative writing programs across the country. Ron Silliman, 
et. al, in “Aesthetic Tendency And The Politics of Poetry:  A Manifesto” argue on these 
terms specifically. Silliman, et. al, characterize the workshop aesthetic as dominated by 
the expressive lyric, which, they insist, is a form of “fetishized personal ‘experience’” 
(262). To place the “I,” the individual, at the center of the poem, they argue, is to posit an 
“authorial ‘voice’” (264). Moreover, they contend the kind of experience that gets carried 
through this particular “I” is often “posited as an heroic and transcendent project” (264). 
With little question, much of the poetic theory offered by Language poets is profoundly 
informed by poststructuralist and postmodern theory. Here, for instance, is something of 
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv), a continuation in the 
critique of Enlightenment values. In the least, the Language poets are skeptical about the 
possibility of a view from nowhere, of a poetry or poetics, as Charles Bernstein writes, 
                                                
9 See Walter Kalaidjian, “Transpersonal Poetics:  Language Writing and the Historical 
Avant-Gardes in Postmodern Culture,” American Literary History 18 (1991):  64-75. 
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that “seems too final or preemptively restrictive” (A Poetics 150). As a consequence, 
much Language Poetry rejects the idea of closed texts.10     
 In contradistinction to the workshop aesthetic and the values that go along with it, 
Silliman, et. al, insist on an “I” that is open to the “implications of experience,” to the “I” 
that is “more generative of insight than the transcendent elevation of carefully scripted 
incidents” (266). To open up the “I” in this way is to open up the self. For these writers, 
that means viewing language and text not “as simply transparent and instrumental but as 
a necessity of the world at large--an obstacle as well as an advantage” (266). The turn 
toward textuality and the word itself is an obvious extension of this argument. 
 The critique of the “I” has come on other fronts as well. Most importantly, the 
Language Poets argue that a self-centered or expressive poetics positions the subject as 
outside of language, an assumption Marjorie Perloff, in “The Word as Such:  
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the Eighties,” deems “invalid” (15) and predicated on 
an “authenticity of feeling or memory being guaranteed by the poet’s ability to specify, to 
match image to idea” (15). Rather, the Language Poets insist, via poststructuralist and 
postmodern theory, that the self is a construction of language. Charles Bernstein, in “The 
Objects of Meaning:  Reading Cavell Reading Wittengstein,” writes: 
The distortion is to imagine that knowledge has an “object” outside of the 
“language games” of which it is a part. . . . Learning a language is not 
learning the names of things outside language, as if it were a matter of 
                                                
10 See, for instance, Lyn Hejinian, “The Rejection of Closure,” Writing Talks, ed. Bob 
Perelman (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois UP, 1985): 270-291. 
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matching up signifier with signifieds. . . . Rather, we are initiated by 
language into a socious, which is for us the world.  (171-172) 
Thus, language and text are inherently social, and, moreover, inherently political. 
 It comes as no surprise then that many of the Language poets are concerned with 
the political dimensions of language. That concern comes on many levels, but most 
commonly it is in the form of a Marxist critique of late capitalism. Ron Silliman, for 
instance, in “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World,” asks whether 
capitalism has “a specific ‘reality’ which is passed through the language and imposed on 
its speakers” (123). If so, language, like the proletariat, becomes commodified; both, in 
turn, are reified. However, this does not abolish struggle. Much to the contrary, the 
Language poets place language on the battleground itself. Silliman writes, in classical 
Marxist terms:   
By recognizing itself as the philosophy of practice in language, poetry can 
work to search out the preconditions of post-referential language within 
the existing social fact. This requires (1) recognition of the historic nature 
and structure of referentiality, (2) placing the issue of language, the 
repressed element, at the center of the program, and (3) placing the 
program into the context of conscious class struggle.  (131) 
Language, then, becomes a site of contestation, a site at which to question and challenge 
the assumptions of capitalism in its many guises.11 For the language poets, this means 
                                                
11 For a discussion of language poetry as a site of resistance to the encroachments of mass 




placing all elements of language at the center of the poetic project. For Grenier, 
specifically, his poetry has tended to privilege the non-referential aspect of language as a 
way of resisting capitalist ideologies. 
 While Grenier has insisted his project is not related to the Marxist critique of 
capitalism,12 the poetry tells another story. In particular, Grenier’s 1986 collection of 
poems, Phantom Anthems, calls into question the nature of (capitalist) values inscribed in 
referentiality. The title itself, in fact, is reminiscent of Lukács’ definition of reification: 
“Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’” (83). This is perhaps an over-characterization or over-
determination of this collection of poems, but many of the poems are concerned 
specifically with the idea of work. The poem “BLUE SKY BATHING JANUARY 2ND” 
is an apt exemplification: 
      sunset / quiet under Capitalism 
  uninterrupted hour that you have sought 
  what thing free from mitigation wearing 
  by the elements oh aether love 
  on a windless day by the shore a 
  bath in that water air my element 
  it’s the no moon sun & moon together 
  at horizon to the west to suck out the tide (n.p.) 
                                                
12 See George Hartley, Textual Politics and the Language Poets (Bloomington:  Indiana 
UP, 1992) 34. 
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The familiar duality of work and play or work and repose is immediately apparent. The 
speaker, insofar as there is one, is “quiet,” yet even then he or she is “under Capitalism”--
a subjugated subject. But “under Capitalism” also signifies the landscape; even the sun 
and the moon are reified objects: “what thing free from mitigation.” The answer to this 
implicit question is, of course, nothing. Even the act of taking a bath is not free from such 
“mitigation.”  This, to be sure, is the commodified body going into orbit. The recourse, 
here, is apparently to a Platonic state of pre-industrialism, to a time when “aether love” is 
possible, a day “without wind,” a day without “wearing / by the elements.” This 
primordial state, of course, does not exist. The “real” site of resistance is the poem itself, 
or, rather, its non-referentiality. If referentiality leads to reification, so the argument goes, 
then a line like “it’s the no moon sun & moon together,” in its syntactical complexity and 
general indecipherability, becomes a point of resistance. Moreover, the extent to which 
the only point of reference in the poem is in the relationship between signifiers, the words 
tend to lose all value. This, in and of itself, is an important recognition, for if words 
function in an interminable play of signification, their market value, their ability to be 
commodified, becomes inherently suspect. 
 Grenier’s privileging of the non-referential has not come without criticism, even 
within the circle of poets writing under the rubric Language Poetry. Ron Silliman, for 
instance, argues in “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World” that while 
Grenier “frontally attacks referentiality,” the extent to which non-referentiality is 
predicated on negation places Grenier as operand in the “referential fetish” (131). And for 
poets like Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein, reference is only “one of the horizons 
of language, whose value is to be found in the writing…before which we find ourselves 
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at any moment” (“Repossessing the Word” ix). The argument is slippery but the point is 
clear: referentiality is only part of the project of poetry as politics, and, moreover, its 
tendency to be fetishized makes it susceptible as a site of contestation, a point David 
Marriott makes undeniably clear: “Language Writing, in its systematic attempt to empty 
the linguistic sign of its referential function, replaces representation with a fetishistic 
substitute, that of the signifier” (338).  
 The range and implications of Phantom Anthems is not, however, so easily 
defined. Also inherent in the title is the idea of multiple subjectivities, of a poetry that at 
once emanates not from a unified subject, but, rather, at and in the intersection of various 
cultural and societal influences. The subject is now fragmented, and the text acts 
accordingly; pastiche, even phonemic pastiche, is the only possible mode: 
  VOICE SAYS 
   v o i c e s (n.p.) 
Here, voice gives way to a polyphony of voices, words give way to a polyphony of 
phonemes, and the subject gives way to a polyphony of influences. The subject, the voice, 
is fragmented. There is, to be sure, an anxiety of influence here, but it is almost 
exclusively a point for celebration. As in much Language Poetry, heteroglossia reigns 
supreme. 
 For Grenier, the inevitable fragmentation of language and (hence) subjectivity is 
not to be mourned. Nor does it, necessarily, mean the death of the author or the subject. 
Rather, these notions get reinscribed. The author or poet becomes (sometimes happily, 
sometimes not) the point at which multiple influences intersect. And this means the end, 
as Fredric Jameson insists, to the “unique and personal,” to the “distinctive individual 
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brush stroke” (15). But it does not, as Jameson despairs, necessarily entail the death of 
the individual subject. For Grenier, as for many Language Poets, pastiche, as both an 
aesthetic and a way of life, is not “blank parody” (17). On the contrary, many of these 
poets bask in the non-authoritarian stance of the poet and human being. The individual 
subject can both be and not be; otherness can persist without the eradication of self or 
agency. 
 This is certainly one of the implications Grenier makes in his 1984 collection A 
Day at the Beach. In A Day at the Beach, postmodern pastiche is hallmark, things are 
transformed into signs, and multiple subjectivities collide and emerge. Yet, within the 
heap of fragments, something of the author or poet persists: 
  IRENE 
  one “I” stress on the first syllable (n.p.) 
This is not, however, the objective “I” of modernism, the self-expressive “I” of 
Confessionalist poetry, or of the experiential and scenic-driven “I” of the workshop 
aesthetic. The “I,” here and now, is a “stress on the first syllable,” a one among a 
multiplicity (of phonemes). Differentially defined, constituted wholly in relation to that 
which is and is not present, the poet is a text, a syllable among syllables. Of course, the 
self maintains in other ways as well. Many of the poems in A Day at the Beach are 
dedicated to and written about the poet’s dog. The influence of wife and daughter are also 
readily apparent. And while these “influences” are measured contributions in an overall 
effect, what issues forth is a picture of the postmodern poet standing on the beach, and, in 
a rare moment of clarity, thinking of the sea, “the shore / primitive / home of man” (n.p). 
Of course, this all plays out very differently in the work of Susan Howe. 
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The Poetics and Politics of Fracture in Susan Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in 
Time 
To write means to graft. It’s the same word. 
--Jacques Derrida, Dissemination 
     Everything graft, everything grafted. 
       --Susan Howe, Thorow 
Similar, in some respects, to the early experimental work of Jacques Derrida and 
his textual disruptions and double readings of philosophical and literary discourse, Susan 
Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in Time deconstructs and destabilizes the 
production of knowledge and meaning. Through a series of textual (poetic) assaults on 
historical narrative—particularly early Euro-American colonial narrative—and lyric 
subjectivity, Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, like other generally emergent 
postmodern texts, is aimed at rupture and disorder, at exposing the systemic, the 
structural, and, importantly, the ideological. Steeped in a politics of deconstruction, 
Howe’s textual project, despite the intention of critics such as Marjorie Perloff to attempt 
to manage the unmanageable aspects of her work through “close reading,” is to register 
contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, implosions, exclusions, differences, deferrals, 
gaps, lags, traces, etc. In fact, the deconstructive elements of Howe’s Articulation of 
Sound Forms in Time are highly reminiscent of Derridean poststructuralism and, at 
moments, a Caputo-like radical hermeneutics in which the combination of discourses 
results in a “productive double cross, a palimp-sestuous, cross-semination . . .” (Caputo, 
Radical Hermeneutics 155). Howe, however, extends, politicizes, and transforms these 
complex deconstructive enterprises into an occasionally inscrutable but nonetheless 
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liberating poetic form. Visual and textual boundaries cross and recross. Language, in the 
course of Howe’s text, all the way down to the phoneme and grapheme, is a site of 
cultural, political, and aesthetic challenge and provocation. 
Like a number of her other texts, including Frame Structures, an expansive 
collection of her earliest poems, and Europe of Trusts, a volume which assembles three 
texts first published in the early 1980s, as well as two challenging pieces of postmodern 
literary criticism, My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-mark: unsettling the wilderness in 
American literary history, Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in Time is undeniably 
rooted in history. As Megan Simpson relates, without, however, adequate elaboration, 
“Howe writes a poetry that is at once a critique of conventional historiography and a 
mode of historical inquiry” (164). Evident in her text are the traces, revenants, specters, 
phantoms of Euro-American colonial discourse—a discourse she attacks, in the syntax 
and “style” of her writing, as an embodiment/representation of a totalizing (or totalized) 
system of knowledge—a narrative of legitimation, to adapt Jean Francois Lyotard’s well-
known formulation13—that seeks to interpellate, dominate, control, and fix. Since poetry, 
for Howe, “brings similitude and representation to configurations waiting from forever to 
be spoken” and, logically, embodies her desire to “tenderly lift from the dark side of 
history voices that are anonymous, slighted—inarticulate” (The Europe of Trusts 14), 
Articulation of Sound Forms in Time can be situated within a radical 
poststructural/postmodern politics that endeavors to challenge and deconstruct the 
imperatives of (Euro-American) colonial history and historiographical writing, namely 
                                                
13 See Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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objectivity, truth, closure, coherency, and containment. As Howe relates in an interview, 
a point worth quoting at length, even the title of the collection in which this text appears, 
Singularities, a term taken from a lecture by mathematician René Thom, is as an 
indication of this deconstructive project: 
It was because of Thom that I named my Wesleyan book Singularities. . . . 
In algebra a singularity is the point where plus becomes minus. On a line, 
if you start at x point, there is +1, +2, etc. But at the other side of the point 
is -1, -2, etc. The singularity . . . is the point where there is a sudden 
change to something else. It’s a chaotic point. It’s the point chaos enters 
cosmos, the instant articulation. . . . Predation and capture are terms he 
uses constantly. I thought this was both a metaphor for Europeans arriving 
on this continent, where a catastrophic change then had to happen—a new 
sense of things on the part of the original inhabitants and the emigrants, 
and to the land as well. And it seemed to me a way of describing these 
poems of mine. They are singular works on pages, and grouped together, 
they fracture language; they are charged. “Singularity” was a word dear to 
the Puritans for other reasons. (The Birth-mark 173) 
Singularity connotes control, order, center, origin, truth, hierarchy, and homogeny, 
concepts obviously essential to a wealth of early Euro-American, especially Puritan, 
ideologies. Howe’s reversal of this term, however, via Thom, puts into play, opens up, to 
put it in Derridean terms, a series of absences, differences, supplements, and traces: 
disorder, disorganization, undecidability, margin, fracture, falsehood, heterogeneity. 
Differentially inscribed in the very notion of the term, in other words, is the possibility of 
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its undoing, the “point where plus becomes minus,” the “sudden change into something 
else.” Articulation is also silence; the “truth” of historiography, in other words, is 
predicated on predation and capture, colonization and control, order and coherency. As 
Howe remarks in an interview, stories, and hence histories, are “in danger of being lost 
the minute someone opens one’s mouth to speak” (“An Interview” 31). This conception 
of literature, history, history writing, and, by extension, language itself, including, of 
course, poetic language, is central to Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, and it 
clearly informs the structural organization of the text. 
Originally published as an unpaginated chapbook in 1987, Articulation of Sound 
Forms in Time, the inaugural section of Singularities, is, like the collection itself, divided 
into three sections. The first section, “The Falls Fight,” is composed, importantly, in 
prose form. It offers, among other things, a cursory but nonetheless complex historical 
reconstruction—replete with quotations from a number of unspecified historical 
sources—of a May 1676 raid by a small group of European colonial troops on an 
“unguarded Nipmunk, Squakeg, Pokomtuck, or Mahican camp” (3) in the Connecticut 
River Valley. Howe notes that the raid was led by “Captain Turner of Boston,” and, 
according to one of her generic but clearly Euro-American historical sources, “‘The 
Reverend Hope Atherton, minister of the gospel, at Hatfield, a gentleman of publick spirit, 
accompanied the army’” (3).14 From here, Howe describes the progression of the colonial 
                                                
14 Although unnamed in Howe’s text, the source of the quotation, a “well known classic 
of New England” (ix), according to its introduction, is from the appendix of an edition of 
The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion: or, The Captivity and Deliverance of Rev. 
John Williams of Deerfield (Springfield, Mass: The H.R. Hunting Company, 1908) 199. 
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troops from Hatfield to the (historically ambiguous) Native American camp, remarking, 
along the way, that the colonial militia “happened upon” the camp after missing a fording 
spot along a nearby river and that the “frightened inhabitants thought they were being 
raided by Mohawks” (3). Other details follow. Howe provides, for instance, a quotation 
from a European “chronicler,” an unnamed historian, who aseptically describes the 
violence and tallies the dead: 
“They soon discovered their mistake but being in no position to make an 
immediate defense were slain on the spot, some in their surprise ran 
directly to the river, and were drowned; others betook themselves to their 
bark canoes, and having in their confusion forgot their paddles, were 
hurried down the falls and dashed against the rocks. In this action the 
enemy by their own confession, lost 300, women and children included.” 
(3)  
Momentarily interrupting her historical reconstruction, Howe intervenes to call this 
narrative into question and, tacitly at least, to reveal her poetic project: “What the 
historian doesn’t say is that most of the dead were women and children” (3). The incision 
complete, the cicatrix initiated, Howe’s assemblage continues to offer elements of the 
story. She notes, in particular, the disorganization of the colonial militia’s retreat—which 
“soon became a rout” (4)—as a consequence of neighboring bands of Native Americans 
being alerted to the militia’s presence, the wanderings of several “Christian soldiers” (4) 
who were separated from the retreat in the confusion, including Hope Atherton, and the 
eventual violent death of many of these lost “soldiers” at the hands of the local tribes 
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after offering surrender “on the condition their lives would be spared” (4). Hope Atherton, 
however, is not among them.  
From this point forward, Howe’s reconstruction recedes, mostly, into 
deconstructive play and aphoristic wandering, a kind of tracing and retracing, a figuring 
and refiguring, of the word and name “Hope.” The focus of the text, in other words, turns 
on and to Hope Atherton, the minister of the militia, who, according to an “EXTRACT 
from a LETTER (dated June 8, 1781) of Stephen Williams to President Styles” which 
appears on the following page, was “‘unhorsed and separated from the company, 
wandered in the woods some days and then got into Hadley, which is on the east side of 
the Connecticut River’” (5). The fight, however, took place on the opposite side near an 
apparently impassable section of the Connecticut River, and so Atherton’s claim that “‘he 
had offered to surrender himself to the enemy, but they would not receive him’” (5) was 
met with disbelief and generally unqualified contempt. Slighted, ostracized, and driven 
into anonymity and marginality, Hope, according to Howe, became a “stranger to his 
community and died soon after the traumatic exposure that has earned him poor mention 
in a seldom opened book” (4). His story, in other words, is a dark and largely neglected 
aspect of the historical record, a symptom of and an apparent supplement to a larger 
politics of erasure and exclusion; the margin, for Howe, is the center. Hope, therefore, or, 
rather, his “epicene name,” which “draws its predetermined poem in,” and “excursion,” is 
an “emblem foreshadowing a Poet’s abolished limitations in our demythologized fantasy 
of Manifest Destiny” (4).        
An excursion is a partial escape. Confinement, limits, borders, and boundaries 
inspire its initiation; the expedition, however, often, or least in intention, returns home. 
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Howe’s text, in other terms, in the process of deconstructing history and history writing, 
is never fully away from home: it moves, finally and importantly, within the boundaries 
of the historical discourse it deconstructs. Even “abolished limitations” contain traces 
(and traces of traces): predefinition, predetermination, and containment. Nonetheless, 
play, wandering, disruption, and fracture necessarily ensue. For Howe, therefore, Hope, 
whose “epicene” name, she conjectures, may “prophetically engender pacification of the 
feminine” (4), is simultaneously a possibility and a trap, a point of opening and a moment 
of enclosure, for both the (female) historian and the (female) poet. As she notes in an 
interview, “If you are a woman, archives hold perpetual ironies.  Because the gaps and 
silences are where you find yourself” (The Birth-mark 158). His story, or, more 
accurately, the possibility of his story, is nonetheless essential, emblematic, and 
supplemental. Howe’s prose reconstruction and deconstruction of “The Falls Fight,” in 
other words, is the first and less radical phase of a larger deconstructive project--a project 
writ large in the complex and radical poetic deconstructions of the remaining sections of 
Singularities, particularly the two remaining sections of Articulation of Sound Forms in 
Time. This point requires explanation.      
In Deconstructive Criticism, Vincent Leitch notes that deconstruction “practices 
two interpretations of interpretation. It aims to decipher the stable truths of a work, 
employing conventional ‘passive’ tactics of reading; and it seeks to question and subvert 
such truths in an active production of enigmatic undecidables” (175-76). One of the 
strategies of deconstruction, in other terms, is a process of doubling, or double reading; 
differences and deferrals (différance), traces and supplements, undecidables, are 
inevitable effects of meaning. In Positions, Derrida outlines this primordial process:  
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The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which 
forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in 
and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or 
written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to 
another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving 
results in each “element”—phoneme or grapheme—being constituted on 
the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. 
This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the 
transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor 
within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are 
only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. (26) 
Derrida’s definition of différance here—as well as the recognizable critique of the 
Western logocentric tradition, the metaphysics of presence, especially the privileging of 
speech over writing—also offers an implied definition of writing, of écriture. To write is 
to mean. And, as Barbara Johnson relates, as “soon as there is meaning, there is 
difference” (ix). In other words, a “deconstructive reading does not point out the flaws or 
weaknesses or stupidities of an author, but the necessity with which what he does see is 
systematically related to what he does not see” (xv). Absolute truth is a fiction. 
Contamination, the production of differences, traces, supplements, and other 
undecidables, is the condition of knowing, of meaning, and of writing. In this process, the 
author, as Vincent Leitch notes, “is a name” (Deconstructive Criticism 177).   
Writing, écriture, therefore, to add on to this list of Derridean effects, is a 
(primordial) process of grafting. In fact, as Derrida argues in Dissemination, “To write 
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means to graft. It’s the same word…. Each grafted text continues to radiate back toward 
the site of its removal, transforming that, too, as it affects the new territory” (355). So, in 
the split writing of Derrida’s Glas, for example, an early experimental text, he divides the 
page between Hegel and Genet, invariably allowing each to contaminate the other: Hegel 
is grafted onto Genet; Genet is grafted onto Hegel. Needless to say, this conception of 
writing, of textual grafting, as Jonathan Culler relates, views discourse “as the product of 
various sorts of combinations or insertions” (On Deconstruction 135). Along the way, of 
course, critiques occur, reinscriptions emerge, new territories are staked out, and new 
effects of meaning are produced. The process of undoing looms large.  
The deconstructive strategy of Howe’s “The Falls Fight,” therefore, is more than 
mere quotation or an instance of historical collage. As with Derrida, Howe’s excisions, 
grafts, and incisions are critiques, expositions, and reinscriptions that give rise to new 
effects of meaning, engender differences and deferrals, reveal blind spots, and, generally 
speaking, undermine the stability of (historical) truth. The simultaneous reconstruction 
and deconstruction of a specific historical event, particularly the extractions from 
unnamed and suggestively unreliable and ideologically driven historical texts, the 
occasional interruptions and incisions, the etymological play, and the overall sense of 
ambiguity, in other terms, is, to reiterate, the first phase of a larger project aimed at 
fracture and disorder, at demonstrating, as Howe notes in another context, that culture 
“representing form and order will always demand sacrifice and subjugation of one group 
by another” (My Emily Dickinson 93). Coherency, form, and order require oppression and 
exclusion. In more explicit and specific terms, then, “The Falls Fight” is aimed at 
exposing and deconstructing historiography’s claim to truth, especially the systemic and 
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ideological function of this claim in histories of European colonization. It is, in the end, 
and in no small part, an initial cut in a larger and highly politicized deconstructive project.  
The next section, “Hope Atherton’s Wanderings,” is composed in serial form, a 
trademark of Howe’s style, consists of sixteen poems, and clearly continues, in 
significantly more radical fashion, the deconstructive and highly political project 
established in the first section of the text. In fact, the form itself is offered as an element 
of Howe’s critique of historiography’s claim to truth. As Kathleen Crown relates, 
“Howe’s turn to serial form is motivated by gender-based critiques—not only of the 
lyric’s presupposition of a unified (male) speaking subject but also of historiography’s 
claim to incorporate memories, narratives, and anecdotes (recorded for the most part by 
male editors) within a progressively larger historical narrative that is coherent and 
continuous” (486). Howe’s poems, therefore, Crown later notes, operate as “textual 
archaeologies that question source documents and explore the material resistance of 
language (its complex etymologies and shifting orthographies) to the social vision it 
inscribes” (488). The first two poems of this section are felicitous representations: 
 Prest try to set after grandmother 
 revived by and laid down left ly 
 little distant each other and fro 
 Saw digression hobbling driftwood 
 forage two rotted beans & etc. 
 Redy to faint slaughter story so 
 Gone and signal through deep water 
 Mr. Atherton’s story Hope Atherton  
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         ________ 
 
Clog nutmeg abt noon 
scraping cano muzzell 
foot path sand and so 
gravel rubbish vandal 
horse flesh ryal tabl 
sand enemys flood sun 
Danielle Warnare Servt 
Turner Falls Fight us 
Next wearer April One (6) 
In an interview with Lynn Keller, Howe remarks, “I believe there are stories that need to 
be told again differently” (“An Interview” 31). Whether or not Howe’s use of the term 
“differently” is intended to function as a reference to Derridean deconstruction is a matter 
for debate, but this initial poem of Articulation of Sound Forms in Time clearly enacts 
and monumentalizes différance. Even the first word of the poem is a lesson in 
signification. The word “prest,” if it functions as a noun, is defined, according to the 
OED, as “a payment made in advance;” as an adjective, it can mean “ready for action or 
use; at hand; prepared; in proper order,” “alert, active, sprightly,” “clear to the 
understanding,” or “close at hand;” as a verb, it signifies “to make haste.” Given the 
inability to determine the term’s syntactical function, all of these definitions appear 
relevant. At the same time, the word is no longer in use; it is a linguistic relic, an odd 
specter, a trace, and, as such, an embodiment of that which is not present but also 
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necessarily not absent. What’s more, it is a representation of a historically specific 
orthographic system, to use Crown’s formulation, linked to ideologies of domination and 
control. A turn to the historical text from which Howe excises this term, as well as others, 
a text that she hints at in “The Falls Fight,” specifically in the extract from a letter written 
by Stephen Williams, reveals the complexity of Howe’s poetic deconstruction.   
Appearing in George Sheldon’s A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts, and 
apparently written by Stephen Williams, son of the Reverend John Williams, and initially 
published in an appendix to the 1793 edition of The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion: 
or, The Captivity and Deliverance of Rev. John Williams of Deerfield, the text documents, 
in clearly romantic and undeniably Puritan fashion, the “heroic” escape of the “boy hero” 
Jonathan Wells, a member of the colonial militia who, like Hope Atherton, evaded death 
during the rout following the “Falls Fight.”15 Given the importance of this text not only to 
the present discussion but to Howe’s text as a whole, I offer an extended excerpt of 
Williams’ account of Wells’ experience: 
“I shall give an account of the remarkable providences of God towards 
Jonathan Wells Esq then aged 16 years and 2 or 3 months who was in the 
action [at the Falls Fight, May 19th]. . . . Upon receiving his wound he was 
in danger of falling from his horse, but catching hold of ye horse’s maine 
he recovered himself. . . . He had now got about 2 miles from ye place 
                                                
15 Howe acknowledges her use of this text in her 2007 collection, Souls of the Labadie 
Tract (New York: New Directions): “I found their narratives in George Sheldon’s A 
History of Deerfield, Massachusetts, published in 1895 by the Pocumtuck Valley 
Memorial Association” (13). 
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where yy did ye exploit in, & now yy had left ye track of ye company & 
were left both by ye indians yt persued ym & by their own men that 
should have tarried with ym. These two men were unacquainted wth ye 
woods, & without anny track or path. . . . J.J. represented ye baldness of 
his wounds, & made his companion think they were certainly mortall, and 
therefore when yy separated in order to find the path, J.W. was glad to 
leave him, lest he shd be a clog or hindrance to him. Mr. W. grew faint, & 
once ye indians prest him, he was near fainting away, but by eating a 
nutmeg, (which his grandmother gave him as he was going out) he was 
revivd. After traveling a while he came upon Green river, and followd it 
up to ye place calld ye Country farms, & passd over Green river. . . . Abt 
noon this, & at abt sun an hour high at nt, being disturbed by ye flies, he 
stopd ye touch hole of his gun & struck fire, & set ye woods on fire. . . . 
He traveled upon ye plain till he came to a foot path wch led up to ye road 
he went out in, where he cd see ye tracks of ye horses. He traveled by 
leaning upon his gun as a staff, & so he came down to Dd river, but did 
not know how to get over. . . . [H]e got over, but filled the muzzell of his 
gun with gravel & sand. . . . Mr. W., suspecting the indians wd come to 
search for him, went away into a swamp . . . and finding two great trees yt 
had been left by ye flood lying at a little distance from each other & 
covered over wth rubbish, he crept in betwixt them & within a little while 
heard a running to & fro in ye swamp, but saw nothing; within a little 
while all was still, and he ventured to proceed on his journey.” (162-164)   
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In Positions, Derrida notes that différance is the “systematic play of differences, of the 
traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. 
This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive . . . production of the intervals 
without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify, would not function” (27). No instance 
of language is ever fully absent or present; differences and deferrals persist. As such, 
Howe’s use of the term “prest,” excised from its historical and cultural context and put 
into a kind of free-floating play without syntactical coherence, simultaneously calls 
attention to and undermines its significance and function. Stripped of its singularity, in 
other words, the term is no longer capable of transmitting a historically stable meaning; 
contiguity, coherence, form, and order give way to play, fracture, difference, and deferral. 
In its current context, in other terms, the word, or, perhaps more appropriately, sound 
form, inspires linguistic uncertainty and phonetic play, as others have noted16: press, 
pressed, impressed, oppressed, present, priest, et cetera. Needless to say, many of these 
phonetically similar terms are historically relevant: Hope Atherton, for instance, was a 
priest; the terms “press” and oppressed” bear an obvious significance in their relationship 
to European colonization. More significantly, of course, this play of differences defers 
and upsets the supposedly stable historical meaning of the term “prest.” Its meaning, 
finally, is undecidable.  To be sure, this undecidability calls into question the “truth” of 
both the historical record and historiography itself.  
 This deconstructive notion of undecidability is achieved in other instances as well. 
A comparison of Howe’s first two poems with the narrative of Jonathan Wells’ escape 
                                                
16 See, for example, Marjorie Perloff’s “‘Collision or Collusion With History’: The 
Narrative Lyric of Susan Howe,” Contemporary Literature 30.4 (1989): 518-33. 
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reveals that Howe’s choice of words—“grandmother,” “distant,” “faint,” “clog,” 
“muzzell,” “sand,” and “gravel” for instance—is in large part constituted by excisions 
from the historical record. At the same time, in the absence of this source material, 
Howe’s poem does not, in any real sense, offer an historical or thematic reconstruction of 
Wells’ escape. Instead, Howe’s text deconstructs, decomposes, shatters, and fractures the 
veracity of the historical narrative, and, as such, opens it up to scrutiny, questioning, and 
possibility. In fact, in typically deconstructive fashion, Howe’s active asyntactical 
combinations, or interweavings, to resurrect Derrida’s term, of words from the historical 
record threaten the order and consistency of a supposedly stable historical truth; turning 
the language of Wells’ story back on itself, Howe exposes premises, gaps, and silences; 
new, unexpected, and, importantly, unintended meanings emerge (which, of course, are 
subject to further deconstruction). 
 In the first poem, for example, the line “Redy to faint slaughter story so” both 
excises and incises. Creating and delaying meaning, the line reassembles a number of 
terms from Wells’ account into an asyntactic collage that simultaneously issues forth a 
wealth of meaningful possibilities and critical denouncements. According to the historical 
narrative, Wells was “redy to faint” prior to being revived by a piece of nutmeg given to 
him by his grandmother. However, in the course of Howe’s line, “faint” might also be 
construed as an adjective; “faint slaughter,” then, recalls, in one sense, the cowardly 
behavior of the colonial militia who slaughtered a number of sleeping Native Americans 
during the beginning stages of the “Falls Fight.” This combination, of course, also calls 
into question the notion of prudence implied by the use of the term “redy,” especially 
since the “Falls Fight” inspired unity among the normally exclusive bands of Native 
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Americans in the Connecticut River Valley. In addition, the amalgam “slaughter story” 
functions antithetically to the colonial intention of Wells’ narrative, namely as a Cooper-
like discourse of Puritan Providence. The process of undoing, once again, looms large. 
 Needless to say, other deconstructions and radical reversals emerge. “Clog 
nutmeg abt noon” reflects the record of Wells’ damaged appendage and subsequent 
revival while exposing, especially through the use of the word “Clog,” which, as a verb, 
denotes restraint and confinement, the violence enacted under the logic of Manifest 
Destiny. The lines “gravel rubbish vandal / horse flesh ryal tabl” recall Wells’ river 
fording and desperate foraging. At the same time, terms like “rubbish” and “vandal” 
intimate destruction and violence, as does “ryal,” which, if pronounced “rial,” signifies 
“froth or foam” and suggests, among a number of other possibilities, an image of the 
bottom of a cataract where, in the “Falls Fight,” hundreds of women and children were 
dashed against the rocks and undoubtedly churned in the waters. Meaning, of course, is 
never final. Difference and deferral is the fundamental condition of language. Howe’s 
“ryal” evokes not only “rial” but “rile” and “real;” “tabl” evokes, both visually and 
phonetically, “tabla,” “tablature,” “table,” “tableaux,” or “topple.” Meaning is also not 
restricted to phonetic resemblance and denotative suggestion. With its abrupt and often 
violent pauses and stops, in large measure a consequence of the preponderance of one- 
and two-syllable words, Howe’s sound forms also mimic the historical violence of the 
“Falls Fight,” of Native Americans clamoring toward the river and struggling through the 
gravel and sand, of hard splashes and strokes in a fight against the rapids, of guns being 
loaded and unloaded, of bodies falling to the ground. History opens: the past is present; 
the present is past. This is not, however, a Modernist gesture. 
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In Howe, Pound’s Modernist directive to “make it new” is transformed and 
transcribed into something like “undo it.” Postmodern innovation is not, however, as with 
the Modernists, an aesthetic end; instead, it is a foregrounding and interrogation of the 
processes by, through, and in which innovation occurs. As Peter Nicholls relates, Howe’s 
mode of composition produces “constellations of words which combine in a way that 
forces prosody against syntax” and consequently moves “beyond the more familiar, 
modernist forms of fragmentation which tend to break discourse into phrases to 
recombine their elements into new wholes” (596). In other words, according to Nicholls, 
Howe’s attention to “sound” and “individual words” flouts “syntactical logic” (596). In 
perhaps somewhat typically poststructuralist fashion, then, language in Howe’s poetry is 
cast as unstable and unreliable but simultaneously inescapable; language is both captor 
and captive. At the same time, the textually deconstructive nature of her texts is more 
than mere aesthetic effect. To be sure, Howe’s textual interrogations, like much 
postmodern art, are inescapably political. For Howe, the instability of language throws 
into question the legitimacy of historical (colonial) narrative. As Peter Nicholls argues, 
Howe’s work proposes an “association between ‘history’ and an idea of narrative as a 
form premised on exclusion and erasure” (588), a sentiment echoed in Rachel Blau 
DuPlessis’ analysis of Howe’s work: “[H]er poems are repositories of the language 
shards left in a battlefield over cultural power” (123).       
 In addition to the deconstructive reversals outlined above, Howe’s use and 
deconstruction of Stephen Williams’ account of Jonathan Wells’ escape, wander, and 
return home is also, then, an indication of a larger politics of erasure and exclusion. Like 
Derrida in Glas, Howe actively grafts (as the condition of language). Hope Atherton is 
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grafted onto Jonathan Wells; Wells is grafted onto Atherton. The result, at moments, is 
something like a lineated version of Derrida’s Glas or of John Caputo’s Radical 
Hermeneutics, an undecidable that “produces not a definite effect but one which keeps 
shifting, ambiguous, impossible to decipher, unyielding to a hermeneuein which wants to 
fix its essence” (188). Strictly speaking, then, these poems are not, as the title suggests, 
“Hope Atherton’s Wanderings.” Clearly, however, Howe identifies with Atherton. His 
“epicene name,” to reiterate, is an “emblem foreshadowing a poet’s abolished limitations.” 
Hope is both a point of opening and a moment of enclosure. Like Daniel Warner, a 
member of the colonial militia feminized as “Danielle Warnare” in the second poem17, 
Hope, for Howe, serves two functions. First, as a point of opening, Hope’s rejected 
story—inscribed, for Howe, in his name—is a representation of that which history and 
history writing excludes and marginalizes; women and Native Americans are obvious 
instances. As Fiona Green notes, “Attending particularly to the mechanics of textual 
transmission, Howe scrutinizes those editorial and institutional frameworks that come 
between her and the vestigial presences she wants to recover” (80). Reinscription and 
reappropriation, then, must occur, or, as Howe writes in The Birth-mark, “If history is a 
record of survivors, Poetry shelters other voices” (47). However, and second, as a 
moment of enclosure, the story of the “Falls Fight” no more belongs to Wells than it does 
to Atherton; both are instances of a larger historical and historiographical politics of 
domination, control, form, order, and, significantly, exclusion. Their stories are, in short, 
                                                
17 For evidence of Warner’s participation in the “Falls Fight,” see George Madison 
Bodge’s Soldiers in King Philip’s War (Boston, Mass., 1906) 242. 
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examples of a colonial discourse that rests on a violent and antithetical conception of 
otherness. This point requires elaboration.                             
In “The Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson,” Howe writes, 
“Avatar of the only literary-mythological form indigenous to North America, this 
captivity narrative is both a microcosm of colonial imperialist history and a prophecy of 
our contemporary repudiation of alterity, anonymity, darkness” (89). She draws attention 
to the fact that, as in much colonial discourse, Rowlandson’s narrative, written 
“ostensibly to serve as a reminder of God’s Providence,” refers to Native Americans as 
“‘murtherous wretches, ‘bloody heathen,’ ‘hell-hounds,’ ‘ravenous bears,’ ‘wolves’” (95). 
At the same time, she notes that many critics “skirt the presence in this genre of an 
equally insulting stereotype, that of a white woman as a passive cipher in a controlled and 
circulated idea of Progress at whose zenith rides the hero-hunter (Indian or white) who 
will always rescue her” (96). Here, as in her poetry, Howe bears the mark of not only a 
poststructuralist but of a feminist and postcolonial critic. In framing Rowlandson’s 
narrative and, by extension, the narratives of Atherton and Wells, Howe exposes one of 
the imperatives of colonialism—to manage the unmanageable. This imperative, 
especially as a function of discourse, has been theorized in several different forms. Homi 
Bhabha’s The Location of Culture, however, provides the most relevant articulation of 
the point.   
Colonial discourse, Bhabha insists, is an “apparatus of power” which turns on the 
“recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences”—strategic functions 
which create a space for “‘subject peoples’” (70). What’s more, it finds authorization for 
these strategies in the production “of knowledges of colonizer and colonized which are 
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stereotypical but antithetically valued” (70). In other words, it finds authorization 
differentially. The objective of colonial discourse, then, consists in construing the 
colonized “as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to 
justify conquest” (70). Further, “[C]olonial discourse produces the colonized as a social 
reality which is at once an ‘other’ and yet entirely knowable and visible” (70-1). To put it 
another way, colonial discourse produces the colonized subject through and by its own 
terms, producing a “social reality” which forever bends back upon itself. Such rhetoric, 
built on notions of a dissipated populace in need of disciplinary control from without, 
recalls the founding principals of Western Imperial domination. And it clearly describes 
at least one of the historical functions of Rowlandson’s, Atherton’s, and Wells’ 
narratives—narratives Howe seeks to deconstruct, destabilize, and fracture. It is of little 
wonder, then, that the siglums, the extracted letters, “M” and “R,” appear, respectively, in 
the third and fourth poems of this section, grafted into Howe’s existing grafts and 
deconstructions of Wells and Atherton: “who was lapd M as big as any kerchief;” “Who 
was lapt R & soe grew bone & bullet” (7). 
Many of the remaining poems of “Hope Atherton’s Wanderings,” as well as a 
number of the poems in the final section, “Taking the Forest,” continue the 
deconstructive strategy outlined above, tracing and retracing, grafting and undermining, 
supplementing and interrogating colonial history and historiography’s claim to order, 
coherency, and truth. Some, however, break out of this mode and offer relatively clear 
indications of Howe’s conception of colonial history and history writing as well as her 
deconstructive approach. In the twelfth poem of the second section, for example, Howe 
writes, “Knowledge narrowly fixed knowledge / Whose bounds in theories slay” (12). 
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Unlike the historian, the purveyor of truth, Howe’s textual constructions and 
deconstructions constantly call into question the author’s role, the poet’s role, in the 
production of (historical) meaning: “Collision or collusion with history” (33). Colonial 
discourse, if it is to serve its intended social, political, and cultural function, demands 
“narrowly fixed” accounts that constrain and limit; stability and truth, “fixed knowledge,” 
is essential to its repudiation of alterity and social and political imperatives of domination. 
Its limitations and order, in other terms, its “bounds,” are extensions of its violence: “in 
theories slay.” At the same time, its desire for coherency exposes it as a system subject to 
interruption, interrogation, and deconstruction. Its limitations and systems of “fixed 
knowledge” are subject to textual violence, a kind of theoretical slaying. As Howe writes 
in one of the poems of the last section, “Taking the Forest,” “total systemic circular 
knowledge / System impossible in time” (28). 
Other announcements and denouncements emerge. In an early poem from 
“Taking the Forest,” Howe writes:  
 Double penetrable foreign sequel 
 By face to know helm 
 
 Prey to destroy in dark theme 
 Emblem of fictitious narrative 
 Step and system 
 Collision and impulsion 
 Asides and reminders to myself 
 Lives to be seen pressing and alien 
 Fix fleeting communication 
 Carried away before a pursuer 
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 Demonstration in a string of definitions (19)  
Clearly less opaque than the early poems of the second section but nonetheless complex, 
the language here inspires a kind of politics of readerly consumption. “Double penetrable” 
describes, among other things, Howe’s deconstructive practice and the back and forth 
movement of Native Americans outlined in the search for Jonathan Wells. The phrases 
“foreign sequel” and “Emblem of fictitious narrative” seem to provide an allusion to the 
rejected narrative of Hope Atherton and the celebrated narrative of Jonathan Wells. “Fix 
fleeting communication” seems, in part, a denouncement similar in fashion to Howe’s 
earlier scrutiny of the imperative of colonial discourse to dominate, control, and fix. Of 
course, “Demonstration in a string of definitions” seems to undermine any attempt to 
offer even a casual suggestion of stable meaning. Definitions initiate limitation and 
control, both forms of demonstration; concurrently, however, definitions inspire an 
interminable process of differentiation and deconstruction. Meaning, as in other sections 
of Howe’s text, is never complete.            
Despite the relative syntactical clarity of some poems in these last two sections, 
other poems recede into nearly inscrutable deconstructive play and linguistic fracture. 
Here, for example, are a few lines from one of the last poems of the second section:   
 Posit gaze level diminish lamp and asleep(selv)cannot see 
 MoheganToForceImmanenceShotStepSeeShowerFiftyTree 
 UpConcatenationLessonLittleAKantianEmpiricalMaoris  (15) 
Kathleen Fraser argues that Howe “takes a whole page as a canvas (she began as a painter) 
and positions words as in a field . . . in which the line does not present itself as 
continuous flow but pinpoints, frames, or locates one vulnerable word at a time for its 
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own resonance, time value, visual texture, and meaning, apart from its connection to what 
precedes and follows it” (161).  Given Howe’s monumentalizing of difference and 
deferral, this, however, seems not always to be the case, if ever. In fact, as in the lines 
above, isolating terms for individual scrutiny seems largely beside the point, as each 
word, each sound, is marked by a series of differences. No element, to put it in Derridean 
terms, is present in and of itself. Specific deconstructions, plays, or neologisms appear 
inscrutable, fail to yield truth or meaning, and, as such, are typically impervious to New 
Critical standards of reading. Howe’s textual experimentations, like Derrida’s attacks on 
the institution of philosophy and philosophical writing, are aimed at questioning 
traditional methods of writing and reading and traditional conceptions of making 
meaning. Contamination is inevitable; knowledge is never fixed. As Michael Greer 
argues, close reading, in and of itself, “dismantles the discourse of language poetry; it 
separates the aesthetic component of the writing from its political contexts and impulses, 
and isolates its forms from its history” (339). This is not to suggest, of course, that 
specific terms are without specific meaning or that any kind of reading or act of 
interpretation should not take place. Rather, Howe’s suggestion is that the impulse to 
control a text is the same impulse that inspires violence in the name of coherency and 
order. The alternative, of course, as demonstrated by Howe’s deconstructive practices, is 
an active reading in which production is never final. Although subject to further 
deconstruction and new erasure, the act of revision and reinscription is both necessary 
and possible. The last line of Articulation of Sound Forms in Time suggestively reads, 
“Crumbled masonry windswept hickory” (38). 
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In addition to Howe’s deconstruction of Euro-American colonial history and 
historiography, the poems of Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, without ever saying 
so, also seem to call into question the legitimacy of the contemporary lyric. In its 
interrogation of voice, lyric, and subjectivity, Howe’s text, in other terms, implicitly 
challenges the workshop aesthetic.  Kathleen Crown, for instance, argues on these terms 
specifically: “Shattering dominant ideologies of the contemporary lyric—its privatized 
subjectivity, scenic-derived emotion, gendered agency, and image-based epiphanies—
Howe’s serial lyrics testify not to the solitary speaker’s inward eye but to a painfully 
public, dissociated, and multiple sensibility” (483-4). Although offering a more general 
assessment, Michael Greer argues along similar lines: 
By problematizing poetic language along the two fundamental axes of 
communication and referentiality, “language poetry” effects a shift in the 
relationship of the (writing) subject to poetic discourse, from a notion of 
the self as a speaker or voice located outside the text, to a notion of the 
subject as a constructed moment or effect within various intersecting 
discourses. The radical potential of poetry, in this argument, lies in its 
ability to make available new modes of subjectivity and communication 
by reworking the fabric of relations among writer, text, and reader. (343) 
The self, in the course of Howe’s poems, is a fractured construct, an intersection, a point 
of reference, a repetition, a doubling, a graft, and an effect of discourse. Like Robert 
Grenier, her work, especially in its construction of polyvalent subjectivity, indirectly 




CHAPTER 3. NATURE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE IN 
GARY SNYDER’S MOUNTAINS AND RIVERS WITHOUT END AND A.R. 
AMMONS’S GARBAGE 
 
 In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson 
insists that postmodernism “is what you have when the modernization process is 
complete and nature is gone for good” (ix). For Jameson, of course, the death of “nature” 
signifies much more than just an end to an experience of natural environments. For him, 
as for many postmodern theorists and critics, nature, or Nature, or the natural, is nothing 
more than an inscription, a culturally mediated text. As Jameson makes clear in his 
discussion of a Robert Gober installation, which displays the work of several other visual 
artists (Webster, Bierstadt, and Prince) within its highly aestheticized “natural” home 
space, postmodernism and postmodern art constitute “something like the grave of Nature, 
as the latter has systematically been eclipsed from the object world and the social 
relations of a society whose tendential domination over its Other (the nonhuman or the 
formerly natural) is more complete than at any other moment in human history” (170). In 
this scenario, nature, and no doubt human subjectivity and reality itself, is a fiction, an 
interminable play of free-floating signifiers without stable/fixed signifieds. Like Jean 
Baudrillard, Jameson, as Vincent Leitch relates, historicizes postmodernism as an “age of 
simulacra addicted to images, stereotypes, pseudoevents, and spectacles. It is not a 
question here of preferring representations to realities but of the transformation of ‘reality’ 
into representations: there is no independent reality, only discourses about it” 
(Postmodernism 118-119). Life in the postmodern era, according to Jameson and 
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Baudrillard, is no longer lived or experienced directly. Representation, now largely the 
domain of profit-driven and debt-laden transnational corporations and conglomerates, is 
reality. Nature is dead. 
Needless to say, Jameson and Baudrillard’s characterizations of the postmodern 
era have profound social, political, cultural, and, importantly, ecological implications. If 
postmodernism constitutes the death of nature, if reality is only representation, if 
subjectivity is a by-product of corporate hegemony, if passive and carefree consumption 
constitute the essence of human life, if watersheds, forests, and ecosystems are only 
viewed as sources of profit and human resource, if, as Vincent Leitch relates, both 
postmodernism and capitalism demand “atomizing, dehistoricizing, commodifying, and 
desacrilizing” (Postmodernism 119), then the manner and content of responses to these 
conditions is not only of fundamental importance but undeniably and unavoidably 
political. Contemplating an apparent revival of literary interest in writing about nature in 
the early 1990s, Gary Snyder notes, “The subject matter ‘nature,’ and the concern for it 
(and us humans in it), have come—it is gratifying to note—to engage artists and writers. 
This interest may be another strand of postmodernism, since the modernist avant-garde 
was strikingly urban-centered” (“Unnatural Writing” 163). What Snyder suggests, at least 
in part, is that to write about (or for) nature in the postmodern era invariably involves 
taking into consideration the ecological impact of human civilization and culture, which 
includes of course the cultural and political system of values, ideas, and ideals upon 
which that impact is predicated. In an age of ecological/environmental crisis, in other 
words, the concept that humans exist separate from or outside of nature, for example, is 
not only outmoded but dangerous. To be sure, then, while Jameson and Baudrillard view 
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the largely destructive and deconstructive nature of postmodernism as simply replicating 
the logic of late capitalism, others see postmodernism, not uncritically of course, as an 
era of potential, possibility, and renewal, particularly in its ongoing scrutiny of modernist 
ideologies. Getting back to nature just might, in fact, be a postmodern gesture. 
In The Postmodern Turn, for instance, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner insist that 
although postmodern social theory rarely deals directly with ecological issues, it is a 
“short step to an ecological perspective in which postmodern ‘incredulity’ realizes the 
bankruptcy of modern views of progress and understands that the modern age of cheap, 
nonrenewable resources is ending” (265). In other terms, the “shift from the modern 
belief in inexhaustible resources…to the postmodern realization of scarcity and finitude 
allows for a new ethic of conservation, a new appreciation of ecology, a critique of 
consumerism, and a new vision of ‘sustainable’ societies and consumption habits that are 
ecologically sound” (265). Since the early 1970s, born in large measure out of 
circumstance and necessity, various strands of environmental thought—informed by the 
ecological consequences of modern and postmodern science, theory, and culture—have 
emerged, sometimes in competing and combative fashion. Among the list of these 
emergent disciplines and movements are various theories of environmental and economic 
entropy, chaos theory, social ecology, ecopsychology, ecometaphysics, ecofeminism, and 
deep ecology. While both direct and indirect traces of these disciplines, as well as others, 
are evident in the work of both Gary Snyder and A.R. Ammons, and while strict 
categorization unfairly limits the breadth and scope of their work, the deep ecology 
movement nonetheless provides a relatively consistent basis on which to discuss the 
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ecological perspective of both writers, as well as their responses to the issues outlined 
above. 
A product, in large part, of the counterculture of the 1960s, both residual and 
emergent in its opposition to the values and ideologies of the dominant culture, deep 
ecology offers a fundamentally radical view of nature, natural systems, and, more 
generally, the place of humans in the biosphere, generally rooted in a logic of both 
science and spirituality. Defined, initially, by Arne Naess, in 1973, deep ecology rejects 
the “human-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image. Organisms 
as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations” (“The Shallow and the Deep” 
3). To be distinguished from what Naess calls “shallow ecology,” a short-range, 
shortsighted, and often technologically driven movement intended to fight “against 
pollution and resource depletion” and secure the “health and affluence of people in the 
developed countries” (3), deep ecology expresses a “value priority system only in part 
based on results . . . of scientific research” (7). In other terms, as Alan Drengson and 
Yuichi Inoue note in The Deep Ecology Movement, shallow ecology must be “clearly 
distinguished from the deep approach, which in contrast examines the roots of our 
environmental/social problems.  The deep approach aims to achieve a fundamental 
ecological transformation of our sociocultural systems, collective actions, and lifestyles” 
(xix). At its source, then, deep ecology is a scientifically grounded philosophical 
movement. It is, as Naess contends, “ecophilosophical rather than ecological” since 
ecology is a “limited science which makes use of scientific methods” while philosophy is 
“the most general forum of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive, 
and political philosophy is one of its subsections” (“The Shallow and the Deep” 8). Given 
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Naess’ conception of the movement, it should, therefore, come as no surprise that deep 
ecology is grounded, both theoretically and practically, in a political philosophy of social 
change that, as he relates, insists on “a geographical sense of belonging” (Ecology, 
Community, and Lifestyle 61) and an understanding that experience of “an environment 
happens by doing something in it, living in it, meditating and acting” (63). This is, 
fundamentally, a bioregionalist ethic. According to its terms, the “local community is the 
starting point for political deliberation” (63) on a range of social and ecological issues: 
act locally; think globally. Like other forms of postmodern thought, deep ecology 
necessarily provides a systemic analysis of social, political, and cultural transformation 
through an examination of dominant and often long-standing conceptions of place and 
world, retaining and discarding along the way. Unlike many strands of postmodern theory, 
however, it does not view postmodernism as an era of fatalistic capitulation to finally 
unknowable sources of power. For deep ecologists, change is both necessary and possible. 
Its analysis and conception of nature is a case in point. 
In Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, Michael 
Zimmerman notes that “deep ecologists call for a shift away from anthropocentric 
humanism toward an ecocentrism guided by the norm of self-realization of all beings” (2). 
Drawing upon, as Zimmerman also relates, “the science of ecology, Asian religions, the 
perennial philosophy, leading Western philosophers . . . Norwegian and American 
naturalism and pastoralism, countercultural ideals, creation-centered spirituality, and the 
practices and attitudes of primal peoples (especially Native Americans)” (19), deep 
ecologists view all species as ontological equals, as nodes, or “knots,” to return to Naess’ 
formulation, in a non-privileged, non-dualistic, and non-hierarchical “biospherical net.” 
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Everything, and every thing, is connected. Choices, therefore, matter. As Gary Snyder 
relates, “Deep Ecology thinkers insist that the natural world has value in its own right, 
that the health of natural systems should be our first concern, and that this best serves the 
interests of humans as well” (“Survival and Sacrament” 180). In other terms, difference, 
diversity, is essential to a sustainable and fully functioning ecosystem. Domination, 
colonization, subjugation, and neglect, the driving forces of modernism, which have no 
doubt been inherited by important aspects of late-capitalist culture as well as certain 
strands of postmodern theory, damage its overall health. In addition, deep ecologists 
insist that nature and natural systems are real, whether we accord to them a reality outside 
of human understanding or not. Of course, failure to acknowledge the reality of nature—
seeing it, for instance, as a massive storehouse for human consumption or viewing it as 
nothing more than a social, political, or cultural construction—threatens the survival of 
all species, including humans. On the unfortunate implications of nature as a purely 
social construction, Snyder, for example, is direct: 
The idea of Nature as being a "social construction"—a shared cultural 
projection seen and shaped in the light of social values and priorities—if 
carried out to the full bright light of philosophy, would look like a subset 
of the world view best developed in Mahayana Buddhism or Advaita 
Vedanta, which declares (as just one part of its strategy) the universe to be 
maya, or illusion. In doing so the Asian philosophers are not saying that 
the universe is ontologically without some kind of reality. They are 
arguing that, across the board, our seeing of the world is a biological 
(based on the particular qualities of our species' body-mind), 
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psychological (reflecting subjective projections), and cultural 
construction. . . . The current use of the "social construction" terminology, 
however, cannot go deeper, because it is based on the logic of European 
science and the "enlightenment." This thought-pod, in pursuing some new 
kind of meta-narrative, has failed to cop to its own story—which is the 
same old occidental view of Nature as a realm of resources that has been 
handed over to humanity for its own use. . . . This is indeed the ultimate 
commodification of Nature, done by supposedly advanced theorists, who 
prove to be simply the high end of the "wise use" movement. (“Nature as 
Seen from Kitkitdizze is No ‘Social Construction’” 22) 
Here, Snyder suggests that theorists like Jameson and Baudrillard are modern wolves in 
postmodern clothing, transforming but unwittingly extending modernist grand narratives, 
including the conception of nature as a limitless resource for human “use.”   
This is not to say, of course, that the postmodern critique of modern ideologies is 
wholly misdirected or theoretically useless. In fact, as a form of postmodern thought 
itself, deep ecology proposes an alternative mode of being in the world that is radically 
and antithetically opposed to the one supplied throughout the history of modern thought. 
To be certain, this is one of the reasons Robert Frodeman, in “Radical Environmentalism 
and the Political Roots of Postmodernism: Differences That Make a Difference,” claims 
that postmodernism “shares radical environmentalism’s sense of the oppressive and 
truncated nature of modern rationality, but it carries the critique of modernism much 
further by uncovering and attacking the hidden premises of modernism” (122). Among 
the list of postmodern attacks on the “premises of modernism” Frodeman outlines are 
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“the individual as the source of meaning,” the “belief in quantification as the defining 
character of the real,” and the “acceptance of oppositional and exclusionary hierarchies” 
(122). What’s more, he suggests, “radical environmentalists and postmodernists both see 
a connection between the domination of others and the domination of nature” (122). For 
Frodeman, essential and clearly essentialized beliefs in the absolute legitimacy of science, 
rationality, and progress are relics, specious artifacts of a bygone era. At the same time, 
Frodeman is not suggesting that these “grand narratives” have been completely flushed 
from the system. On the contrary, the policies inspired by their logic endure, even as the 
recognition of their destructive influence is brought to the surface. Nonetheless, as 
Sueellen Campbell argues, there is a definable logic in the fact that both postmodern 
theorists and deep ecologists begin by “criticizing the dominant structures of Western 
culture and the vast abuses they have spawned” (127). Multidisciplinary, heteroglossic, 
emergent, residual, and, in this obvious sense, postmodern in nature, deep ecology, in a 
fashion similar to social ecology, ecofeminism, and much postmodern theory, seeks to 
“take value from the once dominant and give it to the weak” (127). Hail to the edges! In 
the postmodern era, however, this politics of social redress, this desire for social and 
political parity, has generally excluded the nonhuman. As Susan Kalter notes, “one major 
priority of humanism, a knowledge of the nonhuman, is virtually lost on many 
postmodern thinkers” (16). To be sure, deep ecology’s inclusion of the nonhuman, as 
well as its use of Eastern philosophy and spirituality, in its overall conception of the 




In The Postmodern Turn, for example, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, after 
outlining a number of theories that trace the causes of and present solutions to the current 
ecological crisis, including deep ecology, suggest that the majority of these theories rely 
on a “quietism inherent in many forms of Eastern philosophy, which encourages us to 
merge with the undifferentiated whole, a potentially dangerous idea that could stifle 
individuality and critical reason” (267-268). Their position, as well as the nature of their 
response, is not uncommon, and it is disappointing, to say the least. While Best and 
Kellner readily acknowledge globalization and heteroglot mixing as defining features of 
postmodernism, they imply that ecological solutions must, finally, come from the West, 
and presumably and preferably from postmodern social theory. What’s worse, while they 
are careful to make distinctions among theories of postmodern culture generated by 
Western thinkers, they crudely essentialize the East and Eastern philosophy, as well as 
present, against their own assumptions about the nature of postmodernism, a binary 
conception of whole and part, one and many, self and other. Nonetheless, evident in the 
work of both Gary Snyder and A.R. Ammons is an ethic of deep ecological commitment 
and etiquette—generally grounded in an emergent scientific and social politics and a 
primarily residual (and Eastern) understanding of self and nature—which demonstrates, 
as Leonard Scigaj relates, “sensitivity to ecological thinking, cyclic renewal, 
bioregionalism, and the interdependency of all organisms within an ecosystem” 
(Sustainable Poetry 11). Gary Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers Without End and A.R. 
Ammons’s Garbage are important poetic instances of these deep postmodern ecological 
concerns and tendencies. 




     The idea of Zen is to catch life as it flows. 
     --D.T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen 
Buddhism 
     Water is water’s complete virtue; it is not 
flowing. 
              --Dōgen, “Mountains and Waters Sūtra” 
 Published in complete form in 1996, Gary Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers 
Without End is an expansive long-poem sequence of thirty-nine interconnected poems 
written over a period of forty years. Broken into four sections and conceived, as Tim 
Dean notes, “on a planetary scale” (462), the sequence is simultaneously chaotic and 
organized, regional and global, and it freely moves in and out of various physical, 
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual landscapes, continuously forming and reforming as it 
unfolds. This, of course, is an intentional element of the text’s overall design, gracefully 
reflected in its title. As Snyder notes in a highly suggestive autobiographical essay—“The 
Making of Mountains and Rivers Without End”—that follows the sequence, the title of 
the text is, most directly, an allusion to East Asian landscape painting: 
In museums and through books I became aware of how the energies of 
mist, white water, rock formations, air swirls—a chaotic universe where 
everything is in place—are so much a part of the East Asian painter’s 
world. In one book, I came upon a reference to a hand scroll (shou-chuan) 




Snyder’s identification with and understanding of East Asian landscapes and landscape 
painting is a product of both proximity and experience, and it bears a large degree of 
significance to Mountains and Rivers Without End as a long-poem sequence as well as to 
his ecological vision, often articulated in the form of deep ecology.    
A child of the maritime Pacific Northwest, a member of the Pacific Rim, Snyder 
grew up on a small dairy farm north of Seattle in the “cutover countryside” (“Ancient 
Forests of the Far West” 116)—a landscape of stumps and second-growth forest, with a 
few surviving old trees, including one, a Western Red Cedar, Snyder “fancied” as his 
“advisor” (117). From his home, he could see, in various directions, Mount Baker, 
Glacier Peak, Mount Rainier, and the Olympics. At the age of thirteen, he began snow 
peak mountaineering, and by the age of twenty, he had reached a number of summits, 
including several in the Olympics and the Cascades. He was, as he notes, “forever 
changed by that place of rock and sky” (“The Making of Mountains and Rivers Without 
End” 153). In college, he studied anthropology, literature, and East Asian culture, 
interests that led to a short period of graduate study in anthropological linguistics at 
Indiana University before he returned to the West Coast to take graduate classes in 
Oriental languages and East Asian brush painting at Berkeley. During his years at 
Berkeley, he “spent summers working in the mountains, in National Parks or Forests” 
(153-154), including two seasons as a fire lookout at Crater and Sourdough Mountains in 
the North Cascades, periods of prolonged solitude which gave him his “first opportunity 
to seriously sit cross-legged, in the practical and traditional posture of Buddhist 
meditation” (154). In addition to practicing zazen, or seated meditation, he studied the 
peaks and drainages, practiced calligraphy, wrote in his journal, and digested a number of 
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difficult Zen texts. Snyder’s summers, however, were not confined to the North Cascades. 
In 1955, he spent a summer in Yosemite “building trail and blasting huge granite 
boulders the size of small houses” (Suiter 158). During this summer of working, 
meditating, and writing, Snyder, as he relates, gained his “first glimpse of the image of 
the whole universe as interconnected, interpenetrating, mutually reflecting, and mutually 
embracing” (Riprap and Cold Mountain Poems 65-66). In 1956, he boarded a passenger-
freighter bound for Japan, and he spent the majority of the next twelve years in Zen 
training in and around a Rinzai Zen compound in Kyoto. He officially returned to the 
United States in 1968, where he set up an off-the-grid residence in the San Juan Ridge of 
the Sierra Nevada Mountains of Northern California. 
These details, which, incidentally, represent a mere a scratch on the biographical 
surface, are not inconsequential. Snyder’s range of experiences, academic interests, 
spiritual training, aesthetic tendencies, and walked-in landscapes, both East and West, are, 
to reiterate, part of the larger aesthetic, philosophical, and ecological argument of 
Mountains and Rivers Without End. In this sense, while the title of the text provides a 
direct reference to East Asian landscape painting, it also suggests a wider relationship and 
identification between East and West, local and global, self and other, mountain and river, 
something impressed upon Snyder as a young boy: 
When I was a boy of nine or ten I was taken to the Seattle Art Museum, 
and was struck more by Chinese landscape paintings than anything I’d 
seen before, or maybe since. I saw first that they looked like real 
mountains, and mountains of an order close to my heart; second that they 
were different mountains of another place and true to those mountains as 
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well; and third that they were mountains of the spirit and that these 
paintings pierced into another reality which both was and was not the 
same reality as “the mountains.” (“The Great Clod: China and Nature” 19-
20) 
A number of important terms and concepts appear in this description of Snyder’s first 
encounter with East Asian landscape painting. First, Snyder suggests that there is an 
epistemological and ontological equivalence between the mountains of Washington—the 
mountains “close” to his “heart”—and the mountains of China. At the same time, and 
second, he recognizes that the mountains of the painting also belong to a specific “place.” 
They are rooted in a specific bioregion, and thus they are, in epistemological and 
ontological terms, both independent and interdependent. Finally, Snyder implies that the 
mountains of the painting, indeed, painter and painted, are simultaneously self and other. 
As he writes in an essay on Dōgen’s “Mountains and Waters Sutra,” “If a scroll is taken 
as a kind of Chinese mandala, then all the characters in it are our various little selves, and 
the cliffs, trees, waterfalls, and clouds are our own changes and stations” (“Blue 
Mountains Constantly Walking” 107). East Asian landscape painting, in other terms, one 
of the primary organizing principles of the long-poem sequence, provides what are, 
fundamentally, Buddhist conceptions of self, nature, and reality--conceptions with 
profound ecological implications. As George Sessions argues, in “Gary Snyder: Post-
Modern Man,” Snyder has  
steadfastly worked toward the fusion, in theory and practice, of the most 
positive cultural developments of the latter half of the twentieth century: 
(1) the introduction of Eastern religious thought and 
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spiritual/psychological techniques to the Western world, (2) the 
reevaluation and understanding of primal cultures and the “old ways” of 
living on the planet, and (3) the rise of the science of ecology and an 
ecological understanding of humanity’s place in nature. (365) 
Sessions’ title is revealing. Recognizing that postmodernism is an era in which competing 
values and ideologies are generally recognized and valued, Snyder’s pastiche-like 
combination of “Eastern religious thought,” return to the “old ways,” and use of the 
“science of ecology” is, to be sure, the postmodern situation par excellence, a 
heteroglossic mixing of residual and emergent cultural and social ideas, ideals, and values. 
As Julia Martin relates, in “Speaking for the Green of the Leaf: Gary Snyder Writes 
Nature’s Literature,” Snyder’s “long-time opposition to repressive structures is informed 
by a radical interpretation of Buddhism, ecology, and anthropology” (100). It is of no 
little consequence, then, that Mountains and Rivers Without End is preceded by two 
epigraphs from two well-known figures in the history of Buddhism, Milarepa and Dōgen, 
the former of which I will discuss at length here, which establish a basis for the text’s 
larger ecological argument.    
The first epigraph, by Milarepa, a Tibetan Buddhist ascetic and mountain hermit 
who famously lived and meditated in the ice caves of the Himalayas wearing nothing but 
a cloth, provides a principle of Buddhist thought: “The notion of Emptiness engenders 
Compassion” (ix). Both capitalized, “emptiness” and “compassion” are presented as 
equivalent and inseparable. As Eric Todd Smith relates,  
Mahayana, and more specifically Zen, holds that all beings are “empty” of 
individual self-nature, but are interconnected as an expression of “Buddha-
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nature.” All things, moreover, are transient, without any enduring form or 
individuality. Emptiness thus refers to a principle of “nonduality”: there is 
no separation between beings, only an ongoing process of interdependent 
co-creation. . . . According to Buddhist teachings, suffering comes from 
the deluded conclusion that we possess a stable self, distinct from other 
beings. Emptiness, on the other hand, describes the world as seen from an 
enlightened perspective, free from illusions of permanence. (113) 
In an important sense, then, emptiness, shūnyatā, means that reality is not the exclusive 
domain of humans or human perception. Reality is not, in other terms, a purely social or 
cultural construction. Stepping outside of human-centered awareness—seeing life as a 
complex and constant flow and process, engaging and understanding bear, tree, mountain, 
and stream, seeing, finally, the nature of reality and the reality of nature—engenders 
compassion. Moreover, compassion is rooted in an understanding of emptiness that 
annuls dualistic conceptions of subject and object, self and other, reality and 
representation, body and mind. As Julia Martin argues, in “The Pattern Which Connects: 
Metaphor in Gary Snyder’s Later Poetry,” Snyder “recognizes in the epistemological 
error which opposes ‘self’ and ‘other’ an implicit hierarchy with ‘us’ at top” (101). 
Human and nonhuman, for example, exist not in opposition but as ontological and 
epistemological equals. In other words, the Buddhist notions of emptiness and 
compassion form the basis of Snyder’s poetic critique of modernism and certain features 
of postmodernism, as well as his view of reality, understanding of self and nature, and, 
more generally, his poetic and ecological vision. As he argues in “Writers and the War 
Against Nature,” “Poems, novels, plays, with their great deep minds of story, awaken the 
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Heart of Compassion. And so they confound the economic markets, rattle the empires, 
and open us up to the actually existing human and non-human world. Performance is art 
in motion; in the moment; both enactment and embodiment.  This is exactly what nature 
herself is” (71). Certainly, then, Snyder’s “first glimpse of the whole universe as 
interconnected, interpenetrating, mutually reflecting, and mutually embracing”—a 
variation of what Snyder calls the “Avatamsaka (‘Flower Wreath’) jeweled-net-
interpenetration-ecological-systems-emptiness-consciousness” (“Reinhabitation” 189)—
is relevant here. 
 A strain of Mahayana Buddhism, Hua-yen (Kegon) Buddhism upholds the 
principles of the Avatamsaka Sutra, a sutra D.T. Suzuki calls the “consummation of 
Buddhist thought, Buddhist sentiment, and Buddhist experience” (On Indian Mahayana 
Buddhism 122). As Snyder suggests above, the primary theme of the Avatamsaka is the 
notion of the interpenetration of all things. In the text, this concept is represented, in one 
instance, by the jeweled net of Indra, a vast network of mutually reflecting pearls. In 
other words, a reflection of all pearls in the system can be seen in each individual gem: 
part is whole; whole is part. This image bears an extremely close resemblance to Arne 
Naess’ “knots in the biospherical net,” and, as with Naess, it has important spiritual and 
ecological implications. In “Reinhabitation,” for example, an early manifesto promoting 
bioregionalism, Snyder insists, like Naess, that there is “no self-realization without the 
whole self” and that “knowing who we are and knowing where we are are intimately 
linked” (189). Knowledge of place, in other words, is knowledge of self, and vice versa. 
The implications, inspired by an understanding of emptiness, compassion, and 
interdependence, are both direct and profound: “The expression of it is simple: feeling 
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gratitude to it all; taking responsibility for your own acts; keeping contact with the 
sources of the energy that flow into your own life (namely dirt, water, flesh)” (188). 
Commitment to and knowledge of place, as well as place within place, is both ecological 
and spiritual. Snyder’s notion of bioregionalism—which advocates an “old way” of 
sustainable living within naturally defined regions, a profound knowledge of place, and a 
mix of old and new conceptions of nature—is no doubt representative of an opposition to 
the remnants of modernist ideologies and the unfortunate ecological and spiritual 
consequences of late-capitalist culture. His writing, therefore, as Julia Martin contends, 
offers “a profound rejection of the process by which ‘other’ races and classes, women, 
nature, and animals have been marginalized, exploited, and most particularly silenced by 
the dominant culture” (“Speaking for the Green of the Leaf” 100). Grounded, no doubt, 
in the residue, to use Raymond Williams’s formulation, of a “previous social and cultural 
institution or formation” (Marxism and Literature 122), as well as an emergent view of 
science, this is one of the key postmodern ecological objectives of Mountains and Rivers 
Without End.                   
 Snyder’s long-poem sequence begins with a highly meditative poem, “Endless 
Streams and Mountains,” that explores, among other things, the relationship between 
reality and representation, particularly artistic representation. Ekphrastic and colophonic, 
its evocative title makes direct reference to a Chinese landscape handscroll from the Jin 
dynasty (1115-1234), currently housed in the Cleveland Museum of Art. This scroll 
contains the landscape painting Ch’i Shan Wu Chin (“Streams and Mountains Without 
End”) that Snyder reproduces in his book, before the frontispiece. It also includes nine 
substantial colophons dating from 1205 to 1380 as well as 48 seals, appended by owners 
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and connoisseurs between the early 14th and the 20th centuries. The resulting scroll is 13.8 
inches by 12 yards. Infused with a Zen aesthetic, a poetics of observation and suggestion, 
a deep lurking, the opening lines of the poem are especially complex: 
  Clearing the mind and sliding in 
   to that created space, 
  a web of waters streaming over rocks, 
  air misty but not raining, 
   seeing this land from a boat on a lake 
   or a broad slow river, 
   coasting by. (5)   
Here, the act of “clearing,” or emptying, “the mind” is undoubtedly a reference to the 
practice of zazen. At the same time, zazen is not offered as a mere solitary technique or 
approach, a useful method by which the speaker, or viewer, for example, enters the 
landscape of the painting (or the poem). Instead, the reference to zazen, in combination 
with the other lines of the poem, is a practice of recognizing and engaging with the world, 
including its representations, as a “web” of coextensive, non-hierarchical interrelations. 
The “created space” of the second line, then, is simultaneously the space of body-mind, 
painting, poem, and literal landscape, all of which are equal and equally “created.” Body-
mind is recognized through the practice of zazen, art is created through the act of 
aesthetic representation, and landscapes are created by geologic forces. All exist 
independently and dependently; all rise up into their own shape and “space” while at the 
same time reflecting and interacting with the whole. The viewer, in this sense, is both 
viewer and landscape; the landscape is both landscape and viewer. Poem and painting, 
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water and mountain, are reality and representation, representation and reality, and all 
exist in an unending state of dynamic flux. As a section from the epigraph from Dōgen 
insists, “‘Unsurpassed enlightenment is a painting. The entire phenomenal universe and 
the empty sky are nothing but a painting’” (ix). In koan-like fashion, Dōgen, like Snyder, 
argues that reality is always reality, both empty and full, as it endlessly shifts. 
 The sense of non-dualistic interrelation, of mutual interdependence, is emphasized 
again in the third line. Here, the term “web,” an allusion to the Avatamsaka Sutra, 
provides an important ecological argument about nature and natural processes: the mutual 
interplay of mountains and streams. A “web of waters streaming over rocks” describes, in 
other terms, the process of water giving form to rock and rock giving form to water. 
These processes, an endless shaping, describe, in even larger terms, the interrelationship 
of hydrologic and rock cycles with nitrogen and carbon cycles, as well as with such 
surface processes as wind and erosion. All things, like all thoughts, are in a constant state 
of interdependent cyclical change. Of course, the term “web” also describes the sequence 
and organization of the text as well. Each section, each poem, and each word is a jewel, a 
reflection of the whole. Simultaneously independent and interdependent, insight into a 
specific line necessarily generates a more complete understanding of the entire sequence. 
This is not, of course, simply an argument for thematic coherence. In fact, it suggests a 
larger complementary relationship between all things: air, water, rock, and living matter. 
All are equally and perfectly impermanent, in an endless state of change. 
 Sensing that endless impermanence, and riding along with it, is indicated in the 
remaining lines of the opening stanza, which also gracefully supplies a detailed 
description of the painting. The “boat” in these lines is a reference to Dōgen’s boat, 
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which, as Kazuaki Tanahashi relates, suggests that “one who can ‘locate’ himself in the 
timelessness of all moments will also discover the stillness of all movements” and, 
consequently, will become “free of viewpoints,” no longer experience life “in terms of 
comparisons,” and realize, finally, that there “is no concept of whole or part” (15). This is 
the state of emptiness, impermanence, presence, and compassion, a realm of 
interpenetration and nonduality in which “the birth of a person at each moment is the 
birth of all phenomenal objects at each moment” (15). The past is past, and the future is 
future: reality is always shifting. To catch life as it flows, to participate in its flowing, is 
the essence of this practice. As the relationship between mountains and rivers, the main 
advisors of the poem, suggests, nature is not separate from the experience of life, and, 
moreover, human representation of nature is but merely one aspect of this experience. 
This, to be sure, is as much an ecological argument as it is philosophical and spiritual. 
 It is also important to note, in this sense, that there is no “I” in these lines. 
Certainly, then, this is not a modernist poem in which the speaker serves as its organizing 
principle. At the same time, it is also not a poem written in the dominant self-expressive, 
neo-confessional style of much postmodern American poetry. Who, for example, is 
“clearing the mind” in the opening line of the poem? This is typical of Snyder’s poetics: 
ego is transformed into “eco.” As Robert Kern relates, Snyder writes in an “ecocentric 
mode, a minutely detailed, outer-directed style virtually free of subjective reference” 
(129). To put this in slightly different fashion, and to tease out the implications, the lack 
of subjective reference, as Tim Dean notes, suggests that it is only “through a fully 
impersonal voice can art apprehend the otherness of nonhuman nature without 
transforming nature into something that merely serves human ends. Snyder’s ethical 
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commitment to beneficently engaging the natural world draws on the resources that 
poetry offers for generating and accessing impersonal voice” (463). With little question, 
this is a response to the notion of simulation, of nature as purely social construction, as 
purely human reality. As Snyder writes in “Unnatural Writing,” “Is art an imposition of 
order on chaotic nature, or is art (also read ‘language’) a matter of discovering the grain 
of things, of uncovering the measured chaos that structures the natural world?  
Observation, reflection, and practice show artistic process to be the latter” (168). This is 
what it means to participate in life as it flows; this is practice. As Leonard Scigaj argues, 
in a more obvious indication of how Snyder’s poetics challenge postmodern conceptions 
of nature and representation, “Text and practice are inseparable, and Snyder’s ‘moist 
black line’ dispels the late capitalist illusion that signifiers are unattached commodities, 
Baudrillardian simulacras, mechanically reproduced for middle-class consumption in 
ways that insulate us within language games of aesthetic appreciation” (“Dōgen’s Boat, 
Fan, and Rice Cake” 127). 
 Snyder’s ecopoetic style, or, to use Kern’s phrasing, “ecocentric mode,” is 
undeniably evident in the remaining portions of the poem as well, which, like the first 
stanza, freely move between observation and suggestion as they follows trails and 
streams and meander through the painted mountain landscape. Along the way, humans 
appear, merging seamlessly with the environment: 
The trail goes far inland, 
          somewhere back around a bay, 
lost in distant foothill slopes  
                   & back again 
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at a village on the beach, and someone’s fishing. (5-6)   
These moments of observation, of catching life catching life, of following trails through 
the landscape, have serious implications, especially in their suggestion that humans are 
capable of living coextensively with, as Snyder would frame it, the actually existing 
nonhuman world, the “frothy braided torrent,” the “jumble of cliffs,” the “cascading 
streambed,” “chinquapin or liquidambar” (6). 
 Of course, Snyder’s conception of nature, human interaction with nature, and 
overall ecological message is not reducible to harmonious interaction, to eating wild 
berries in the sunshine. Snyder is careful to document the long course of destructive 
human habits and their ecological impact. The third poem in the sequence, “Night 
Highway 99,” is an important instance. Structured, in many ways, like “Endless Streams 
and Mountains,” “Night Highway 99” is a travel poem, a hitchhiking poem, which 
meanders from place to place via a trail, Highway 99, and, like “Endless Streams and 
Mountains,” merges reality with aesthetic representation. However, whereas “Endless 
Streams and Mountains” takes on the painted landscapes of China, “Night Highway 99” 
takes on, in a similar philosophical fashion, the literal landscapes of late-capitalist U.S. 
Pacific Coast culture. Throughout the course of this travel, which begins in northern 
Washington and extends south into portions of California, “hacksaw gothic homes / 
Shingle mills and stump farms” exist alongside “packstrings brought / down to the 
valleys: / set loose to graze” (12). The implication of this juxtaposition of urban and rural 
is apparent. As Snyder relates in an interview with Anne Greenfield, “Seattle, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, all the cities up and down the west coast were built with Pacific 
Northwest Douglas fir” (“Grasping the Natural” 56). Other examples come in and out of 
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focus. Turing off 99 at Mt. Vernon, for instance, the speaker, presumably somewhere 
along Route 20, observes “under apple trees by the river / banks of junked cars” (13). 
Riparian life, the poem suggests, must contend and compete with the swell and sweat of 
steel and rust; pollution is inevitable. And so, as the poem moves through Seattle, where 
minds are “blunt” and talk is “twisted” (13), and into Tacoma, a kind of continuity begins 
to emerge: “Night rain wet concrete headlights blind / salt air / bulk cargo / steam cycle / 
AIR REDUCTION” (14). The sense of cultural blindness to the ecological impact of 
American consumerism is palpable; clean air, a place to breathe, is hard to find. By the 
time the speaker arrives in San Francisco, s/he is “sick of car exhaust” (23) and realizes 
“NO / body / gives a shit” (23-24). This, of course, is a biological (ecological) statement 
as much as it is a form of cultural criticism. 
Similar ecological lessons, following a similar structure, appear throughout the 
course of the long-poem sequence. “Three Worlds, Three Realms, Six Roads” begins in 
Seattle, moves through Portland, the mountains of the North Cascades, down into San 
Francisco, extends out to Kyoto, and ends, in a kind of return, with the following lines: 
“Throwing away the things you’ll never need / Stripping down / Going home” (30). 
Needless consumption is not a sustainable value. “Night Song of the Los Angeles Basin” 
studies the “calligraphy of cars” (62). “Covers the Ground” provides, in almost Whitman-
like fashion, a catalog of human encroachments on once-pristine wilderness (weighed 
against an epigraph and a sizable quotation from John Muir’s The Mountains of 
California): “mobile homes, pint-size portable housing, johnny-on-the-spots, / concrete 
freeway, overpass, underpass / exit floreals, entrance curtsies, railroad bridge. . .” (65). 
“Old Woodrat’s Stinky House,” the inaugural poem of the final section, suggestively 
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compares the age and longevity of written and spoken languages to the lifespan of 
specific species of trees:  
          & four thousand years of using writing equals 
the life of a bristlecone pine 
 
A spoken language works 
for about five centuries, 
lifespan of a Douglas fir; (119) 
Late-capitalist policies of planned obsolescence, and, more generally, human 
consumption, Snyder suggests, have little or no respect for history or time. Historically 
clueless, policy makers and whole governments give an unfortunate and decidedly 
negative ring to the phrase “the present moment.” The short-lived experience of humans 
on the planet is too often matched by a shortsighted understanding of use and resource. 
As Anthony Hunt relates, “The poem is unquestionably a criticism of the way humans 
have ‘fouled’ their nest” (220). Of course, Mountains and Rivers Without End is not, in 
any sense, a text that merely outlines the damage. Its ecological lessons are rooted in a 
complex interplay between attention to destructive tendencies and to possibilities of 
renewal, both of which require an understanding of human limits.                    
Appropriately, then, sentient nonhuman beings—vole, hare, mouse, dolphin, 
hawk, coyote, salmon, raven, sheep, bear—figure prominently in the text alongside 
human interactions with nature and larger geomorphic actions: wind and erosion, 
mountain uplift and subduction. Like mountains and rivers, they act as advisors, spirits 
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and physical beings whose presence is instructive. Near the middle of the first section, for 
instance, a jackrabbit appears: 
  Jackrabbit, 
  black-tailed Hare 
  by the side of the road, 
  hop, stop. 
 
  Great ears shining, 
  you know me 
  a little. A lot more than I 
  know you.  (31) 
Short and concentrated lyric pieces such as this are rare occurrences in Mountains and 
Rivers Without End. Encountering them is akin to homing in on a detail—a small 
outcropping, a swirl in a river, a man holding a staff—in the larger flow of a vast 
landscape scroll. Recognition of their significance is a matter of seeing and understanding 
the mutual, interdependent, non-hierarchical, and coextensive relationship of stroke and 
scroll, poem and sequence, mountain and river, human and hare. Focused meditation, a 
method and practice of mindful observation, an art of seeing, is capable of generating this 
awareness. “Jackrabbit,” then, offers an aesthetic, spiritual, and ecological lesson.  
 In the first case, the hare determines the shape and the sound of the poem. Small 
and quick, attentive and cautious, and always seemingly on the verge of breaking out into 
an evasive run, a pausing hare moves in short hops and stops, a movement indicated in 
the fourth line as well as in the largely monosyllabic language of the poem. In addition, 
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its two “Great shining ears,” which initiate the lesson of the poem, demand the use of two 
stanzas. Advisor and guide, the hare, through the form and content of its movement, 
speaks. The role of the poet, in this instance, is to watch, listen, and record; the poem will 
rise up into its own shape. The hare, here, is no mere totem, no mere instance of symbolic 
or textual inscription. The lesson of the poem is the lesson of the hare: seeing, listening, 
and understanding are not only inextricable but also essential to survival. Humans, of 
course, rarely see or listen, especially to the nonhuman: “you know me / a little / A lot 
more than I / know you;” spiritual and ecological lessons are therefore often missed. 
Appearing again, in the second section of the sequence, in a poem entitled “The Black-
tailed Hare,” Snyder writes, in much more direct fashion, “A grizzled black-eyed 
jackrabbit showed me / irrigation ditches, open paved highway, / white line / to the hill…” 
(73). According reality and spiritual wisdom to nonhuman species is an ancient practice. 
In “Writers and the War Against Nature,” Snyder writes, in a section worth quoting at 
length: 
How can artists and writers manage to join in the defense of the planet and 
wild nature? Writers and artists by their very work “bear witness.” They 
don’t wield financial, governmental, or military power. However, at the 
outset they were given, as in fairy tales, two “magic gifts”: One is “The 
mirror of truth.” Whatever they hold this mirror up to is shown in its 
actual form, and the truth must come out. . . . The second is a “heart of 
compassion,” which is to say the ability to feel and know the pains and 
delights of other people, and to weave that feeling into their art. For some 
this compassion can extend to all creatures and to the earth itself. . . . 
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Anciently this was a shamanistic role. . . . Today, such a role is played by 
the writer who finds herself a spokesperson for nonhuman entities 
communicating to the human realm through dance or song. This could be 
called “speaking on behalf of nature” in the ancient way. (63) 
The appearance of the nonhuman in Mountains and Rivers, as in all of Snyder’s texts, is 
part of this residual practice.   
A short and focused lyric poem from the third section of the sequence, “The Bear 
Mother,” a significant detail in the larger flow, is another apt exemplification: 
She veils herself 
         to speak of eating salmon 
   Teases me with 
         “What do you know of my ways” 
   And kisses me through the mountain. 
 
  Through and under its layers, its 
         gullies, its folds; 
   Her mouth full of blueberries, 
         We share. (113)                            
References to bears, to bear scat, and to interaction and union, including marriage, 
between bears and humans are common in many of Snyder’s texts. “A Berry Feast” from 
The Back Country, “this poem is for bear” from Myths & Texts, and the well-known 
“Smokey the Bear Sutra” are important instances. Like the hares in “Jackrabbit” and 
“The Black-tailed Hare,” the bear in “The Bear Mother” is an advisor and guide. As she 
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playfully “teases” the speaker with spiritual insight—“‘What do you know of my 
ways’”—into her nature, she also offers instruction on the proper course of mountain 
etiquette: “And kisses me through the mountain.” Connected by the landscape, the 
“layers,” “gullies,” and “folds” of the mountain, human and bear graciously and 
compassionately “share” the same region. As Snyder notes in an essay entitled “The 
Woman Who Married a Bear,” bears “like human beings, and they decided long ago to 
let the humans join them at the salmon-running rivers and the berryfields” (164). In this 
communal act, then, both are provided with necessary sustenance, namely space, food, 
and spiritual insight and training in good manners. Bear is not privileged over human; 
human is not privileged over bear. Such a conception of the relationship between bears 
and humans, as Anthony Hunt argues, is Snyder’s “way of shifting our perspective 
toward what he regards as a more enlightened—and sacred—view of animal-human 
interaction” (215).   
Of course, this sense of sharing and interdependence is a far cry from long-
standing popular conceptions of bears as vicious, human-hungry predators—conceptions 
that generate fear, inspire hunting, and, on a larger scale, help to explain, along with 
deforestation and massive increases in human population, the loss of habitat for both 
brown and black bear populations. The long-term damage this loss of habitat will have on 
the stability of local ecosystems, and hence on the long-term survival of all species, is not 
yet fully understood. The cascading ecological benefit initiated by the reintroduction of 
wolves into Yellowstone National Park in the mid-1990s, however, provides an 
indication. According to a recent study, which measured the impact of wolf/ungulate 
interactions on willow growth, the return of wolves to the northern Yellowstone 
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ecosystem points “toward improved riparian plant communities as well as improved 
habitats and sustainability of numerous species of riparian-dependent wildlife” (Ripple 
and Beschta 105). Once again, everything, and every thing, is connected, mutually 
reflecting jewels in the net. Killing off top predators, driving entire species to extinction, 
altering, in short, the natural flow of ecosystems has obvious deleterious and readily 
observable consequences, for humans and non-humans alike. Life and nature are far from 
a mere accumulation of spectacles; the survival of our species depends on this 
recognition. 
In the last poem of the sequence, “Finding the Space in the Heart,” Snyder returns, 
in more direct fashion, to East Asian landscape painting, as well as to the coextensive 
notions that, as the argument of the long-poem sequence goes, inspire deep ecological 
responsibility: emptiness, impermanence, interdependence, and compassion. The poem 
captures, with obvious shades of nostalgia, forty years of visiting and revisiting the Great 
Basin: “I first saw it in the sixties / driving a Volkswagen camper / with a fierce gay poet 
and a / lovely but dangerous girl with a husky voice” (149). The term “it,” of course, 
refers to both the Great Basin as well to the spiritual insight inspired by its vast openness 
and presence, which appears as the path along a canyon “suddenly” opens onto “silvery 
flats that curved over the edge:” “O, ah! The / awareness of emptiness / brings forth a 
heart of compassion!” (149). The Great Basin, as Barbara Paparazzo insists, “is a mirror 
of the poet-narrator’s true nature. Emptiness suddenly arises in his heart, bringing a direct 
recognition of something familiar, a coming home. This emptiness is full of 
potentiality—energy—and gives rise to compassion” (115). Empty, open, present, and 
compassionate, the narrator returns to the basin again and again, after the initial trip in the 
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1960s, “when it seemed / the world might head a new way” (149). In the 1970s, the 
narrator gets “stuck” (150), and in the 1980s he discovers “a path / of carved stone 
inscriptions tucked into the sagebrush:” 
 “Stomp out greed” 
 “The best things in life are not things” (150) 
Passive consumption and the ideologies of late-capitalist culture are brought into focus 
and weighed against a heart of compassion inspired by openness, awareness, ghost lakes, 
and spirit fish: “Faint shorelines seen high on these slopes, / long gone Lake Lahontan, / 
cutthroat trout spirit in silt” (150). These remnants of the ice age serve as embodiments of 
emptiness, traces of an endless process of birth and death. Time passes, and, in the 1990s, 
the narrator returns with his wife, children, and friends to sing “sūtras for the insects in 
the wilderness, / —the wideness, the / foolish loving spaces / full of heart” (152). 
Emptiness and impermanence inspire a sad and tender heart of compassion:     
  Walking on walking, 
   Under foot   earth turns 
  Streams and mountains never stay the same. 
 
The space goes on. 
   But the wet black brush 
   tip drawn to a point, 
                   lifts away. (152) 
Waters flow; mountains flow. Nothing stays the same. All is fleeting and impermanent; 
change is endless. 
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In cyclical fashion, Mountains and Rivers Without End ends where it begins: 
enlightenment is a painting. Of course, enlightenment is also not a painting. As the last 
lines suggest, reality, the “space,” continues on after aesthetic representation, after the 
brush “lifts away.” Representation is not the end of reality, and nature is not merely a 
social construction. Finding a place within the system, finding a space in the heart, 
finding, finally, a heart of compassion, an ethic of ecological responsibility and 





The philosophical basis of this rigorous 
determinism was the fundamental division between 
the I and the world introduced by Descartes. 
--Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics 
Study how a society uses its land, and you can come 
to pretty reliable conclusions as to what its future 
will be. 
--E.F. Schumacher, Small is 
Beautiful  
Like Gary Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers Without End, A.R. Ammons’s 
Garbage is an ecological long-poem about mountains. The mountains of Garbage, 
however, are not formed by orogenic or epeirogenic movements. The mountains in 
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Ammons’s poem are formed by the push and pull of machines, the process of piling trash. 
To be sure, this is an uncommon but nonetheless compelling and exigent poetic subject, 
one that understandably earned the text a National Book Award. Despite this critical 
recognition, the poem, strangely, has prompted only a small amount of serious critical 
scholarship, and within this work, there is limited examination and acknowledgement of 
the poem’s deep postmodern ecological vision--a philosophical, spiritual, and political 
vision that is in many ways comparable to Snyder. In fact, like Snyder, Ammons’s 
ecological vision, his postmodern politics of nature, is situated in a heteroglossic mixing 
of residual and emergent cultural and social ideas, ideals, and values—in a politics, in 
other words, which at once accepts and rejects postmodernism. At the same time, while 
Snyder and Ammons arrive at a strikingly similar ecological position, their poetic paths 
are unquestionably different.  
In “The Titles,” Helen Vendler insists that Garbage is a “great book-length poem 
about death” (222). She is right, of course. It is a book-length poem, spanning 121 pages 
and written, mostly, as Vendler relates in another essay, in “loose-pentameter blank-verse 
couplets, which are separated by stanza-breaks that aerate the page” (“A.R. Ammons’ 
The Snow Poems and Garbage” 28). And it is a poem about death. It is also, however, a 
poem about garbage, as well as decay, debris, disease, detritus, decomposition, desire, 
chaos, consumption, contamination, composting, age, aging, waste, excrement, energy, 
ecology, poetry, nature, science, religion, spirit, matter, motion, regeneration, 
transfiguration, incineration, suffering, love, compassion, language, self, body, mind, 
body-mind, eternity, infinity, process, product, simplicity, sublimity, provisionality, 
profligacy, pollution, economy, elegance. . .the list could go on and on and on. Garbage 
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resists both simplification and essentializaton. This, to be sure, an engaged politics and 
poetics of mutability or provisionality, informs the broader ecological argument of the 
text.  
In the postmodern era, to write about garbage is to write about nature. And, 
conversely, to write about nature is, as in Snyder, to offer an invariably political response 
to and against a kind of ecological genocide, a process of progress and modernization 
which produces, as Ammons writes near the beginning of his text, a flood of garbage 
“getting in the way, piling / up, stinking, turning brooks brownish” (18). For Ammons, 
garbage “has to be the poem of our time because / garbage is spiritual, believable enough” 
(18). In Florida, then, “down by I-95” where “flatland’s ocean- and gulf-flat, / mounds of 
disposal rise” like Sumerian “ziggurats” (18). Erected out of refuse, garbage heaps--
mountains of trash--are postmodern temples, emblems of a terrifyingly rapid (and rabid) 
pace of consumption. As Gyorgyi Voros relates, trash “connotes rank excess of 
production” and “takes on special significance for post-World War II American 
consumer culture, whose garbage, both because of sheer volume and because of its 
unbiodegradability, threatens to clog both the physical and metaphysical cycles of 
degeneration and renewal” (162-163). Indeed, garbage, in all its forms, is particularly 
symbolic and symptomatic of late-capitalist consumer culture; it, therefore, has to be the 
“poem our time.”     
Garbage, however, begins before it begins, in a moment of epigraphic dedication: 
“to the bacteria, tumblebugs, scavengers, / wordsmiths—the transfigurers, restorers” (7). 
Poetry, the epigraph suggests, lies in the restoration and transfiguration of the dead and 
discarded. Language, like matter, must be broken down, deconstructed, and built back up, 
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transfigured and restored. To be sure, there is more than a hint here of artistic production 
as a method and process immersed in the politics and aesthetics of cultural pastiche. As 
Fredric Jameson argues, “For with the collapse of the high-modernist ideology of style . . . 
the producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead styles, 
speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a now 
global culture” (Postmodernism 18). For Jameson, then, pastiche is “speech in a dead 
language” and “blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs” (17). At the same time, 
Garbage, as a whole, seems unwilling to concede that Jameson’s conception of 
postmodern cultural production as “speech in a dead language” is correct; it especially 
seems to disagree with Jameson about the political impotency of this process. In fact, as 
Ammons implicitly argues early on in the poem, the apparent postmodern death of the 
unified and stable subject—the “bourgeois ego” or “monad” (Postmodernism 15) as 
Jameson frames it—that demands the work of pastiche is a compelling but nonetheless 
convenient fiction. The role of the poet, the poem suggests, is to transfigure and restore 
“values thought lost”—values that “lie around demolished / and centerless” (13). Poetry, 
then, for Ammons, is more like postmodern parody and less like a de-historicized and 
apolitical form of cultural pastiche. As Linda Hutcheon argues in The Politics of 
Postmodernism, “As a form of ironic representation, parody is doubly coded in political 
terms: it both legitimizes and subverts that which it parodies” (101). In addition, this 
practice is not, as Hutcheon relates, “simply academic play or some infinite regress into 
textuality” (95). There is more at stake. Like bacteria, tumblebugs, and scavengers, 
wordsmiths transform and restore, returning the old in a creation of the new. Postmodern 
parody, then, it turns out, especially as Ammons frames it, is an ecological practice, a 
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complex process of decomposition and regeneration. To no surprise, then, Ammons, as 
early as 1965, in Tape for the Turn of the Year, proclaims ecology as a kind of signature 
for his work: 
  ecology is my word: tag 
       me with that: come 
       in there: 
       you will find yourself 
  in a firmless country: 
       centers & peripheries 
       in motion, 
       organic, 
   interrelations! (112)  
Garbage is an important and complex instance of the ecological poetics and politics 
hinted at both in the epigraph as well as here.  
Using ecology as a “tag,” it is clear that lost values, along with other forms of 
cultural and linguistic detritus, must be taken apart and reconstructed. In Garbage, among 
the list of these “values thought lost” are love, compassion, responsibility, social change, 
and self-realization—values largely engendered by an awareness of suffering, 
impermanence, and the limits of language. Of course, the deconstruction and 
transfiguration of these values is, in somewhat typically postmodern fashion, a 
responsibility the poet-narrator of Garbage adopts with a definable sense of unease. The 
responsibility, in other words, is framed as a kind of artistic privilege and curse, a 
position and imposition that is both embraced and despised, and it is a 
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position/imposition embedded in the structure and content of the poem. To frame it in 
slightly different fashion, the poem must simultaneously be garbage and make something 
out of garbage; this includes, of course, its own excesses and refuse. 
If the content and structure of Garbage is to model its subject, as it does, then it 
must, in one sense, adopt a measure of randomness—mistakes, odd mixings, absurd 
concurrences, meaningful coincidences, bizarre regenerations. What, for example, 
emerges when excrement from a diaper leaks onto the pages of a discarded religious text? 
The text must, in other terms, provide a mixture, however unbalanced, of the sacred and 
profane, the abstruse and the everyday, the grand and the banal, the high and the low, and 
everything in the middle. What’s more, the poem, if it is to be of use, if it is to have value, 
will have to be broken down, recycled, and brought back, or, alternatively, it must resign 
itself to spending centuries just taking up space. Certainly, the former is Ammons’s sense 
of the poem: 
My hope was to see the resemblances between high and low of the secular 
and the sacred. The garbage-heap of used-up language is thrown at the feet 
of poets, and it is their job to make or revamp a language that will fly 
again. We are brought low through sin and death, and hope that religion 
can make us new. I used garbage as the material submitted to such 
transformations, and I wanted to play out the interrelationships of the high 
and the low. (Set in Motion 102) 
The process of the poem’s making, then, as with its interpretation, involves sifting and 
sorting, constructing meaning out of the decay and debris, including the offensive, putrid, 
rancid, and rank along with the sacred and sublime. As Willard Spiegelman notes, the 
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“poetics of accretion and development has been supplemented, if not entirely replaced, by 
a poetics of excretion” (63). The poem, therefore, provides, as Ammons writes in section 
seven, a “clear space and pure / freedom to dump whatever” (49). The poem, to repeat, 
and to put it in plain terms, is not just “about” garbage; it is a form of garbage itself. As 
Ammons writes in section 12, “poetry to no purpose! all this garbage! all / these words” 
(75). 
This, to be certain, raises a number of interesting if not troubling questions. For 
example, how can a poem about garbage which considers itself a form of garbage—a 
“space” in which there is “freedom to dump whatever” and “poetry to no purpose”—offer 
a progressive, radical, and ecologically based politics opposed to the excesses of 
consumption and waste? In Writing for an Endangered World, Lawrence Buell insists 
that the poem “gathers its energy from angry-bemused nonstop oscillation between the 
image of garbage as recyclable and garbage as shameful refuse” (53). What Buell 
unfortunately misses, to return to an earlier point, is that Ammons’s conception of the 
poem, particularly its function, ultimately differs from his conception of the literal 
garbage that symbolically gives birth to the poem. Since garbage is only partially 
recyclable, one of the cruxes of Ammons’s ecological argument lies in the notion of 
unimpeded natural cycles, including, of course, the cycles of degeneration and renewal. 
This accounts, of course, for a limited amount of excess and waste, but what cannot be 
broken down and returned piles up, contaminates, inhibits, and, finally, arrests these 
various processes of decomposition and regeneration. According to H. Y. Tammemagi in 
The Waste Crisis, “Some archaeological digs have found that after 2,000 years much 
garbage has not fully decomposed” (104). Much garbage, in other words, gives nothing 
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back. This is not the case with Ammons’s poem. While the poem may be a form of 
garbage, constructed out of linguistic and cultural debris, given to flights of excess and 
waste, it is also responsible enough to insist that within its own processes of 
decomposition there is restoration and transfiguration. Recycled and renewed, the poem 
then serves as a source of instruction. Like Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers Without End, 
it provides an argument on the nature of mutability as well as good old-fashioned 
guidance on matters of etiquette and ecological responsibility. This, too, is built into the 
structure and content of the poem.           
Structurally, the postmodern long poem, according to James McCorkle, is “recast 
as an accumulation of lyric moments rather than as a narrative moving toward a 
culminating closure,” and, as such, “discontinuity and recombinatory properties of 
language are in constant play” (48). This, to be sure, is the sense in which Brian McHale 
argues that postmodern poetry “entails the effacement or occlusion or dispersal of the 
traditional ‘lyric I’” (256). These related definitions undoubtedly hold true for Ammons 
(although less so for Snyder). In Garbage, Ammons invites, if not demands, a reading of 
lyric subjectivity—what Kevin McGuirk describes as his “continuing advertisement of 
presence when postmodernism elsewhere celebrates surface, difference, and alterity” 
(“A.R. Ammons and ‘the only terrible health’ of Poetics”)—in that it bears relevance to a 
politics of nature and natural systems. Ammons writes, near the beginning of the poem: 
so, these little messengers say, what do you 
mean teaching school (teaching poetry and 
 
            poetry writing and wasting your time painting 
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            little organic, meaningful pictures)….  (3) 
In short, Ammons calls attention to both his status and profession in a poem that is 
seemingly absent of a fixed or stable subject, in a poem that often seems to elide 
subjectivity. Ammons seems to argue, then, that the self-expressive lyric, the 
overwhelming presence of the lyric “I” manifest most significantly in 1950’s and 1960’s 
“subjective” poetics and the “workshop aesthetic” of much contemporary poetic practice, 
with its implications of constituting or establishing identity/subjectivity, is an 
unacceptable postmodern mode—a mode he eschews and accepts in parodic fashion. The 
poet-narrator of Garbage, therefore, is both comically and tragically self-conscious, self-
referential, self-aggrandizing, and self-effacing. He is both sincere and insincere, both 
reliable and unreliable, both conclusive and indefinite. 
 In section two, the poet-narrator wonders “how to write this / poem, should it be 
short, a small popping of / duplexes, or long, hunting wide, coming home / late, losing 
the trail and recovering it” (19). The struggle is whether to write a modernist epic—a 
long-poem with weight, meaning, and, importantly, coherence that would “act itself out” 
and “intensify / reductively into statement” (19)—or to amass a series of small and 
relatively insulated but nonetheless look-alike lyrics. The poem, as it turns out, is neither 
and both. Consistent with its elision of stable poetic subjectivity and its postmodern 
ecological politics, it simultaneously aims for and undermines coherence, delighting in 
both digression—acts of “losing the trail,” moments of wasted space —and small 
resurrections—acts of returning and “recovering”—of a consistent theme. It is, after all, 
“just a poem with a job to do: and that / is to declare, however roundabout, sideways, / or 
meanderingly (or in those ways) the perfect / scientific and materialistic notion of the 
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spindle of energy” (24-25). At the same time, proclamations of consistency and order, 
declarations of thematic unity within the disorder and chaos, including the poem’s 
structural neatness, must be measured against the poem’s continual effacement of its 
project and the questionable reliability of its poet-narrator who is always “trying to get in 
position to be serious” (54) but is “afraid of convincingness” and a “little uncertain on 
purpose” (56). Meaning, in other words, is temporary and tentative, and so extracting 
purpose and supplying coherence seems, at least partially, to miss the point. As Helen 
Vendler notes, “Accustomed as we are to a narrative thread . . . we are surprised to find 
no such auxiliary pointers in Ammons.  Indeed, we find ourselves in the midden-heap of 
language and literature, comparable to the Florida pit with its life-detritus” (“A.R. 
Ammons’ The Snow Poems and Garbage” 46). Nonetheless, the poem does have a point, 
in fact several points, to make, including, as with Snyder, important philosophical and 
ecological lessons on the nature of impermanence and compassion. As Vendler also notes, 
the poem “gathers itself into interior smaller lyrics, disperses itself into bits and pieces, 
and becomes a sustained tragic and comic meditation on the Heraclitean conversion of 
matter into energy” (“The Titles” 222). 
Vendler’s desire for coherence aside, her reference to Heraclitus, and, by way of 
implication, to the pre-Socratics, is warranted. Early on, the poet-narrator proclaims that 
“the poem / which is about the pre-socratic idea of the / dispositional axis from stone to 
wind, wind / to stone (with my elaborations, if any) / is complete before it begins” (20). 
The immediate reference, of course, is to Anaximenes, who argued “primordial unity is to 
be treated as a stuff, a matter out of which things are made” (Allen 4). For Anaximenes, 
the source of primordial unity was air, which when “rarified became fire and when 
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condensed, wind, then cloud, then water, then earth, then stone” (4). Everything, and 
every thing, is connected. These cycles of change, of beginnings and endings, are both 
natural and endless, and they show up time and again throughout the course of 
Ammons’s poem—a poem that the narrator insists is a “scientific poem, / asserting that 
nature models values, that we / have invented little (copied) reflections of / possibilities 
already here” (20) and that we are “natural: nature, not / we, gave rise to us: we are not, 
though, though / natural, divorced from higher, finer configurations” (21). 
 In section three of the poem, Ammons writes that “when energy is gross, / 
rocklike, it resembles the gross, and when / fine it mists away into mystical refinements” 
(25). To be sure, Anaximenes’ conception of primordial unity functions as an allusion 
here, as do contemporary geological conceptions of rock cycles, which are importantly 
part of larger geocycles. This is not, of course, the only reference in the text. In section 
six, the narrator exclaims, “things are sustained by interrelations” (40). These ideas are 
beautifully and somewhat playfully blended at the beginning of the tenth section: 
  in your end is my beginning, I repeat; also, 
  my end is, in fact, your end, in a way: 
 
  are we not bound together by our ends: and when, 
  end to end, our ends meet, then we begin to 
 
  see the end of disturbing endlessness: unity 




  it accords in mutuality a mist wonderfully and 
  onefully coming together…. (63) 
T.S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” is no doubt part of the aesthetic and 
philosophical heap here, as are the notions of impermanence, non-duality, and 
interdependence. In fact, the “end of disturbing endlessness,” the “unity” that preserves 
“two” and “accords mutuality,” is as thoroughly steeped in Taoist and Buddhist notions 
of emptiness and impermanence as it is in pre-Socratic notions of primordial unity and 
change. And, so, in the last section of the poem, the narrator asserts that “forms / are 
never permanent form, change, the permanence, so / that one thing one day is something 
else another / day, and the energy that informs all forms just / breezes right through filth 
as clean as a whistle” (115). Notions of emptiness and impermanence are not, therefore, 
exclusive to the sections or even smaller lyrics that take up the cyclical processes of the 
creation and destruction of rock. As James McConkey notes, in a descriptive overview of 
Ammons’s long poems, it is “life itself, life in all of its changes—that is, life as 
process—that is his subject, and it is a falsification of whatever constitutes ‘truth’ or 
‘reality’ to freeze into ideal form any segment of it” (285). All matter, including human 
matter, is subject to the processes of decomposition and regeneration. All life is change, 
and all matter, in this sense, is garbage. 
 It is in this capacity, consequently, that the poem concerns itself with various 
kinds of ends. Section one includes an overgrown maple whose trunk is “split down from 
a high fork: wind has / twisted off the biggest, bottom branch” and “disease may find it” 
(16). Near the end of section two, the poet-narrator ponders “old trees, I remember some 
of them, where they / used to stand: pictures taken by some of them: / and old dogs, 
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specially one imperial black one” (22). Section six begins with the symptoms of 
deterioration and the pains of aging—“a pain in the knee or hipjoint or warps and / knots 
in the leg muscles, even strange, binding” (40)—and stretches out to include the physical 
and emotional ravages of disease: “and I said, terminal cancer of the brain, and / she said, 
I found out a week ago, but don’t say / anything to him” (41). In section eight, 
“sometimes old people snap back into life for a / streak and start making plans, ridiculous, 
you know, / when they will suddenly think of death again / and they will see their coffins 
plunge upward” (53). Life is death; death is life. It is “ridiculous” to see them as separate, 
especially as they give rise to one another.     
 Other, less literal ends, as well as the lessons they initiate, are included in the 
poem as well. In section two, for example, the poet-narrator insists that love and 
compassion is necessitated by both death and suffering: 
  where but in the very asshole of comedown is 
  redemption: as to where but brought low, where 
 
  but in the grief of failure, loss, error do we 
  discern the savage afflictions that turn us around: 
 
  where but in the arrangements love crawls us 
  through, not a thing left in our self-display 
 
  unhumiliated, do we find the sweet seed of 
  new routes…. (21) 
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The first noble truth of Buddhist thought is that “life is suffering.” Recognition of this 
truth is the first step to awakening. Zen, as D.T. Suzuki relates, frames it like this: “Zen in 
its essence is the art of seeing into the nature of one’s own being, and it points the way 
from bondage to freedom” (Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series 13). True self is no-self, 
or, as Garbage suggests, true self is the end of self—“not a thing left in our self-display.” 
Emptiness, in other words, as Ammons frames it, engenders “the sweet seed of / new 
routes,” love and compassion, which “crawls us / through.” Ends are beginnings; 
beginnings are ends. In section three, then, the narrator asserts that “only born die, and if 
something is / born or new, then that is not it, that is not / the it” (27). The “it,” instead, 
“is the indifference of all the / differences, the nothingness of all the poised / somethings, 
the finest issue of energy in which / boulders and dead stars float” (27). Differences retain 
their differences while reflecting the whole, the “nothingness of all the poised / 
somethings.” There is no birth and no death, or, as Ammons writes at the end of section 
four, “all is one, one all” (34). This sense of the mutual, the interconnected, and the non-
hierarchical no doubt brings to mind Snyder, Naess, and deep ecology. As Steven 
Schneider argues, in the course of discussing Ammons’s long-poems of the mid-1970s, 
Ammons’s “sense of the earth and its living matter—air, ocean, and land surfaces—as a 
complex interconnected system anticipates the idea of the Gaia theory…” (149).                    
Notions of impermanence, to finally, or at least partially, return to the initial point, 
are embodied in the provisional nature of the poem—its structure and content—as well as 
in the provisional nature of its self-conscious and self-reflexive poet-narrator. In the 
introductory text to Ommateum with Doxology, Ammons notes that his poems “suggest a 
many-sided view of reality; an adoption of tentative, provisional attitudes, replacing the 
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partial, unified, prejudicial, and rigid” (qtd. in Set in Motion 5). The argument 
undoubtedly holds true for Garbage as well. Ammons, through a series of provisional 
assertions, constructions and deconstructions, favors small narratives over grand 
narratives. As such, and as Kevin McGuirk relates, “In his skepticism toward 
metanarratives, totalizations that give no purchase on the particulars of the world, 
Ammons invites the label ‘postmodern.’” (“A.R. Ammons and the Whole Earth” 144). 
His poetic advertisement of the self as provisional and temporary instead of stable and 
unified also seems to invite the use of the term “postmodern.” In fact, as Frederick Buell 
insists, Ammons’s ecological vision is imbued with postmodern notions of the dispersal 
and fragmentation of poetic subjectivity: 
As inhabitant of the edge of chaos, as one who conceived of lifeform, 
institution, psyche, idea, and poem as constructions of and from process, 
as an imaginative ecocentrist who continually displaced centrality in the 
web of natural relationships, Ammons always was one to whom the 
postmodern notion of decentering the self was not alien; this awareness 
has increased in Garbage, where the speaker’s self-conscious marginality 
has fewer consolations. (228) 
At the same time, postmodern conceptions of self and subjectivity begin and end in 
language, and they are dependent, as Vincent Leitch relates, on “particular kinds of social 
arrangements” (Postmodernism 120). To be sure, this is at odds with the conception of 
language and, consequently, the conception of reality Ammons offers in the poem and 
elsewhere.    
In a section from Set in Motion, for example, Ammons writes:  
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It seems obvious to me that things and the world came first. In spite of all 
philosophical sophistry and negativism and subjectivism, I believe what’s 
“written” in the rocks. I believe this planet is ancient, that it preceded man 
or manlike creatures by billions of years and preceded words and 
languages by at least an equal time. The center of consciousness for me is 
not verbal. I live in a world of things, not texts, not written texts. (“On 
‘The Damned’” 123) 
Ammons does not, of course, reject the significance or importance of language, as 
Garbage attests. At the beginning of section 12, for instance, the poet-narrator 
homologizes linguistic and literal garbage: “a waste of words, a flattened-down, 
smoothed- / over mesa of styrofoam verbiage; since words were / introduced here things 
have gone poorly for the planet: it’s been between words and rivers” (74). Later in the 
section, and in similar fashion, Ammons writes, “words have / driven the sludge in 
billows higher than our / heads” (75-76). And, finally, the concluding couplet of the 
section, imagining the near future, angrily asserts that “we’ll kick the l out of the world 
and cuddle / up with the avenues and byways of the word” (77). The ecological 
consequences of language are clear. Removed from a direct experience of the world, 
humans, Ammons suggests, invariably choose language. Humans, in other words, 
invariably side with representation over reality, regardless of the impact these 
representations have on the nonhuman world. A world driven only by language spawns 
abuse. As Gyorgyi Vorgos insists, Ammons “meditates on all manner of excess and 
redundancy, from the natural to the social to the linguistic, and concludes that, indeed, the 
world and language are separate, and not equal, entities and that language is extra, not a 
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critical part of any ecosystem” (170). Of course, to insist that language is not a “critical 
part of any ecosystem” is to deny the impact of ideas, ideals, and values, an impact 
Ammons clearly acknowledges throughout the course of Garbage.      
Ammons uses language, poetic language in fact, to decry the importance of 
language; the irony does not go unnoticed, by either reader or writer. This, however, is 
part of the larger ecological argument the poem makes about the provisional nature of 
language (reflected, of course, in the provisional nature of the poem and its speaker). 
Even postmodern parody, Ammons insists, has its limits. The poem, to put it another way, 
is provisional because language is provisional; nothing is absolute. Ammons, therefore, 
rejects the fetishization and essentialization of language characteristic of much 
poststructuralist and postmodern theory. Jameson’s notion of pastiche, for example, is a 
process and function of language. In fact, even the mind, for Jameson, as for many 
poststructuralists and postmodernists, including, importantly, Jacques Lacan, is structured 
like a language. For Ammons, however, language is not the end. Like Snyder, like the 
Taoists and the Buddhists, like the deep ecologists, he insists that “forms are never / 
permanent form, change the permanence” (115). Conceding, of course, the importance of 
language, Ammons nonetheless and finally argues for a more fundamental, and no doubt 
residual, understanding of self and reality, an understanding that exists inside and, 
importantly, outside of language, an understanding that acknowledges human reality is 
not the only reality. As the poet-narrator writes in section seven, “have some respect for 
other speakers of being and / for god’s sake drop all this crap about words, / singularity, 
and dominion: it is so boring” (50). This is language as waste, as “crap,” that needs to be, 
in another reference to waste, dropped. After all, “whole languages, like species, can / 
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disappear without dropping a gram of earth’s / weight, and symbolic systems to a fare 
you well / can be added without filling a ditch or thimble” (51).      
To reiterate, Ammons does not deny that language is fundamental to human 
reality. Language can destroy and create, and, as the poem suggests, transfigure and 
restore, but, again, it is not the end. In other terms, Ammons suggets that there is 
something more important, as Marianne Moore once said, “beyond all this fiddle.” As his 
poet-narrator writes at the end of section seven, “our language is something to write 
home about: / but it is not the world:  grooming does for / baboons most of what words 
do for us” (52). And, in section 18, he writes, “words, which attach to edges, cannot / 
represent wholeness, so if all is all, the it / just is” (114). Laotzu’s Tao Te Ching or Way 
of Life, one of the acknowledged sources essential to Ammons’s conceptions of language 
and change, immediately comes to mind. Laotzu’s text begins with the following lines: 
“Existence is beyond the power of words / To define: / Terms may be used / But none of 
them are absolute” (31). And, of course, Laotzu’s tao, or “way,” has a parallel in Zen, 
which D.T. Suzuki frames in the following way: 
 A special transmission outside the Scriptures; 
 No dependence upon words and letters; 
 Direct pointing to the soul of man; 
 Seeing into one’s nature and the attainment of Buddhahood.  
(Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series 20) 
Or, as Suzuki relates elsewhere, “No real value is attached to such words as God, Buddha, 
the soul, the Infinite, the One, and suchlike words. They are, after all, only words and 
ideas, and as such are not conducive to the real understanding of Zen” (An Introduction to 
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Zen Buddhism 76). Here, the space separating A.R. Ammons’s Garbage and Gary 
Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers Without End begins to close. Like Snyder, Ammons 
insists that language, including aesthetic representation, is not the whole “world,” not the 
“it.” Human representation is not the whole of reality, and nature is not merely a social or 
cultural construction. After all, what could be more postmodern than avoiding 
totalizations and recognizing limits, including, in an obvious but nonetheless often 
neglected sense, the limits of language-based systems of knowledge? 
To be certain, here is the postmodern poet as postmodern deep ecologist, steeped 
in a simultaneously residual (spiritual) and emergent (scientific) ecological poetics and 
politics of “self-realization,” to resurrect Naess’s term. In section seven, Ammons writes, 
“have / you stopped to think what existence is, to be here / now where so much has been 
or is yet to come and / where isness itself is just the name of a segment / of flow” (48). 
The present is the present, a “segment / of flow.” Every moment is both birth and death, 
past and future, and therefore not birth and not death, not past and not future. The present 
is endless: empty, impermanent, and interpenetrating. As D.T. Suzuki notes, “When the 
mind, now abiding in its isness—which, to use Zen verbalism, is not isness—and thus 
free from intellectual complexities and moralistic attachments of every description, 
surveys the world of the senses in all its multiplicities, it discovers in it all sorts of values 
hitherto hidden from sight” (Zen and Japanese Culture 17). A section from section 17 of 
Garbage offers an indication of these “values hitherto hidden from sight.” In short, 
Ammons provides an indication of what it means to be present: 




  wonder, and the rights, of things, so just as 
  the fear of losing something (or someone) increases 
 
  its value enormously, so wariness of vipers and 
  other maelstroms of panic give us the brilliant 
   
  morning, the sun brittle on the hill-line before 
  it pops an arc-glob…. (114-115)   
The present moment is not mysterious: the “sun brittle on the hill-line” rises. Nonetheless, 
the present ceaselessly exists as a form of “wonder,” as a non-dualistic recognition of 
interpenetration that has obvious and self-evident ecological implications. Awareness, 
paying attention, is not, then, just to behold “wonder” but also the “rights” of “things.”   
This profound ecological sentiment, this politics of justice for both human and 
nonhuman, is offered again, in slightly transfigured fashion of course, near the end of the 
closing section of the poem. Here, in fact, is perhaps Ammons’s most direct proclamation 
of interrelation and ecological responsibility: 
  …if there is to be any regard for 
 
  human life, it will have to be ours, right regard 
  for human life including all other forms of life, 
 
  including plant life: when we eat the body of 




  of noticing that life has been spent into our 
  life, and we must care, then, for the life we 
 
  have and for the life our life has cost, and we 
  must make proper acknowledgments and sway some 
 
  with reverence for the cruel and splendid tissue 
  biospheric… (118) 
Here, Ammons presents the biosphere as a “tissue,” a term that both literally and 
figuratively bears significant resemblance to Naess’s organisms “as knots in the 
biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations” as well as the jeweled net of Indra in the 
Avatamsaka Sutra. These lines also bring back, of course, as do nearly all of the sections 
of the poem, the endless processes of destruction and creation, decomposition and 
renewal: “life has been spent into our / life.” The ecological imperative here is apparent: 
life is process and flow; self-realization is the recognition that nothing functions 
independently. True self is empty self, no-self. And emptiness, to return directly to 





CHAPTER 4. FROM PARODY, PASTICHE, AND THE POLITICS OF (FUNNY) 
GRIEF IN SHERMAN ALEXIE’S FACE TO PLAGIARISM AND PRIVILEGE IN 
THE CONCEPTUAL WRITING OF KENNETH GOLDSMITH 
 
     It is difficult to forgive the poem 
That spends its time in search of the next 
joke. 
      --Sherman Alexie, Face 
I loved it all, so I guess I’m trying to 
combine it all, the white classicism with the 
dark-skinned rebellion. 
 --Sherman Alexie, Ten Little Indians 
For the natives, they are near all dead of the 
smallpox, so the Lord hath cleared our title 
to what we possess. 
--John Winthrop, 1634, Boston 
On the surface, Sherman Alexie’s poetry and poetic voice is perfectly suited for 
late-capitalist consumer culture: approachable, accessible, clever, amusing, entertaining, 
self-expressive, self-effacing, self-referential, irreverent, ironic, parodic, etc. This, of 
course, is intentional, an imitative device by which he captivates, castigates, and derides. 
In fact, the notion of parody, even Linda Hutcheon’s notion of postmodern parody, a 
form that both “legitimizes and subverts that which it parodies” (The Politics of 
Postmodernism 101), does not, despite its precision, seem to entirely capture the depth of 
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Alexie’s subversive poetic mode. As Kenneth Lincoln insists, Alexie is a “surreal 
trickster savage in two-dimensional poetic cartoon” whose work “elicits charged reaction, 
critical gut response, positive or negative argument” (Sing with the Heart of a Bear 269). 
His poetry, therefore, is “more performance than poem, more attitude than art, more 
schtick than aesthetic,” a kind of “Indi’n vaudeville,” a “stand-up comedy at the edge of 
despair” (271). At the same time, Lincoln insists, Alexie “pushes against formalist 
assumptions of what poetry ought to be, knocks down aesthetic barriers set up in 
xenophobic academic corridors, and rebounds as cultural performance” (273). Alexie’s 
work is not, in other terms, entirely absent of an aesthetic. In fact, Alexie tends to adopt a 
Warhol-like aesthetic, a postmodern poetic mode in which the “high” art of poetry is 
fused with the “low” of late-capitalist consumer culture: Shakespeare meets Hallmark. As 
in Warhol, the elevated, the serious, the ordinary, the profane, the commodified, the 
circulated and the recirculated, are simultaneously charged with and stripped of meaning: 
style replaces history; surface replaces depth. However, despite its stylized, surface-level, 
and seemingly apolitical and ahistorical appearance, his postmodern poetics is a highly 
political and deeply entrenched historical enterprise firmly rooted in the deconstructive. 
To put it another way, Alexie’s Warhol-like aesthetic is aimed at disruption, subversion, 
reinscription, and reterritorialization. It is an aesthetic that challenges—by way of parody 
and/or politicized pastiche—both dominant and residual modes of postmodern American 
poetic practice as well as the historical, social, and cultural conditions of Native 
Americans, an often collusive and increasingly media-dominated terrain in which 
erroneous assumptions and false representations perpetuate an historical pattern of anger, 
abuse, colonization, subjugation, and neglect. These points require explanation. 
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In The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon insists that it is “not that 
modernism was serious and significant and postmodernism is ironic and parodic, as some 
have claimed; it is more that postmodernism’s irony is one that rejects the resolving urge 
of modernism toward closure or at least distance. Complicity always attends its critique” 
(99). Postmodern parody, therefore, according to Hutcheon, is “doubly coded,” 
“inescapably bound to its aesthetic and even social past,” and “offers an internalized sign 
of a certain self-consciousness about our culture’s means of ideological legitimation” 
(101). It is an aesthetic of contact and by its very nature political. Hutcheon’s conception 
and definition of postmodern parody stands, of course, in radical opposition to Fredric 
Jameson’s frequently referenced notion of postmodern pastiche, a “situation,” Jameson 
insists, in which “parody finds itself without a vocation” (Postmodernism 17). For 
Jameson, pastiche, like parody, is the “imitation of a peculiar or unique idiosyncratic 
style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language” (17). Unlike parody, 
however, pastiche, he argues, functions “without any of parody’s ulterior motives” (17). 
Postmodern buildings, for example, “celebrate their insertion into the heterogeneous 
fabric of the commercial strip and fast-food landscape of the postsuperhighway American 
city,” and through a “play of allusion and formal echoes (‘historicism’),” these buildings 
blend with “the surrounding commercial icons and spaces, thereby renouncing the high-
modernist claim to radical difference and innovation” (63). The “newer artists,” as it is, 
“no longer ‘quote’ the materials, the fragments and motifs, of a mass and popular culture, 
as Flaubert began to do; they somehow incorporate them to the point where many of our 
older critical and evaluative categories (founded precisely on the radical differentiation of 
modernist and mass culture) no longer seem functional” (64). Perhaps needless to say, 
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Jameson’s understanding of the function of parody in the postmodern era—wholly and 
fully transformed into the “well-nigh universal practice” (16) of pastiche—seems to 
exempt both artistic (poetic) practice and artistic (poetic) content of a definable, viable, 
and sustainable politics. In fact, for Jameson, in an era of pastiche, simulacrum, and 
pseudoevents bound to the social, cultural, and economic imperatives of late capitalism, 
real politics, real resistance, and real collective struggle are reduced to “fantasies of sheer 
catastrophe and inexplicable cataclysm” (46). Everything is contaminated; everything is 
commodified. In this environment, critical distance and political intervention, the 
hallmarks of parody, are phantoms; opposition is futile.     
While Jameson’s depressing conception of the impotency of art and politics in the 
postmodern era—along with its formal consequences, the “end of the distinctive 
individual brush stroke” (15) and the “disappearance of the individual subject” (16)—is a 
relatively sagacious characterization of a wealth of postmodern cultural production, 
especially in the areas of film and television, it does not, however, seem to fairly or 
accurately account for work in which pastiche, parody, or, more generally, co-optation 
and incorporation—“complicity,” to return to Hutcheon’s term—function as a means of 
artistic, institutional, and, broadly speaking, political/cultural resistance. As it is, Jameson 
acknowledges that these forms of postmodern resistance exist, but he insists that they are 
“all somehow secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves 
might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance from it” (49). Again, 
for Jameson, critique and resistance require distantiation, a historical position that 
interestingly ignores its own manner of complicity and contamination while 
simultaneously relegating postmodern art and postmodern aesthetics to the vagaries of 
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late-capitalist simulation. What Jameson fails to acknowledge is that such combinatory 
postmodern practices as parody and pastiche are not, in and of themselves, simply blind 
cannibals of the past, uniformly and naively succumbing to a dominant aesthetic that 
replaces real history with an endless series of signs and codes—the precession of 
simulacra. As Vincent Leitch relates, postmodern pastiche “revivifies the past and 
questions it, uses and revalues hallowed intertexts, acknowledges and contests historical 
contexts” (Postmodernism 107). In other terms, there is “more critique than capitulation 
in such postmodern pastiche and more liberation than resignation in the transformation of 
traditions” (107). Postmodernism is an era dominated by spectacle and simulation, and 
long-standing notions of originality and artistic monumentalism have largely evaporated, 
but the author and the work are not dead, even if they have been reconfigured into 
something like the decentered self and the (inter)text. Postmodern parody and pastiche, 
then, are not purely naïve or indoctrinated celebrations of heterogeneity, and opposition is 
not futile.   
This is not to suggest that the practices of postmodern pastiche and parody are not, 
in an obvious sense, defined, bound, and consequentially limited by social, historical, and 
cultural circumstances/conditions; they are. In fact, in the postmodern era, implied in the 
use of pastiche and parody is an acknowledgment that, to appropriate Raymond Williams, 
“all initiatives and contributions, even when they take on manifestly alternative or 
oppositional forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic: that the dominant culture, so to 
say, at once produces and limits its own form of counter-culture” (Marxism and 
Literature 114). Dissent, like everything else in postmodern culture, is always already for 
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sale; this is the condition of our times.18 However, Williams’ notion of the hegemonic 
and the aesthetic and institutional “limits” it places on resistance and opposition is not a 
consistent matter for despair, as it is for Jameson and other critics. Contact and 
contamination produce limits but also create an open (and sometimes emergent) space for 
opposition and critique. Williams, for instance, insists that it would be “wrong to 
overlook the importance of works and ideas which, while clearly affected by hegemonic 
limits and pressures, are at least in part significant breaks beyond them . . .” (114). To put 
this in slightly different terms, postmodern parody, as Linda Hutcheon relates, “may 
indeed be complicitous with the values it inscribes as well as subverts, but the subversion 
is still there: the politics of postmodern parodic representation is not the same as that of 
most rock videos’ use of allusions to standard film genres or texts” (The Politics of 
Postmodernism 106-07). What’s more, she contends, the “doubleness of the politics of 
authorized transgression remains intact: there is no dialectic resolution or recuperative 
evasion of contradiction in narrative fiction, painting, photography, or film” (107). To 
this list, I would add certain modes of postmodern American poetry, specifically those 
that self-consciously employ parody and/or politicized pastiche as aesthetic methods of 
deconstruction, subversion, and, in this sense, political/cultural resistance. Face, Sherman 
Alexie’s sprawling and somewhat loose conglomeration of poetic artifacts published in 
2009, is an apt exemplification of this postmodern political project. 
Simultaneously symptomatic and subversive, existing largely in the connective 
spaces between dominant, emergent, and residual postmodern poetic modes, Face, as a 
                                                
18 See, for example, Thomas Frank’s The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, 
Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism. 
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whole, is a series of textual soup cans whose repetitive label reads “Postmodern 
American Poetry.” As a further indication of irony, irreverence, and critique, all of these 
terms should be imagined inside individual quotation marks: “Postmodern” “American” 
“Poetry.” A patchwork of New Formalism, neo-confessionalism, performance poetry19, 
prose poetry, and straight-up prose, Alexie’s hybrid aesthetic resists strict categorization.  
At the same time, this somewhat bizarre intersection of ostensibly incompatible poetic 
modes feels strangely homogeneous, due, in large part, to the collection’s ironic, comedic, 
parodic, and yet, interestingly, seemingly sincere and serious poetic voice; of course, 
comedy, Alexie claims in the title to one of the poems in the collection, is “simply a 
funny way of being serious” (73). As it is, Alexie, in more or less mechanical fashion, 
churns out sonnets, villanelles, free verse, and prose, as well as numerous intermixings 
and parodies of these forms. What’s more, many of the poems in the collection are 
punctuated by trite, if not downright corny, end and internal rhymes; the concluding 
couplet to the first poem in a sequence entitled “The Blood Sonnets,” for example, reads, 
“Years later, in Seattle, my nose bled / When my mom called and said, ‘Your father is 
dead’” (48). The result is a series of poems that embody what Alexie, in a typical tongue-
in-cheek manner, calls a “ragged and rugged formalism” (128). Of course, Alexie’s 
“ragged and rugged formalism,” most clearly evidenced in his use, combination, 
                                                
19 Alexie is a four-time winner of the World Heavyweight Championship Poetry Bout, a 
spoken-word competition modeled after a boxing match held in New Mexico from 1982 
to 2003. Other champions of the competition include Anne Waldman, Ntozake Shange, 
Simon Ortiz, Quincy Troupe, and Jimmy Santiago Baca. Undefeated, Alexie retired from 
the competition in 2001. 
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deconstruction, and reinscription of traditional forms, is likely what Dana Gioia—an 
acerbic critic of the “workshop aesthetic” and a vocal proponent of New Formalist 
poetics—would refer to as “pseudo-formal verse.” In other terms, to appropriate Gioia, 
while many of Alexie’s poems employ “neat visual patterns, the words jump between 
incompatible rhythmic systems from line to line” and the “rhythms lack the spontaneity 
of free verse without ever achieving the focused energy of formal poetry” (“Notes on the 
New Formalism” 404). For Alexie, however, unlike Gioia, the recuperation and 
reinscription of poetic tradition—an adherence to the residual, to use Raymond Williams’ 
terminology—is not an end in itself. In fact, adherence to the rigid standards of traditional 
form and meter—playing tennis with the net up, as Robert Frost might have framed it—is 
in many ways beside the point. Indeed, as the poems of Face suggest, New Formalism is 
little more than one of a number of available aesthetic trends—a trend, to return to Linda 
Hutcheon’s formulation, that Alexie both legitimizes and subverts in service of a larger 
ideological end: Alexie’s parody-based aesthetic implicitly foregrounds and then calls 
into question the historical, cultural, and political values inscribed in the use of traditional 
poetic forms—values that are inescapably tied to a history of colonization, subjugation, 
violence, marginalization, and exclusion. As Alexie writes in “Tuxedo with Eagle 
Feathers,” a poem I will return to shortly, “If I find it pleasurable / To (imperfectly) 
mimic white masters, / Then what tribal elders have I betrayed?” (82). The answer is far 
from simple. 20 Regardless, the form(al) is never innocent: Alexie’s aesthetic is imbued 
                                                
20 Some critics insist that Alexie’s work reaffirms all-too-common Native stereotypes and 
is constructed for a largely white audience. See, for example, Gloria Bird, “The 
Exaggeration of Despair in Sherman Alexie’s Reservation Blues,” Wicazo Sa Review 
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with a deconstructive politics, a politically subversive strategy, and one, importantly, that 
is not exclusive to Face. 
With little question, Face is both an extension of and a departure from Alexie’s 
earlier collections of poetry. In The Summer of Black Widows (1996), for example, Alexie 
plays loose and fast with the sonnet. For instance, “Sonnet: Tattoo Tears” is comprised of 
fourteen interrelated sections of short prose in which the connective order of alternating 
rhyme characteristic of the English sonnet is loosely simulated through thematic 
association: the last term or idea of one section becomes the foundation of the succeeding 
section. Another multi-part piece from the collection, “Totem Sonnets,” offers a radical 
and often comedic coalescence/pastiche of the Native artistic tradition of totem carving 
found among a number of tribes of the Pacific Northwest and the European literary 
tradition of the sonnet, a kind of “creative bricolage,” to appropriate Nancy Peterson’s 
term, that blends “Indian realities and traditional Western poetic forms” (135). Divided 
into seven individual “totem sonnets,” each poem in the series adheres to the structural 
divisions of either the Italian or the English sonnet. However, the lines of these poems are 
composed almost entirely of names and titles—lists that visually and symbolically 
resemble the shape of a totem pole. The first stanza of the fourth “sonnet,” for instance, 
reads as follows: “The Exorcist / Manhunter / Alien / Halloween” (35). For readers, 
formal confusion abounds. The use of a quatrain suggests that this is an English sonnet, 
                                                                                                                                            
(1995): 47-52. In addition, see Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “American Indian Intellectualism 
and the New Indian Story,” Natives and Academics: Researching and Writing about 




but, very obviously, meter and rhyme have been thrown out the window. Interpretive 
confusion also ensues, as the vertical structure implicit in the totem design is weighed 
against the alternating rhyme scheme of the English sonnet. Is The Exorcist to be 
considered in conjunction with Alien, or is The Exorcist simply being placed at the top of 
this list of well-known horror and suspense films? Is there a relationship between this 
stanza and the other stanzas of the poem? Does the concluding couplet provide resolution 
to an established problem? Is there a problem at all? More questions could be posed. 
Nonetheless, any interpretive position must consider that all of the films in the stanza 
either directly or indirectly take on the concepts of evil and violence, both literal and 
abstract. In this sense, they are of the same general class, and since totemism, as Marjorie 
Halpin relates, is “essentially a system of classification” (16), Alexie’s poem, as well as 
this stanza, might be read as a series of related categorical definitions, or, more 
appropriately, as cultural totems—film-based, media-generated representations of evil 
and violence.  
Embedded, of course, in this hybrid form, in the interaction between Native art 
and English literary tradition, is the actual and still largely dismissed history of 
interaction between Native peoples and Europeans, a history of violence, murder, and 
subjugation, a history of domination and colonization that is easily linked to the 
deplorable economic and social conditions currently endured by many Native Americans, 
especially those living on reservations. As Kenneth Lincoln relates, Native peoples are 
“still caught between cultures, living the worst conditions of both” (Native American 
Renaissance 20). Despite, for example, occupying land with rich natural resources, 
including uranium and coal, “some reservations suffer the worst hardship in America—
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incomes at half the poverty level, five years average schooling, the highest national 
alcoholism and suicide rates, substandard housing and social services, infant mortality, 
tuberculosis, and diabetes in multiples beyond any other minority in the country, resulting 
in an average lifespan of forty-four years” (20). Such horrifying inequity, such “endemic 
disadvantage rooted firmly in the history of colonialism” (39), as Joy Porter frames it, has 
done little to engender a national sense of accountability; policies of social redress have 
been few. In fact, in much the opposite fashion, basic issues of sovereignty and civil 
rights are under constant attack. Mere survival is often a way of life, and, as such, it has 
become a key concept in much Native literature, theory, and scholarship. As Kenneth 
Roemer notes, “The secular post-apocalyptic senses of loss, survival, and sovereignty 
remind non-Indian readers that there is a group of Americans for whom near extinction is 
an historical reality, not a hypothetical worry for the future or an event that happened 
elsewhere” (18). Of course, the poem suggests that the history upon which these 
conditions are predicated is not confined to historically literal instances of assault, 
displacement, or social neglect.   
To put it plainly, the totemic/cinematic representations of evil and violence in the 
first stanza of the fourth sonnet indirectly recall the history of cinematic violence enacted 
against Native Americans, a violence conducted through stereotype and caricature, a 
spectacle of gross cinematic misrepresentation. As Vine Deloria, Jr. argues in Custer 
Died for Your Sins, a manifesto first published in 1969, “Because people can see right 
through us, it becomes impossible to tell truth from fiction or fact from mythology. 
Experts paint us as they would like us to be” (2-3). It is of little wonder, then, that the 
third stanza of this totem sonnet—“Little Big Man / Enter the Dragon / The Searchers / 
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The Wild Bunch” (35)—makes reference to three popular films that provide in both 
implicit and explicit fashion destructive stereotypes of Native Americans and brazenly 
sympathetic depictions of Euro-Americans and Euro-American conquest and Westward 
expansion. As John Newton relates, Native American identity is reduced, essentialized, 
put on cinematic and televisual display, and, more generally, “spectacularized on a global 
scale” (415). Alexie, therefore, Newton insists, must make “his stand in the struggle for 
subjective agency not in some autochthonous interiority but on the flat, open-ground of 
the invader’s image-repertoire . . .” (415). The history of this “image-repertoire” includes, 
of course, more than 4,000 movies and television shows that are, as Ward Churchill notes 
in Fantasies of the Master Race, “objectively racist at all levels” (167). “Nothing,” 
Churchill insists, “is more emblematic of Hollywood’s visual pageantry than scenes of 
Plains Indian warriors astride their galloping ponies, many of them trailing a flowing 
headdress in the wind, thundering into battle against the blue-coated troops of the United 
States” (168). Sadly, these gross misrepresentations “have been served” along with the 
“tipi and the buffalo hunt, the attack upon the wagon train and the ambush of the 
stagecoach until they have become so indelibly imprinted upon the American 
consciousness as to be synonymous with Indians as a whole . . .” (168). Reality dissolves, 
individual identity is subsumed, and the spectacle reigns supreme: real Indians become 
reel Indians. As Alexie writes in the second section of “My Heroes Have Never Been 
Cowboys,” one of a number of prose-poems from an early collection entitled First Indian 
on the Moon (1993), and a poem, interestingly, also written in mock-sonnet form, “Did 
you know that in 1492 every Indian instantly became an extra in the Great American 
Western?” (102). “Sonnet: Tattoo Tears,” in other words, to return squarely to the point, 
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provides not only a deconstruction and reconstitution of the sonnet form but also 
implicitly ties its values of order and hierarchy to the history of Euro-American conquest, 
a history of violence that extends into the representational spaces of postmodern 
American popular culture. As Susan Berry Brill de Ramirez relates, Alexie “transforms 
the classic lyric of Britain and Shakespeare into a vehicle that . . . speaks the history of 
atrocity” (110). In a media-dominated, image-saturated, Xerox-based culture, the poem 
suggests, style replaces history and surface replaces depth. As a consequence, genocide is 
ignored, conquest is justified, and the true conditions of contemporary Native existence 
continue to go largely ignored. Resistance, however, is not futile. As Dean Rader relates, 
since the “site of cultural colonialism and erasure has shifted from the empty expanse of 
the West to the empty expanses of television and movie screens,” Alexie’s poems “resist 
the imperial colonizing thrust of contemporary culture through participation in it” (149). 
Kenneth Lincoln, in a similar fashion, contends that Alexie’s poetry functions as 
“revisionist history from an insurgent Indian perspective, reimagining Native devastation, 
deconstructing tribal heroism, reversing good guy/bad guy paradigms, cowboys and 
Indians, the Lone Ranger and Tonto” (Speak Like Singing 284). Though plain, the politics 
here deserve consideration.   
In a section worth quoting at length, John Newton argues that “contact” with 
American popular culture—a kind of border-space—serves as the basis for Alexie’s 
radical postmodern aesthetic: 
Alexie detaches himself from a complex of neighboring assumptions: that 
an appeal to indigenous metaphysical systems will take precedence over 
self-reflexive textuality; that a contestation of imperial agency will 
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supplant a critique of the humanist subject; that the urgency of active 
resistance will prohibit the sportive indulgences of postmodernism. In 
Alexie’s poetics of the contemporary reservation, history is neither 
metaphysical nor even tribal, but always emphatically a history of contact. 
Indigenous mythology and figurative systems give way to the Esperanto of 
American mass culture, the “narrative primacy” of oral tradition to the 
cartoon dramaturgy of the reservation drive-in. Swaying between 
flippancy and the most acute seriousness . . . Alexie’s work employs a 
cheerful pop-cultural globalism in negotiating a history which is 
drastically specific. The result is a “postcolonialism” that makes no claim 
to disentangle itself from either the colonial past or the postmodern 
present. (415)  
To be sure, this border-space, this liminal space, is suffused with the complex 
relationship between heritage and tradition and the continued influence, impact, and force 
of late-capitalist American culture, a culture that continues its long history of 
colonization not only in the literal space of the reservation and its attendant politics but 
through spectacle and simulation—the tyranny of the image. Newton’s quotations around 
the term “postcolonialism” are therefore warranted. As Alexie notes in an interview with 
Gretchen Giles, “The United States is a colony, and I'm always going to write like one 
who is colonized . . .” (“Seeing Red”). At bottom, then, such writing, in its refusal to take 
a side, in its rejection of closure and its celebration of contradiction and contamination, 
amounts to an autochthonous aesthetic of resistance, an employment of the language, 
imagery, and forms of the dominant culture—both historical and contemporary—as 
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necessary tools for Alexie’s larger project, one invested in the art and politics of 
deconstruction and reinscription. 
To no surprise, this simultaneous participation and resistance is evident in a 
number of other poems in The Summer of Black Widows, including the remainder of the 
“Totem Sonnets” series, which offer, generally speaking, similarly politicized 
deconstructions of Americana, including actors, authors, athletes, musicians, historical 
figures, religious icons, and products: “Steamed Rice / Whole Wheat Bagel / Egg White / 
Baked Chicken” (33). In typical postmodern fashion, the past and the present collude and 
collide, and, as the series attests, tradition amounts to little more than an aesthetic code. 
This conception of tradition as mere aesthetic code also explains Alexie’s liberal use of 
other forms in this relatively early collection, including the inaugural poem of the second 
section, “Haibun,” which makes less than artful use of the disciplined Japanese poetic 
tradition of prose and haiku, and “Elegies,” which transforms a typically mournful and 
contemplative lyric form into a self-reflexive series of running jokes: “This is a poem for 
people who died in stupid ways” (49). Of course, the transformation, deconstruction, and 
reinscription of poetic tradition evident in Alexie’s earlier work, the “politics of 
authorized transgression,” to return to Hutcheon’s phrase, is fully realized in the poems 
of Face. 
In Face, the space between high and low, the sacred and the profane, the private 
and the public, dissolves into bricolage, collage, parody, pastiche. References to movies, 
television shows, actors, athletes, comedians, companies, and commercial products, from 
high-definition televisions to Google and iTunes, appear alongside a host of mostly white 
and largely canonized literary figures, including Emily Dickinson, F. Scott Fitzgerald, 
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Gertrude Stein, Edith Wharton, John Donne, and, perhaps most significantly, 
Shakespeare. Boundaries of all kinds collapse, and nothing, it seems, is off limits. 
“Thrash,” for example, a twenty-one section piece that spans sixteen pages and contains 
an inscrutable mix of poetic and non-poetic forms, including a mid-section reading quiz, 
is devoted, in large part, to genitalia, sex, and various forms of bodily secretion; the poem 
openly challenges all manner of propriety and taste as it takes on urination, defecation, 
masturbation, foreplay, copulation, vasectomy, and circumcision, often in verse form. 
Self-reflexive interruptions, meta-commentary, and other postmodern clichés are 
common. In “Wrist,” Alexie claims, “I want to write ‘adulterous carriage,’ / But that 
seems pretentious and clunky to the ear” (53). Later in the poem, he writes, “My lame 
poetry suffers when compared to Edith Wharton’s description of the adulterous Archer 
and Olenska” (54). In “Inappropriate,” a four-page pastiche of poetry and prose that 
examines F. Scott Fitzgerald, alcoholism, and public speaking, Alexie breaks in to note, 
“Fitzgerald had given me the vocabulary to describe my own Native American identity. 
Oh, yes, I am the genocided Indian who is also the dream-filled refugee! Oh, yes, I am 
indigenous to the land but an immigrant to the culture! I am the ironic indigenous 
immigrant” (27). The history of Native devastation is openly declared, and, as such, 
Alexie leaves little space for passive readerly consumption. 
Here, as in other places, Native history and reservation life intersect with 
references to and anecdotes of Alexie’s current personal and professional life, a life lived 
off the reservation and one enmeshed in and devoted to marriage, parenthood, career, and 
the complicated politics of border-crossing and assimilation. In fact, to be fair, the vast 
majority of the poems in the collection deal with post-reservation life, an apparently 
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conscious choice, since most “Native literature,” Alexie contends in an interview with 
Ase Nygren, “is about the reservation” (145). At the same time, for Alexie, who now 
lives, as Duncan Campbell relates, “in Madrona Valley in Seattle, a gentrified area in 
what was once a mainly black neighborhood known as the Central District” (117), 
disconnection from tribe and tribal traditions is a source of both comedy and despair. In a 
poem called “Gentrification,” for example, which, on the surface, appears to be about a 
neighbor’s home in Alexie’s residential Seattle neighborhood, the past functions as a 
specter, recalling the country’s history of racial violence, colonization, and cultural 
erasure: “Let us remember the wasps / That hibernated in the walls / Of the house next 
door . . .” (68). This poem, like so many others in the collection, is packed in ice and then 
thrown into the fire. And the sonnet, more than any other form, is the preferred poetic 
package. In fact, there are more than twenty poems from the collection that might be 
fairly categorized as sonnets, not to mention that the standard line for the majority of the 
poems in the collection, sonnet or not, consists of ten syllables. Of course, Alexie 
recycles some of the tricks of his earlier work, such as making muted reference to the 
sonnet by writing poems with fourteen stanzas, but Face, on the whole, takes up the form 
in a much more direct manner. 
 “Volcano,” a multi-poem piece—interspersed with a section of prose—on the 
eruption of Mount St. Helen’s, ends with a Shakespearean sonnet, although the closest 
the poem comes to alternating rhyme is “blood” and “tomb” (15). A series called “The 
Blood Sonnets” contains five poems in which the form is used to examine alcoholic 
fathers, menstruation, rats, ghosts, virginity, sex, and death; though apparently serious, 
the gravity of these subjects is typically belied by the content. In the first piece, the 
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speaker claims, “Drunk daddy only hit the road / And I’d become the rez Hamlet who 
missed / His father so much that he bled red ghosts” (48). The ending couplet of the 
fourth poem in the series reads, “And we watched LA Law with her parents, / Who 
ignored the bloodstains on her gray pants” (50). Later in the collection, “The Fight or 
Flight Response” uses an English sonnet to conclude, “Like us, swans can be jealous and 
dangerous, / And, oh, so lovely, sure, and monogamous” (62). Other instances, like 
“Song Son Blue” or “Comedy is Simply a Funny Way of Being Serious,” both of which 
contain footnote-based sonnets, help to expose the purpose of Alexie’s aesthetic. At the 
end of the latter poem, he writes, “It is difficult to forgive the poem / That spends its time 
in search of the next joke” (73). That joke, of course, is already there, in Alexie’s parodic 
deconstruction of the form. 
In a sequence entitled “The Seven Deadly Sins of Marriage,” a male speaker, 
presumably Alexie, catalogs various types of marriage-related sin through the use of a 
poetic form that very closely resembles the English sonnet. Each of the seven poems in 
the series contains three quatrains and a concluding couplet, most of the lines are 
comprised of ten syllables, the principal poetic foot is the iamb, and there is often an 
alternating rhyme scheme. And unlike the poems from Alexie’s earlier collections, the 
formal quality of these poems seems to blur the line between parody and fidelity to 
formal poetic tradition. As it turns out, however, that line is observable. In more or less 
anticipated fashion, the earnest title of the series, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Marriage,” 
serves as little more than a front for the less-than-serious content. In fact, on the whole, 
the poems in the sequence are frivolous, absurd, incidental, banal, trite. The concluding 
lines of the first sonnet, “Envy,” a poem devoted to jealousy and past lovers, read, “I 
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celebrate the men who preceded me— / Just as the bank celebrates each debtor— / 
Because they make me look so much better” (56). The concluding couplet to another 
sonnet from the series, entitled “Wrath,” a poem that chronicles the revenge of a speaker 
who has been kept awake by a group of women in a nearby hotel room, ends with the 
following lines: “When I tell my wife about my adolescent rage / She shrugs, rolls her 
eyes, and turns the page” (59). And, finally, the opening lines of “Pride” proclaim, “A 
female fan, upon meeting my wife, / Said, ‘Oh, wow, you must have a wonderful life’ . . .” 
(56). Trivial, silly, unapologetically common, the poems rarely adhere to the sentiment of 
the form, as if to suggest a flaw in its historical use.  
Of course, Alexie’s parodic deconstruction is felt not only in the irony of the 
content but also in the seemingly random rhyming patterns, the inconsistent meter, and 
the shamelessly predictable end rhymes: “Envy” is missing an alternating rhyme scheme; 
the concluding couplet of “Wrath” contains one line comprised of thirteen syllables and 
the other of nine, and both make almost inexplicable use of the iamb. A poem called 
“Pride” rhymes “wife” and “life,” “poems” and “homes,” “wood” and “could.” 
Rhythmically, metrically, and despite their (extremely) loose iambic structure and 
alternating rhyme, these poems pretty much read like prose. Here, for instance, is the 
opening quatrain of “Greed:” 
Every summer, my wife travels to France  
To spend a week or two with her good friend.  
Of course, my sons and I welcome the chance 
To de-evolve and cave it up, and yet . . . (57)   
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There is only one instance of alternating rhyme here, “France” and “chance,” and though 
each line contains ten syllables, the rhythmic structure, an odd mix of trochees and iambs, 
creates a feeling less of poetry and more of prose. What’s more, it reveals that the poem’s 
formal appearance, like most of the poems in the collection, functions as little more than 
camouflage—a tuxedo with eagle feathers. This, interestingly, is a strategy common to a 
number of Native writers. 
In “As if an Indian Were Really an Indian,” Louis Owens, using the popular 
acceptance of M. Scott Momaday’s House Made of Dawn as authentication, contends that 
the success of colonized Native writers is often predicated on the adoption of culturally 
and institutionally mandated aesthetic standards: “The most prosperous of such texts are 
both accessible to the aesthetic and political tastes of the metropolitan center and, perhaps 
more significantly, present to such readers a carefully managed exoticism that is 
entertaining but not discomfiting to the non-Native reader” (22). At the same time, 
Owens continues, lurking under the surface of House Made of Dawn is a highly 
subversive politics of appropriation. In short, Momaday self-consciously adopts the 
“aesthetics of the center” (22) in order to see the text “past the palace guards into the 
royal Pulitzer chambers” (23). For Momaday, then, as for Alexie, colonization and co-
optation engender a textual practice that at once both legitimates and questions the forms 
and aesthetic standards that their work takes up. Linguistic and aesthetic appropriation—
the “wearing of a linguistic mask,” as Jameson derisively frames it—is therefore a means 
of both survival and subversion. As Alexie writes in “Tuxedo with Eagle Feathers,” “It 
was all those goddamn texts / By all those damn dead white male and female writers / 
That first taught me how to be a fighter” (42-45).               
168 
 
Perhaps more clearly than any other poem in the collection, “Tuxedo with Eagle 
Feathers” openly and defiantly clarifies Alexie’s aesthetic and political project. An 
outright attack on Elizabeth Cook Lynn’s conception of sovereignty, which Alexie brands 
as essentialist, separatist, an “ugly fundamentalism” (80), the piece moves between prose 
and poem—a sort of postmodern haibun in which Alexie replaces a concentrated poetic 
form, the haiku, with a loose and largely parodic version of the English sonnet. In the 
final prose section of the piece, which, incidentally, reads much like autobiographical 
metafiction, Alexie caustically and self-reflexively offers his own definition of the piece: 
As I changed back into my street clothes, I told Dorothy that I was going 
to write a poem about her. ‘What kind of poem?’ she asked. ‘A hybrid 
sonnet sequence,’ I said. ‘An indigenous celebration of colonialism or 
maybe a colonial celebration of the indigenous. O, Dorothy, it’s going to 
be a hand-sewn sonnet! You’ll be able to count the stitches!” (81)   
Alexie, of course, is fond of the irony and apparent contradiction embedded in both the 
title and the explanation of the piece. An attack on tribalism, a defense of Alexie’s 
aesthetic, the piece exposes his desire to have it all, without apology. As he writes in the 
third prose section of the piece, “I wasn’t saved by the separation of cultures; I was 
reborn inside the collision of cultures” (80). This liminal space, the space of collision, is 
fraught with grief and loss, but it is also open to discontinuities, gaps, lags, and 
contradictions. In short, Alexie gets to stand on both sides, simultaneously engaging and 
denying, accepting and rejecting, and, finally, liberating both Native identity and 
aesthetics from a lack of choice and the essentialism implied in being forced to pick a 
side. Alexie writes, “But colonialism’s influence / Is fluid and solid, measurable / And 
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mad . . .” (81-82). The way in is also the way out, though it might not be immediately 
recognizable. Or, as Alexie writes at the end of the poem, “I claim all of it; Hunger is my 
crime” (82).       
The sonnet, of course, is not the only traditional form that Alexie parodies in the 
collection. In “Villify,” a poem from the first section of Face, Alexie provides a comedic 
and parodic deconstruction and reinscription of the villanelle. In what is now virtually a 
cliché of postmodern artistic production, the poem begins with a reference to itself: the 
title of the poem is followed by a reference to a footnote in which Alexie provides a 
“history” of the villanelle. In this footnote, the first of fourteen throughout the course of 
the poem, a number Alexie chooses in less-than-subtle reference to the sonnet form, 
readers learn not only that the “poem is a villanelle” but that “the modern villanelle with 
its two alternating refrain lines took shape only with Jean Passerat’s sixteenth-century 
villanelle, ‘J’ai Perdu Ma Tourtourelle’ (‘I Have Lost My Turtledove’)” (30), a point 
Alexie, the poet turned stand-up comic, apparently picks up while conducting a Google 
search on the history of the form. Alexie goes on to call Passerat’s well-known villanelle 
a “sentimental piece of crap,” makes reference to other poets who have worked with the 
form, insists that the villanelle is “best used to express the painful and powerful 
repetitions of grief,” notes that the current poem is a “grief-filled villanelle that is also 
funny,” and, in more or less expected self-deprecating fashion, acknowledges the 
generally poor quality of his poem: “[W]hile I don’t think it’s a great poem, or maybe not 
even a good one, I do enjoy the punning title. Yes, a villanelle called ‘Vilify.’ I tried to 
title it ‘Villanelle-i-fication,’ but I just couldn’t live with that monstrosity . . .” (30). 
Finally, as an aside, Alexie maintains that “‘Funny grief’” is the “best answer to the 
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question: ‘What is Native American poetry?’” (30), a point that further clarifies Alexie’s 
aesthetic method. 
The length and particularly the content of this first footnote make it fairly clear 
that the poem itself, including its use of a traditional form, is largely and self-consciously 
irrelevant, a notion implicitly reiterated through the deficient quality of the poem. The 
opening tercet should serve as ample proof: “I’ve never been to Mount Rushmore. It’s 
just too silly. Even now, as I write this, I’m thinking / About the T-shirt that has four 
presidential faces on the front and four bare asses on the back. / Who’s on that damn T-
shirt anyway? Is it both Roosevelts, Jefferson, and Lincoln?” (29). Is the near rhyme and 
lineation the criteria by which these lines qualify as poetry? There is, with little question, 
a temptation to argue, as Marjorie Perloff does in her castigation of many of the post-
World War II poets included in Cary Nelson’s Oxford Anthology of Modern American 
Poetry, that this is “sloppy, badly written, sentimental, overtly and annoyingly ideo-
logical, and excessively shrill and/or bathetic” (“Janus-Faced Blockbuster” 209). To say 
so, however, would be missing the point. This is “bad” poetry, and Alexie knows it. 
Prose-like, conversational, a mere a hint of poetic approximation in the slant rhyme of 
“thinking” and “Lincoln,” Alexie’s journal-like villanelle devoted to Mount Rushmore is 
little more than a comedic front for a series of footnotes that, in one form or another, 
reveal the irony and hypocrisy carved into the rocks of South Dakota. The tail end of the 
sixth footnote should provide ample proof: 
Andrew Jackson was also the architect of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 
which gave the president power to negotiate the removal of Indian tribes 
living east of the Mississippi. Among other thefts, blackmails, and broken 
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treaties, the most tragic result of this legislation was the Trail of Tears, in 
which 7,000 U.S. troops forced 16,000 Cherokee Indians to march west to 
new lands. Over 4,000 Indians died of cold, hunger, and disease during the 
march. (34) 
A kind of Trojan horse, Alexie’s villanelle, like his sonnet, imitates and lures, begging 
readers to assume a position of false complacency in the poem’s external and formal 
appearance. Once inside, however, the guts are revealed, and the work plainly and 
unapologetically tells it as it is. 
New Formalism is not, of course, the only aesthetic standard Alexie 
simultaneously champions and subverts in the collection. According to Hank Lazer, the 
“standardized American poem of the past twenty-five years” adheres to a specific set of 
criteria: “simple declarative syntax; the illusion of a craftless transparent language; a 
simple speechlike singular voice in the service of a poem that ends with a moment of 
epiphanic wonder and/or closure where all parts of the poem relate to a common theme” 
(Opposing Poetries 131). As noted in previous chapters, Lazer is not alone in insisting 
that American poetry is currently dominated by an institutionally validated and largely 
homogenous poetic mode, and there is little question that Alexie’s poetry is often replete 
with the hallmarks of this dominant tradition. Seemingly built for a readership raised on 
television and movies, many of his poems, steeped in special effects and heavy on punch-
line entertainment, have the feel and fugacious quality of a big-budget summer film. 
Easily digested, the poems culminate in a final line (or stanza) that provides summation 
and closure, much like the final scene of a blockbuster film or the tail end of a (dirty) 
joke. In “In the Matter of Human v. Bee,” a piece that takes on the consequences of 
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colonly collapse, Alexie concludes: “The bees are gone. / We need new bees / Or we are 
fucked” (24). Of course, Alexie’s poetry has rarely conformed to an academic standard of 
poetry. Instead, it has favored, like the majority of poetry written in the dominant mode, 
the colloquial, the conversational, the personal, the syntactical, and the ostensibly natural. 
At the same time, Face provides an opportunity to examine how poetry written in an 
aesthetically dominant mode can be used to simultaneously challenge that mode, 
especially since Alexie’s poetry epitomizes the convergence of dominant aesthetic 
standards with an emergent politics committed to the subversion of those standards and 
their related values, a common theme in both postmodern poetry and postmodern theory. 
As Vincent Leitch relates, “[T]heory is mired in commodified, coopted, cooperative 
moments; however, it regularly presents contestatory discourses” (Theory Matters x). Or, 
as Alexie puts it: “[I]n more literary terms, the poet, feeling far too assimilated while 
writing a semi-formal poem that features Western civilized rhyme, syllabics, and meter, 
tried to ‘Indian up’ the damn thing by bringing his mother into it” (154). 
 
 
From Content to Context: Kenneth Goldsmith and the Politics of Plagiarism and Privilege 
It’s a choice of object. Instead of making it, 
it is a ready-made.   
--Marcel Duchamp 
       
      Where technology leads, art follows. 
       --Kenneth Goldsmith 
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 In 1915, Marcel Duchamp moved from Paris to New York, in part to escape the 
increasingly repressive and exclusionary politics of Paris’ avant-garde. Approximately 
three years prior, Duchamp had been pressured to withdraw what would become his most 
celebrated painting, Nude Descending a Staircase, for an opening hosted by the Salon des 
Indépendants, the organization founded in the early 1880s to challenge government-
sponsored art and to promote artistic autonomy. Duchamp later explained that the 
members of the group, including Albert Gleizes and Henri Le Fauconnier, “found that the 
Nude wasn’t in the line that they had predicted” (Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp 17). 
Such rejection helped to initiate Duchamp’s abandonment of conventional painting. By 
1913, he was focused on creating conceptual art—art that is not merely retinal but, as 
Duchamp explained, in the “service of the mind” (The Writings of Marcel Duchamp 125). 
Three Standard Stoppages, for example, a wood box that contains three pieces of thread 
glued to three painted canvas strips mounted on glass panels and three pieces of wood 
that match the curve of the threads, questions the absolutism of scientific knowledge by 
exposing assumed mathematical certainties to the effects of chance. Ironically, in this 
same year, Nude Descending a Staircase was exhibited at the Armory Show in New York. 
The work met considerable resistance and generated national controversy, but it also 
provided Duchamp with a degree of commercial success and assisted in establishing him 
in the United States prior to his arrival in New York in 1915. 
 In New York, supported by the patronage of Walter C. Arensberg, who had 
learned of him through the Armory Show, Duchamp socialized with a number of avant-
garde artists and writers, some of whom were proponents of Dada. In 1916, he became a 
founding member of the Society of Independent Artists, along with such members as 
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Man Ray, John Marin, and Albert Gleizes, and they began to plan an exhibition for the 
spring of 1917 in the spirit of Paris’ Salon, a point made apparent by the exhibition’s 
motto: “No Jury. No prizes. Hung in alphabetical order.” Perhaps as a consequence of his 
exclusion from the 1912 show in Paris, or perhaps simply as a lark designed to challenge 
the members of the committee, Duchamp submitted a porcelain urinal, entitled Fountain, 
under the pseudonym “R. Mutt,” a likely allusion to the popular comic strip Mutt and Jeff. 
At some point prior to the exhibition, the piece was removed and placed behind a 
partition. Duchamp found the work after the show had ended, and when he learned that 
members of the committee had agreed to have it removed, he, along with Arensberg, 
resigned from the Society in protest.  
Fountain, of course, is now considered a landmark work in the history of 
twentieth-century art. One of Duchamp’s infamous Readymades, Fountain, according to 
Peter Bürger, “radically questions the very principle of art in bourgeois society according 
to which the individual is considered the creator of the work of art” (52). Concept, 
according to this aesthetic, determines content, and selection (choice of object) replaces 
individual artistic process and material production; in fact, content may be theoretically 
arbitrary or even unnecessary, except, perhaps, as material fact. A pre-existing object, an 
already made and commercially fashioned artifact, Duchamp’s selection and (intended) 
display of a porcelain urinal, in other words, contested prevailing assumptions about 
artistic production and denounced the museum gallery as an artificially constructed space 
that simultaneously elevates and degrades art. An act of provocation, Fountain not only 
unmasked the hypocrisy of the art market and the progressive claims of the avant-garde 
but exposed the crisis of authenticity latent in Modernist aesthetics, especially its claims 
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to genius, originality, and artistic monumentalism. No longer can art or artist, the work 
maintained, be divided from the larger culture of commercial production, a concept 
resurrected if not fetishized in the mid-century mechanical Pop Art of Andy Warhol, who, 
in an interview with G.R. Swenson, famously declared that he wanted “to be a machine” 
(18). And, of course, Duchamp is apparent in Warhol’s contemporary heir, Jeff Koons, 
the former stockbroker, who, sometimes entirely removed from the process of production, 
replicates Warhol’s factory-based aesthetic in his flat but nonetheless lucrative display of 
kitsch and other symbolic representations of America’s materially obsessed and 
consumer-based culture. 
A self-styled postmodern variant of Marcel Duchamp, an Andy Warhol on 
steroids, a Jeff Koons without the plexiglass, Kenneth Goldsmith, sculptor turned poet 
and self-proclaimed as the “most boring writer that has ever lived” (“Being Boring”), 
abandons the concept of parody and its attendant oppositional politics as seen in the work 
of a writer like Sherman Alexie for a far-off logical extension: plagiarism. “Because 
words today are cheap and infinitely produced,” Goldsmith claims, “they are detritus, 
signifying little, meaning less” (Uncreative Writing 218). For Goldsmith, language, as a 
consequence of its large-scale digitization, is in an unstable state of excess—overloaded, 
piled up, a kind of “junk” (“Conceptual Poetics”). Production has exceeded use. As such, 
his poetic project demands reuse and recycling, a sort of ecology of language, a politics 
of management and restoration: “Regurgitation is the new uncreativity; instead of 
creation, we honor, cherish, and embrace manipulation and repurposing” (Uncreative 
Writing 219). Such writing—typically called “Conceptual writing” (originally Craig 
Dworkin’s term), “Uncreative writing” (Kenneth Goldsmith’s moniker), and/or 
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“Unoriginal Genius” (Marjorie Perloff’s honorific title)—proclaims “context” as “the 
new content” (3) and takes “inspiration from radical modernist ideas” and infuses them 
with “twenty-first century technology” (4). 
Insisting that he is “not doing much more than trying to catch literature up with 
appropriate fads the art world moved past decades ago” (120), Goldsmith situates his own 
work, and the work of other Conceptual writers, including Vanessa Place, Craig Dworkin, 
Robert Fitterman, Caroline Bergvall, and Christian Bök, with direct reference to 
Duchamp and other visual (though often non-retinal) artists. In “Uncreativity as a 
Creative Practice,” for example, Goldsmith asks, “One hundred years after Duchamp, 
why hasn't straight appropriation become a valid, sustained or even tested literary 
practice?” For Goldsmith, this is the unavoidable implication of Duchamp’s work, 
especially of a piece like Fountain. Duchamp, according to Goldsmith, “eschewed the 
retinal qualities to create an object that doesn’t require a viewership as much as it does a 
thinkership; no one has ever stood wide-eyed before Duchamp’s urinal admiring the 
quality and application of the glaze” (Uncreative Writing 111). Of course, work in the 
spirit of Duchamp’s Readymades is well established in the visual arts, a fact Goldsmith 
acknowledges when he notes that artists like “Elaine Sturtevant, Louise Lawler, Mike 
Bidlo, or Richard Pettibon” have “recreated the works of other artists, claiming them as 
their own, and they have long been absorbed into a legitimized practice” (Uncreative 
Writing 120-121). Surprisingly, he leaves out the appropriation work of Cindy Sherman 
and Sherrie Levine. Levine, for instance, famously photographed Walker Evans’ iconic 
Depression-era photos and then displayed them as her own, a series that not only 
questions the reification of art but openly challenges the idea of individual authorship as 
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well as larger notions of ownership and copyright. Nonetheless, the line is clear, and it 
explains why Goldsmith’s theoretical manifesto, Uncreative Writing, begins with 
Douglas Huebler’s famous defense of the appropriation-based aesthetics of Conceptual 
art: “‘The world is full of objects, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add any more’” 
(1). It also explains Goldsmith’s unambiguous admiration for the work of Sol LeWitt, 
who “echoed Duchamp’s claim that art need not be exclusively retinal and goes further 
by stating that a work of art should be made with the minimum of decisions, choices, and 
whimsy” (130). In fact, in LeWitt’s “recipe-based art,” Goldsmith finds “a model for 
uncreative writing all the way through, from its inception to execution, right up to its 
distribution and reception” (128).  
Like Duchamp, Lawler, Levine, Huebler, LeWitt, and others, Goldsmith denies 
the primacy of the individual artist, scoffing at concepts of originality, authorship, and 
authenticity. In fact, Goldsmith insists that authenticity is little more than “another form 
of artifice” (“I Look to Theory”). Subjectivity and singularity, according to this logic, 
give way to heterogeneity and multiplicity, and the “fabled Death of the Author,” 
Marjorie Perloff contends, in the work of Goldsmith and other Conceptual writers, 
“finally” becomes a “fait accompli” (Unoriginal Genius 18). In the absence of a 
traditional author, the work of Conceptual writing consists, Goldsmith argues, of 
“intentionally self and ego effacing tactics using uncreativity, unoriginality, illegibility, 
appropriation, plagiarism, fraud, theft, and falsification as its precepts; information 
management, word processing, databasing, and extreme process as its methodologies; 
and boredom, valuelessness, and nutritionlessness as its ethos” (“Conceptual Poetics”). 
For Goldsmith, in other words, there are no lines. Everything—the everyday, the 
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common, the banal, the empty, the commodified, the popular, the profane, the sacred, the 
circulated, the recirculated—is poetry. And writing, according to this model, requires 
little more than selection: plagiarism, appropriation, transcription, excision, reframing, 
recontextualization. Here, in other words, is an aesthetics grounded in the act of mirroring, 
recycling, echo, return. As Craig Dworkin suggests in “The Fate of the Echo,” the 
introduction to an anthology of Conceptual writing he co-edited with Goldsmith, entitled 
Against Expression, “The great break with even the most artificial, ironic, or asemantic 
work of other avant-gardes is the realization that one does not need to generate new 
material to be a poet: the intelligent organization or reframing of already extant text is 
enough” (xliv). 
Like Dworkin, Paul Stephens insists that Conceptual writing operates by 
“restructuring and reframing aggregate data” (154). To be sure, much of Goldsmith’s 
work bears out this premise. In 2003, for example, he published Day, a laboriously 
constructed word-for-word transcription of the September 1, 2000 edition of The New 
York Times. Disregarding the boundaries that divide and define editorial and advertising, 
Goldsmith meticulously typed out each page, from left to right, top to bottom, creating a 
largely unreadable and theoretically superfluous 836-page text: “All this week Mr. Bush 
has criti- Continued on Page A22 PRESIDENT VETOES EFFORT TO REPEAL 
TAXES ON ESTATES REPUBLICANS VOW A FIGHT” (13). In 2005, Goldsmith 
published The Weather, a textual appropriation of the one-minute weather reports of 1010 
WINS, an all-news radio station based in New York. Transcribed over the course of a 
year, 2002-2003, and thematically organized by season, the text divides the weather 
reports into single paragraphs, complete with the informal stutters and hesitations that 
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characterize radio-based speech. Offered in a new context and put on textual display, the 
temporary, mundane, and commercial nature of these reports takes on a symbolic if not 
artistic quality, like a basketball suddenly and strangely suspended in a plexiglass case. A 
report from the spring of 2003, presumably in late March, is telling: “Oh, we are looking 
at, uh, weather, uh, across, uh, Iraq obviously here for the next several days, uh, we have, 
uh, actually some good, good weather is expected. They did have a sandstorm here earlier, 
uh, over the last twelve to twenty-four hours those winds have subsided and will actually 
continue to subside” (39). A mere compiler, a sorter, a selector, or, perhaps, a collector, 
the individual author recedes, as the text communicates with a voice that is oddly familiar 
but eerily unidentifiable. As Judith Goldman argues, “Like a photograph of language in 
language, the readymade text does not circulate among contexts promiscuously and anew, 
but takes its world with it. And yet the textual readymade, over against this would be self-
effacing documentary effect, also draws attention to its work of mediation, its re-siting 
and medium translation of the text it captures” (“Re-thinking ‘Non-retinal Literature’”). 
In his repetitions of the language of the dominant culture, in other words, Goldsmith 
positions himself as a kind of mirror. The language simultaneously belongs to him and 
yet exists outside of him. The space, however, is not divided. This lack of distance, this 
fundamentally interior position, this reflection through repetition and reproduction, lacks 
opposition. In fact, if it is critical or subversive at all, it is because the material itself is 
antithetical to long-standing assumptions about what constitutes poetic form and poetic 
subject matter. The connection to Duchamp, in this sense, is rather obvious; return, or 
echo, theoretically speaking, redefines, reinvigorates, and reinscribes the quotidian, the 
mundane, the commodified, and the transient as art.    
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Goldsmith followed The Weather with two similarly constructed texts, Traffic 
(2007) and Sports (2008), also transcribed from New York radio. Comprised “entirely” of 
“New York material,” Marjorie Perloff insists that the texts “should properly be called 
The New York Trilogy” (Unoriginal Genius 151). True to Goldsmith’s aesthetic claims, 
these texts are not only boring, but they do not need to be read, at least in any traditional 
sense, as he notes in an interview with The Believer:  
My books are better thought about than read. They’re insanely dull and 
unreadable; I mean, do you really want to sit down and read a year’s worth 
of weather reports or a transcription of the 1010 WINS traffic reports 'on 
the ones' (every ten minutes) over the course of a twenty-four-hour period? 
I don’t. But they’re wonderful to talk about and think about, to dip in and 
out of, to hold, to have on your shelf. In fact, I say that I don’t have a 
readership. I have a thinkership. I guess this is why what I do is called 
“conceptual writing.” The idea is much more important than the product. 
(“Kenneth Goldsmith”)  
Despite its appearance, this is not hyperbole. The texts are genuinely flat, featureless, 
stale, and tired. A section from Sports adequately demonstrates the point: “During Ford’s 
model year clearance, the possibilities are endless. Right now at your Tri-State Ford 
dealer, lease a 2006 Explorer Eddie Bauer Edition 4x4 for $279 a month. That’s just $279 
a month for 24 months, red carpet lease on the best selling SUV in America for 14 years 
straight. Security deposit waved” (82). Clearly, concept and context replace content; 
these are merely objects (ideas) on display. However, as Fredric Jameson might argue, 
“parody finds itself without a vocation” (Postmodernism 17). Further, while the texts 
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represent “speech in a dead language” (17), they cannot be labeled as pastiche. Wholly 
impersonal, there is no imitation, no affect, no allusion, no alterity, no author, and, 
importantly, no intervention. There is, to appropriate Jameson, little more than the 
transcription and display of a “neutral and reified media speech” (17), a copy of a copy of 
a copy, an odd and somewhat troubling postmodern simulation bereft of all subversion 
and opposition. The Weather, Sports, and Traffic, in fact, are the very kinds of texts that 
Fredric Jameson insists are “secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they 
themselves might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance from it” 
(Postmodernism 49). In fact, these series of texts might fairly be categorized as an 
aesthetic representation of the intensification and concentration of the postmodern 
condition, a sort of Baudrillardian hyperreality, a hyperpostmodernism, in which even the 
practices of simulation, appropriation, and replication give way to absolute emptiness. As 
Goldsmith notes, “The future of writing is the managing of emptiness” (“I Look to 
Theory”). 
This lack of opposition begs the question of Conceptual writing’s progressive 
function. Historically, the avant-garde, the “emergent,” to return to Raymond Williams’ 
formulation, has positioned itself antithetically, as “substantially alternative or 
oppositional” (Marxism and Literature 123), to the dominant, the hegemonic, in terms of 
both smaller institutions and the larger dominant culture. In the case of texts like The 
Weather, Traffic, or Sports, however, the issue of distance without contamination is 
framed as irrelevant, as an always already and therefore accepted condition. Again, this is 
Jameson’s concern with much of the art and literature created during postmodern times. 
Andy Warhol’s commodity-based works, for example, as Jameson notes, “which 
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explicitly foreground the commodity fetishism of a transition to late capital, ought to be 
powerful and critical political statements. If they are not that, then one would surely want 
to know about the possibilities of political or critical art in the postmodern period of late 
capital” (Postmodernism 9). To put it another way, and to come back to Linda 
Hutcheon’s description of postmodern parody, this is “complicity,” but unlike the work 
of Sherman Alexie, it is complicity without opposition or critique. Largely uncritical, 
Goldsmith’s work is fundamentally different than the work of Duchamp (or perhaps even 
Warhol). In other words, if “context” is “the new content,” as Goldsmith insists, then the 
distinction between the social, historical, and cultural context in which Duchamp 
produced Fountain and in which Goldsmith produced The New York Trilogy is 
undeniably essential.  
In many ways, the current postmodern culture might be characterized as a culture 
of inundation, deluge, excess, surplus, or overabundance. As Goldsmith argues, writing is 
“faced with an unprecedented amount of available text” and “we must learn to negotiate 
the vast quantity that exists” (Uncreative Writing 1). The same, of course, could be said 
of other kinds of information. Now largely digital, the landscape is confusing if not plain 
bewildering; maps and guides are unquestionably needed. This condition of inundation 
creates collapse, disintegration, disorganization, and, importantly, contamination. As 
Jacques Derrida insists in another context, “What happens is always some contamination” 
(“This Strange Institution” 68). And, of course, contamination, as Goldsmith readily 
acknowledges, creates a crisis of authenticity, although he sees the issue as unimportant, 
as “another form of artifice.” However, in an environment of inundation and 
contamination, what constitutes necessary or even reliable information? How, for 
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example, does one distinguish between what is relevant and irrelevant, important and 
unimportant, credible and not credible? The democratization of information has created 
an open environment of incredulity, one that is simultaneously democratic and oppressive. 
The postmodern era acknowledges the illusion of objectivity in favor of multiple and 
often competing narratives, all seemingly contaminated by each other and all 
disseminated within a dominant (hegemonic) consumer-based culture. Goldsmith’s 
aesthetics, in other words, are built on both contamination and complicity, and, therefore, 
his selections and repetitions are patently distinct from Duchamp’s interrogative 
questioning of the institutions of art. They may, in fact, be distinct from Warhol’s 
consumer-based selections and repetitions. As Christopher Schmidt relates, “Like Warhol, 
Goldsmith chooses ephemeral, well-circulated, often banal texts as source material; 
periodicals, radio reports, and his own mundane chatter are some chosen objects of 
détournement” (25). Unlike Warhol, however, Goldsmith’s work is “less transformative” 
in his faithful reproduction of the “detritus of mass culture” (25). Again, the risk of an 
aesthetic model founded on simple reproduction is the possibility of complicity without 
critique, mere capitulation to the consumer-driven logic of late-capitalist culture. 
Moreover, if Goldsmith’s aesthetics involve the wholesale movement of information 
from one context to another, then it would reasonably follow that he would provide 
reproductions of poetry, plays, novels, songs, short stories, films, television shows, 
polemics, etc. Strangely, however, this has not been the case, as Goldsmith has chosen to 
work almost exclusively within the domain of popular culture.  
Nonetheless, The New York Trilogy places America’s postmodern culture of 
banality, complicity, inundation, contamination, commodification, and consumer 
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fetishism on full display, and it functions, at least in part, as an homage to the conceptual 
work conducted by Andy Warhol, who Goldsmith claims is “perhaps the single most 
important figure for uncreative writing” (Uncreative Writing 139). The text of Traffic, in 
fact, is preceded by a well-known quote from an interview with Warhol, in which he 
offers a description of the origins of his Death and Disaster series: “I realized that 
everything I was doing must have been Death. It was Christmas or Labor Day, a holiday, 
and every time you turned on the radio they said something like, ‘Four million are going 
to die.’ That started it. But when you see a gruesome picture over and over again, it 
doesn't really have any effect” (Traffic 2). Critical of the use of morbidity in commercial 
culture, particularly as a means of generating profit, Warhol, beginning in the early 1960s, 
famously appropriated photos from tabloid newspapers and police archives. Mirroring 
consumer processes of production and repetition, Warhol, in mechanical fashion, 
reproduced and recontextualized images of car crashes, race riots, suicides, electric chairs, 
and tainted tuna cans. These images, as Arthur Danto relates, are “like illustrations to 
Marcel Duchamp’s mock epitaph—D’ailleurs, c’est toujours les autres qui meurent—
‘Anyway, it’s always the others who die’” (44). Traffic, to be sure, has an obvious 
relation to this series, especially in its reproduction of car crashes. At the same time, 
Goldsmith’s reproductions lack the repulsion and horror of Warhol’s silk-screen images: 
“This is all because of an, uh, accident on the other side, on the Gowanus, right at Fort 
Hamilton Parkway, so that traffic is really crowded indeed” (Traffic 17). 
A sort of extension of The New York Trilogy and a more obvious tribute to 
Warhol’s series, Goldsmith, in 2013, published Seven American Deaths and Disasters, a 
text that transcribes and appropriates radio and television broadcasts of national tragedies, 
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beginning with the assassination of JFK and ending with the death of Michael Jackson. In 
between, Goldsmith appropriates coverage of the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, the 
murder of John Lennon, the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, the mass shooting at 
Columbine, and the fall of the World Trade Center towers. Unlike The New York Trilogy, 
this text contains profound traces of authorial direction; it is more selective, more 
assembled, more grafted, and more clearly driven by a desire to unmask and challenge 
the compulsions of commercial media. The section entitled “World Trade Center,” for 
example, as Goldsmith notes in the afterword, is “culled from a variety of sources, which 
comprise its seven parts. Beginning with an initial CNN television report, the bulk of it is 
taken from New York City radio stations including WABC, WOR, WFAN, and WNYC” 
(175). Far from empty or flat, nutritionless or boring, there is an identifiable politics here, 
as well as an aesthetic that is not far from the postmodern practice of pastiche. The writer, 
in this sense, to use Best and Kellner, is “no longer the originary and unique self who 
produces the new in an authentic vision, but, rather, a bricoleur who just rearranges the 
debris of the cultural past” (133). More intimate and perhaps even less conceptual in its 
purest sense, the text, in many instances, invites and encourages close reading. 
The first lines of “World Trade Center” are instructive: “This just in. You are 
looking at obviously a very disturbing live shot here. That is the World Trade Center, and 
we have unconfirmed reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers 
of the World Trade Center” (127). For those who recall the coverage, this is a disturbing 
reminder, an emotional trigger that returns feelings of sadness, confusion, and dismay. 
Real feeling is evident, though it is, in an obvious sense, concealed in the pre-made, 
limited, and repetitive speech of American corporate media. Like Warhol’s Death and 
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Disaster series, Goldsmith’s text exposes control, compulsion, repetition, and, implicitly, 
the profit-driven demands of the 24-hour news cycle: “And as we can see in these 
pictures, obviously something devastating that has happened. And again, there are 
unconfirmed reports that a plane has crashed into one of the towers there. We are 
efforting more information on the subject as it becomes available to you” (127). Though 
unnerved and unsettled, the speaker’s language habitually returns to the linguistic, or, as 
Daniel Morris frames it, “discursive,” conventions of the trade, a common trait among 
most of the transcriptions in the collection. In the section devoted to JFK, the broadcast 
veers back and forth between music, commercials, and news bulletins as hosts struggle to 
negotiate the demands of the situation with the demands of the industry: “KLIF news. On 
at Parkland Hospital to confirm the reports that someone had been wounded in the firing 
of shots in the Kennedy motorcade at downtown Dallas. Stay tuned for more news” (13). 
Then, oddly, the broadcast returns to playing “Everybody” by Tommy Roe, a moment of 
strange but unacknowledged synchronicity: “One time or other everybody listen to me, / 
you lose somebody you love / But that’s no reason for you to break down and cry . . .” 
(13). In the chapter devoted to John Lennon, a portion of the transcription reads, “John 
Lennon was shot tonight and, uh, he is dead. And I think if you’re looking for a radio 
station tonight that’s not playing Beatles music, you will have a long hunt. Stereo 101 
doing a complete hour of Beatles songs, some written by Lennon, some written by 
Lennon and McCartney, but John Lennon was a part of them all” (75). The line between 
advertisement, news, and tribute is never clear; dissolution and contamination are 
hallmark.     
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In some instances, though, especially in Goldsmith’s transcriptions of the radio 
coverage of the fall of the World Trade Center towers, the veneer begins to come off, as 
broadcasters struggle to offer any description at all: “There’s almost no textbook for any 
of us here on the radio to figure out just what to say. There are no words at all to express 
this” (141). Interestingly, even lack of expression does not escape the language of cliché. 
However, more than the mere struggle for expression, other moments from this portion of 
the text reveal deep political bias. In the absence of factual information, for example, an 
unidentified radio host demands retribution, couched in the now familiar language of 
preemptive war: “So, Lawrence Eagleburger said that George Bush needs to respond 
quickly and go after terrorism wherever terrorism exists, indicating that even if we don’t 
know for sure that they were the people directly responsible, we must go after those who 
support Osama bin Laden and who have done so in the past” (150). What’s worse, these 
reactive demands are informed and directed by fundamentally racist claims and 
assumptions: “Ron, as you know, in radical Muslim literature, they refer to New York 
City as sort of the Jewish capital of the world, even larger in scope than Tel Aviv” (149). 
In fact, the final lines of this section, which are also the final lines of the text as a whole, 
function in the same manner, namely to expose the insidious nature of xenophobic and 
racist assumptions: “And just below me is a park right near the edge of Chinatown. And 
while’s there’s some curiosity among these people, they continue to play their card games. 
They continue to chat as if nothing is going on. Their markets are open. They’re shopping, 
they’re…they’re…they’re buying their fish” (154). Then, as if there is an 
acknowledgement that the broadcast is live, the speaker continues, slowly and only 
slightly backing away from his previous claims: “Uh, it’s…it’s as if this little corner of 
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New York City was totally unaffected, but you know it’s at the top of their minds. 
They’re talking about it. They’re pointing up in the air periodically and they’re 
continuing with their card games. So it’s, uh, just a little snapshot of, uh, a piece of New 
York as they deal with this immense tragedy” (154). The excision done, the coda 
complete, and the politics made plain, Goldsmith’s Seven American Deaths and Disasters 
offers an echo, a return, a pastiche-like reflection on the role of the mass media and 
consumer culture in the social construction of reality, including the conception of race. 
The text also anticipates and prefigures Goldsmith’s most controversial piece.  
In March of 2015, at Brown University, Goldsmith read what was then a new 
piece, entitled “The Body of Michael Brown.” Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old 
African American man, was shot and killed by a white police officer, Darren Wilson, in 
Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis, on August 9, 2014. Brown’s death and the 
questionable use of deadly force sparked a prolonged period of protests as well as other 
forms of civil disobedience, many of which were violently suppressed by local law 
enforcement. The event became the focus of a national conversation about race and its 
function in various institutions, including law enforcement. Standing under a projected 
image of Brown, Goldsmith read, word for word, in an approximately 30-minute 
performance, a reordered and slightly altered version of Brown’s autopsy report. The last 
line of Goldsmith’s performance read, “The remaining male genitalia system is 
unremarkable.” This was not, however, the last line of the official autopsy report. 
News of Goldsmith’s performance spread quickly through various forms of social 
media, prompting almost instantaneous disapproval. On Twitter, for example, Cathy Park 
Hong wrote, “Kenneth Goldsmith has reached new racist lows yet elite institutions 
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continue to pay him guest speaker fees.” Saeed Jones, also on Twitter, insisted, “It's 
WILD how many poets get a pass on the blatant racism / misogyny in their work because 
of poetry's relative obscurity.” Many similar comments followed. On March 16, three 
days after Goldsmith’s performance, in a blog entry entitled “The Body of Kenneth 
Goldsmith,” PE Garcia argued that “for Kenneth Goldsmith to stand on stage, and not be 
aware that his body—his white male body, a body that is a symbol loaded with a history 
of oppression, of literal dominance and ownership of black bodies—is a part of the 
performance, then he has failed to notice something drastically important about the 
‘contextualization’ of this work.” On this same day, Goldsmith wrote the following on 
Facebook: “I am requesting that Brown University not make public the recording of my 
performance of ‘The Body of Michael Brown.’ There’s been too much pain for many 
people around this and I do not wish to cause any more. My speaker's fee from the 
Interrupt 3 event will be donated to the family of Michael Brown.”  
Goldsmith’s request to have the performance removed and his decision to donate 
his proceeds from the event to the family of Michael Brown is fraught with contradictions. 
For example, in the initial hours and days after the performance, Goldsmith, as if to 
express dismay and disagreement, republished some of the comments of those who had 
found it offensive, on both Facebook and Twitter. More significantly, and as a direct 
response to the expressions of pain and indignation that the performance generated, 
Goldsmith posted a public defense of the work on Facebook, claiming that the text and 




I took a publicly available document from an American tragedy that was 
witnessed first-hand (in this case by the doctor performing the autopsy) 
and simply read it. Like Seven American Deaths and Disasters, I did not 
editorialize; I simply read it without commentary or additional 
editorializing. The document I read from is powerful. My reading of it was 
powerful. How could it be otherwise? Such is my long-standing practice 
of conceptual writing: like Seven American Deaths and Disasters, the 
document speaks for itself in ways that an interpretation cannot. It is a 
horrific American document, but then again it was a horrific American 
death. 
Goldsmith also acknowledged that he had “altered the text for poetic effect,” translating 
“into plain English many obscure medical terms that would have stopped the flow of the 
text.” In a revealing gesture, Goldsmith has since deleted his defense of the performance. 
Nonetheless, it is still easily located at various places on the web. Needless to say, this 
gesture, along with his decision to remove the performance from public view, raises a 
number of serious questions and concerns.  
Leaving aside, initially, the fact of the performance itself, there is the real 
question of whether “The Body of Michael Brown” is, in fact, a work, as Goldsmith 
claims, in the tradition of Seven American Deaths and Disasters. On the surface, this 
might appear to be the case. Categorically speaking, all of the sections of the text explore 
and consider death, or, more specifically, to use Goldsmith’s terms, “horrific American 
death.” And, of course, there is no argument that Brown’s death was horrific. At the same 
time, the text of “The Body of Michael Brown,” an autopsy report, is significantly 
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different from the other appropriated material in Seven American Deaths and Disasters. 
Why, for example, did Goldsmith not appropriate media coverage of the event, which 
would have been easily locatable and more clearly in line with the existing material? For 
him, however, as noted earlier, he “took a publicly available document from an American 
tragedy that was witnessed first-hand (in this case by the doctor performing the autopsy) 
and simply read it.” At bottom, both of the claims made in this statement are false. 
Prior to the Michael Brown performance, when asked about his exclusion of other 
American tragedies from Seven American Deaths and Disasters, particularly those 
involving African Americans, including the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Malcolm X, Goldsmith offered a claim that stands in direct opposition to his assertions 
about the Brown piece: “I wish there were air checks available from Martin Luther King 
and Malcolm X, but in those cases, the media doesn’t show up until well after the 
assassination and the reporting is pretty slick stuff, lacking the struggle to find words to 
express the horrors that they were witnessing” (“You Take Your Love”). Here, there are 
two very obvious logical inconsistencies. First, he claims to have excluded these events 
because the coverage takes place “after.” Needless to say, the autopsy of Michael Brown 
is not a text that deals in the present moment of the event, as it was unfolding; it was 
conducted postmortem. In fact, the pathologist’s examination took place on the day after 
Brown was shot and killed by Wilson. 
Goldsmith also claims that his exclusion was based on the fact that the coverage 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X lacked “the struggle to find words to express 
the horrors that they were witnessing.” The words “struggle,” “express,” “horrors,” and 
“witnessing” suggest uncertainty and distress. In an essay entitled “‘The wound track 
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shows deeper hemorrhage’: Kenneth Goldsmith’s ‘The Body of Michael Brown’ as The 
Eighth American Disaster,” Daniel Morris offers a close reading of the autopsy in order 
to outline the “meanings that the reporter cannot staunch.” Morris, in other words, argues 
that the surface text of the autopsy reveals a “gruesome reality the official story cannot 
hold at bay, regardless of how strenuously the storyteller works the language, narrative 
point of view, and sentence construction to deflect responsibility for Brown’s death from 
Officer Wilson and from the racist national imaginary made manifest by Wilson’s actions 
against Brown’s body.” While there is little question that the autopsy, as with any text, is 
open to gaps, lags, traces, differences, and deferrals, or, as Morris frames it, “paradoxes, 
inconsistencies,” the purpose of an official autopsy report is to formulate and fix, within 
an existing and restricted nomenclature. Its language, in other words, is not one of 
uncertainty and distress, a “struggle to find words to express the horrors.” Rather, it is an 
expression of horror itself, as Goldsmith acknowledges: “It is a horrific American 
document, but then again it was a horrific American death.” 
At issue here, as well, is whether the text invites close reading, as do many of the 
texts in Seven American Deaths and Disasters. On the one hand, Morris is correct, almost 
definably so. Medical documents require close reading. On the other hand, there is the 
reality that Goldsmith’s version of the text, which, again, he “altered for poetic effect,” is 
unavailable. A close reading and interpretation of the original autopsy report, therefore, is 
not a close reading and interpretation of Goldsmith’s treatment of it as a conceptual text. 
Further, Goldsmith’s use of the report is inconsistent with his previous conceptual work 
and his claims about Conceptual writing generally. Instead of translating “into plain 
English many obscure medical terms that would have stopped the flow of the text,” the 
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text should have been presented in unaltered form. Goldsmith did not, in other words, 
“simply read it.” His alterations and translations, by definition, were interpretive, 
designed to create a “poetic effect,” which calls attention not only to the problem of close 
reading but to a general inconsistency between the text and Goldsmith’s stated aesthetic 
claims. In other terms, Goldsmith insists that his work is conceptual, that he requires a 
“thinkership” and not a “viewership,” that the “idea is much more important than the 
product.” If these are serious claims, then the “The Body of Michael Brown” must be 
treated as a conceptual work, as an idea rather than simply a text. What, then, of the idea 
itself? What, for example, does it mean for a white male poet to appropriate and perform 
the autopsy report of a slain African American male? What does it suggest that the report 
was altered? For example, what conclusions might be drawn from the fact that Goldsmith 
ended his version of the text with a line about Michael Brown’s genitalia? And what to 
make of Goldsmith’s declared rationale for removing the performance from public view, 
namely that it caused “too much pain for many people,” a statement that does not provide 
direct or perhaps even implied repudiation of his alteration, appropriation, and 
performance of the text? Many more questions could be posed. In short, however, the 
conceptual gesture, the performance, and Goldsmith’s comments and behavior after the 
fact reveal that Goldsmith fails to understand, or, in the very least, to acknowledge, his 
own level of cultural and institutional privilege. 
There is little question that Goldsmith benefits from numerous kinds of cultural 
and institutional support. For example, one of American poetry’s most prominent critics, 
Marjorie Perloff, has published multiple essays on his work as well as a book-length 
defense of Conceptual writing, Unoriginal Genius. What’s more, Goldsmith was singled 
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out for a profile in The New Yorker, appointed as the first Poet Laureate of the Museum 
of Modern Art, provided with a chance to perform at the White House, where he read 
excerpts from Walt Whitman, Hart Crane, and his own text, Traffic, and invited to appear 
on an episode of Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report, where he wore a pink suit and 
mismatched socks and remarked, sneeringly, “I never write any of my books.” This says 
nothing, of course, of the seemingly endless stream of invitations to speak and perform at 
various colleges and universities, the sustained requests for interviews and article 
submissions, the spate of reviews about his work, and Goldsmith’s overall warm 
relationship with numerous publishers.  
Goldsmith most often appears befuddled by his own success, expressing surprise 
that elite institutions, from the White House to Columbia to The Chronicle of Higher 
Education and The New Yorker, support, publish, and praise his work. In an essay entitled 
“My Career in Poetry or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Institution,” 
Goldsmith remarks, “[W]hat I find remarkable is these institutions’ embrace and 
acceptance of what they’re most often accused of dismissing and ignoring.” Here, he 
seems to have an almost absent understanding of his own privilege, which is further 
evident when he notes that he is “given free reign to teach in unconventional ways” and 
that the “university supports this agenda, so you see that perhaps the academy is not what 
it used to be.” Significantly, in this same piece, Goldsmith spends four paragraphs 
describing and defending the Brooks Brothers suit he wore to his White House 
performance, uncritically establishing a link between poetry, fashion, and commercial 
culture as well as blurring the line between poet and celebrity: “It was clear that Brooks 
Brothers needed to revitalize their brand, shake up the staid traditions, hence they called 
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in Browne to bring Brooks Brothers into the 21st century, replete with self-conscious 
winks and nods, engaged with remix culture, and to add a big dose of impurity.” 
Goldsmith’s focus on the style of his dress and his reference to haute couture is not only a 
reminder of his financial privilege but of the undeniable visual quality of his 
performances, which also seems to be at odds with an aesthetic that places concept over 
context. So, in March of 2015, at Brown University, when he read “The Body of Michael 
Brown” dressed in black boots, black leggings, a black skirt, a black shirt, and a black 
suit jacket, potentially from Brooks Brothers, while standing in front of a projected image 
of Michael Brown, who grew up in a suburb of St. Louis and lived with constant 
reminders of racial and social inequality, Goldsmith offered viewers a visual contrast and 
a stark reminder of the racial politics embedded in the aesthetics of unequivocal 
appropriation. 
In “Pretending to Disrupt, Merely Distracting: Plundering Privilege in the World 
of Poetry,” Amy King argues, “Goldsmith is privileged and will have nothing to do with 
generating a ‘voice’ of his own and acknowledging his own identity and all that gives 
him access to—such shirking is a privilege white people may enjoy.” She continues by 
drawing a direct line between institutional support and aesthetic freedom:   
Kenneth Goldsmith and Vanessa Place have pronounced their work as 
anti-lyrical. They both also appropriate voices and experiences that are not 
their own, excerpting and re-presenting those voices as their own work. 
Perloff has taken up and validated these “writing acts” as the latest in the 
line of the avant-garde, the line of poetics that presumably challenges the 
status quo order as it is perpetuated. However, what Goldsmith and Place 
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are doing is actually nothing new; white America has a longstanding 
tradition of appropriating and sanitizing experiences and voices not our 
own—removing the sting and challenge of those voices—and re-
presenting them as something we either own or control.  
Imagine, for example, if an African American poet, or, perhaps, a member of Brown’s 
family, had read Brown’s autopsy report as “The Body of Michael Brown.” Imagine if 
Goldsmith had read, in pastiche-like fashion, the autopsy report interspersed with 
quotations from the media coverage, quotations from studies that detail racial 
discrimination in the treatment of African Americans by law enforcement, and/or 
quotations from prominent critics and scholars on the politics of racial and cultural 
privilege. Contextually, visually, and politically, these would have been radically 
different gestures, ones consistent with the racial politics surrounding Brown’s death. 
Instead, devoid of a rhetorical gesture that suggests opposition, Goldsmith appropriated 
and exploited the experience and death of Michael Brown for his own aesthetic ends and 
professional gain. As Sueyeun Juliette Lee relates, “‘Whiteness’ doesn’t have to care—it 
doesn’t have to have a body or a history, etc. Writers of difference ought to care whereas 
‘conceptual’ writers don’t have to. They get to remain unaffected. Whiteness allows them 
to be read as dwelling in abstraction and play which writers of difference aren’t typically 
afforded unless they clamor for it.” Goldsmith, in other words, Lee continues, “felt 
licensed to write about ‘American’ events, and licensed to claim a Warholian gesture and 
be acknowledged for it” while “writers of difference” are not allowed to “operate at this 
level of abstraction. We still predominantly read them from an embodied standpoint.” 
Along similar lines, in “Delusions of Whiteness in the Avant-Garde,” Cathy Park Hong 
197 
 
contends, “Avant-garde poetry’s attitudes towards race have been no different than that 
of mainstream institutions.” Further, she insists, “For too long, white poets have claimed 
ownership and territorialized ‘the new’ as their own and for too long experimental 
minority poets have been cast aside as being derivative of their white contemporaries.”  
Is Goldsmith truly unaware that the vast majority of writers who have comprised 
various avant-garde movements in the history of American poetry have been male and 
white? Does Goldsmith not recognize that the primary recipients of support from various 
institutions, including the university, are largely male and white? Does Goldsmith 
genuinely not understand that the institutions that grant him “free reign” and support for 
his “agenda” are the very same institutions that have historically denied access to others 
and continue to do so in various ways? Is he unaware that a recent survey by the Pew 
Research Center on race and inequality validates the fact that an “overwhelming majority 
of blacks (88%) say the country needs to continue making changes for blacks to have 
equal rights with whites, but 43% are skeptical that such changes will ever occur” (4), 
and that “black and white adults have widely different perceptions about what life is like 
for blacks in the U.S.” (5). The study also demonstrates numerous forms of racial 
discrimination experienced by African Americans and highlights the gross inequalities 
between blacks and whites in terms of median income, employment opportunities, and, 
importantly, college completion. To be sure, instead of functioning as a haven, the 
academy, the university, and the artistic avant-garde has, in many ways, symptomatically 
replicated the exclusionary politics of the dominant culture. This, of course, is the context 
in which Goldsmith chose to appropriate and perform the medical autopsy of an African 
American male as a poem by Kenneth Goldsmith entitled “The Body of Michael Brown.”  
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In the closing moments of a conference in Denmark, in December of 2015, the 
poet Jen Hofer transcribed, “verbatim,” Marjorie Perloff’s response to a question about 
her “uncritical reading of critiques of Kenneth Goldsmith,” particularly his performance 
of Brown’s autopsy (“If You Hear Something”). Perloff started by saying, “You can’t say 
this today but they’ll say it a year from now, that Michael Brown was very romanticized, 
because there also is the video available of him in the convenience store, which is 
frightening.” She continued, 
I think the romanticization, where everybody kept calling him the poor 
child Michael Brown, and they constantly showed photographs of him in 
the media when he had been about 12 years old. That’s what they do. 
Many of the pictures you saw, he looks like a little kid. He was a 300-
pound huge man. Scary. He was scary, I’m just saying, that way. So that 
things then turn out to be much more complicated. And so I don’t know 
what’s happened to poetry, or to poetic discourse, I shouldn’t say to poetry, 
but to poetic discourse, when we have all over Facebook these sentimental 
things about the poor sweet child and his poor family. Michael Brown 
himself had said, “I wish I had a family.” He didn’t even—he hadn’t seen 
his father in years, his mother was on crack, he didn’t have much of a 
family or much of a life.  
It would be unfair, of course, to conflate Perloff’s disgustingly racist defense of Brown’s 
death and by extension Goldsmith’s performance with Goldsmith. However, Perloff’s 
staunch defense and loyal support for Goldsmith’s previous work begs the question. In 
the least, Perloff’s comments expose the function of institutional support, which, in its 
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need for maintenance and control, often creates nearly impervious barriers. It is not 
surprising, in other words, to learn that Perloff harbors racist views, given her 
promulgation of various avant-garde movements that have consisted of a largely white 
and predominantly male constituency, all while derisively castigating numerous poets of 
color, including Rita Dove, Adrian Louis, and Ana Castillo. “Here,” Perloff writes, 
describing the poetry of Louis and Castillo, “is poetry approaching the condition, not of 
music, as Walter Pater famously held, but of journalism—a form of writing as harmless 
as it is ephemeral” (21st-Century Modernism 164). 
One of the undeniable lessons of the postmodern era, particularly as a 
consequence of the rise of new social movements, is that institutions support and 
maintain various forms of power and privilege. In 1989, in The Politics of 
Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon insisted that postmodern art “cannot but be political, at 
least in the sense that its representations—its images and stories—are anything but 
neutral . . .” (3). In the postmodern period, in other terms, there has been an undeniable 
focus on the politics of exclusion, marginalization, subjugation, colonization, domination, 
exploitation, and oppression, especially along the lines of class, race, and gender. The 
fact that Goldsmith seems to miss some of these lessons is, perhaps, a symptomatic 
representation of the problem itself, namely that institutions do not encourage individuals 
in positions of power to develop an awareness of their own privilege. This does not, of 
course, exempt Goldsmith from any kind of responsibility or stage him as a victim. In 
fact, it suggests a willing denial of social reality, a luxury not afforded by Michael Brown 
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